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ABSTRACT 
U.S. Navy efforts in implementing Department of Defense policy guidance for the 
effective integration of space capabilities and effects consist of a variety of multi-pronged 
and disjointed efforts.  Lack of clear direction in analysis and identification of current and 
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undertakings not related to core functions.  This thesis establishes arguments to propose 
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I. HISTORY  
Present day issues regarding national policy, doctrine and utilization of U.S. space 
assets have their roots in a complex history of inter-service competition and a half-
century of rapidly changing global political environments.  This chapter is intended to 
provide a historical perspective for subsequent commentary on resource utilization in the 
national space arena.  U.S. Navy efforts in space date to the very earliest experimentation 
in the field, and the people and personalities involved are among the most influential in 
the world.  Proud tradition, however, like royalty and empire, has a tendency to become 
exclusive, diseased and weakened.  Apropos of the gradual collapse of the Roman 
Empire, the house of Navy Space has slid into disrepair from its heights in the 1940s and 
1980s.  Ahead remain decisions on the Navy’s involvement in space, but in the past lies 
the following history: 
A. THE BEGINNINGS OF PRACTICAL ROCKETRY 
Space systems development in the U.S. prior to the end of World War II was 
largely conducted by the Army and Navy on an ad-hoc basis, with the personality and 
genius of specific luminaries providing the foundation and direction for the service 
programs.  Practical work that led to the U.S.’s ability to operate in the space 
environment began in 1926, with the efforts of Dr. Robert Goddard.  Goddard proved, 
during work between 1912 and 1926 on liquid-fueled rockets, that they would produce 
usable thrust in the vacuum of space.  Until his experiments, scientists were in wide 
disagreement as to whether propulsion in space was possible without a medium to push 
against.  Goddard’s testing and design of liquid-fueled rockets captured the attention of a 
group of German scientists when in 1920 he published a paper for the Smithsonian 
Institution entitled “A Method of Reaching Extreme Altitudes.”  These German scientists, 
in 1927, founded the German Rocket Society (Vercin für Raumschiffart – Society for 
Space Travel), which was subsumed into the German Army’s rocket program in 1931.1 
                                                 
1 Lynn Jenner.  Dr. Robert H. Goddard:  American Rocket Pioneer.  December 2004.  
http://www.nasa.gov/centers/goddard/about/dr_goddard.html.  May 2007. 
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Despite the warm reception that Goddard’s 1920 paper received in Europe, and 
specifically Germany, the popular press in the U.S. lampooned his efforts and ridiculed 
and misquoted his comments hypothesizing the possibility of launching a rocket to the 
moon.  The negative press had the effect of damaging Goddard’s credibility with the 
mainstream American scientific and military establishment, and despite repeated offers of 
service to the government, he was turned down multiple times in the years before World 
War II. 
Following the less-than-supportive reception of “A Method of Reaching Extreme 
Altitudes”, Dr. Goddard found financing and support from Daniel Guggenheim, a former 
naval aviator.  With Guggenheim’s patronage, Goddard constructed an experimental 
rocket pad in New Mexico, near Roswell.  During the years after he moved to New 
Mexico, a thriving community of rocketry enthusiasts in the United States - the American 
Rocket Society - formed, drawing the attention of Navy officials.  In 1942, Lieutenant 
Fink Fischer, a Naval Aviator interested in rocket-assist for takeoffs, approached 
Goddard with an offer of employment for the U.S. Navy.  Goddard began work in that 
year at the Experiment Station facility in Annapolis, across the Severn River from the 
Naval Academy with then-Lieutenant Robert Truax. 
Robert Truax was an American Rocket Society member who graduated from the 
U.S. Naval Academy in 1939.  In 1937, he built a small prototype liquid-fueled rocket 
engine in Naval Academy machine shops, and test-fired it at the Naval Experiment 
Station across the Severn River from the Naval Academy.2  This work, while small in 
scope (Truax’s rocket only produced 25 lbs of thrust) drew the attention of the Bureau of 
Aeronautics, who solicited his expertise in helping to “power up” the PBY-2 Catalina, 
which was underpowered at takeoff.  His application of rockets to this problem came to 
be known as JATO. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Ted Wilbur. Navy Space.  Naval Aviation News. November 1970. pp. 20-21. 
http://www.history.navy.mil. June 2007. 
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B. WORLD WAR II DEVELOPMENTS 
Truax and Goddard, in the course of their experiments at the Annapolis 
Experiment Station, developed the groundwork for the U.S. Navy’s guided missile 
program.  Work on military rocket boosters in the early 1940s devolved into applications 
of solid rocket boosters because of the relative ease of construction, maintenance and 
durability.  Army Air Corps and Bureau of Ordnance efforts were along these lines.  
Realizing the potential of long-range missiles and the threat they represented to the 
Allies, Truax and Goddard shifted their efforts to the design and development of air-to-air 
and surface-to-air interceptor weapons.  Though they met with limited success before 
Goddard’s death in August of 1945 and the end of the war, the technical developments in 
liquid-fueled rockets resulted in the Navy’s BuAir publishing a study by Commander 
Harvey Hall and Lieutenant Robert DeHaviland entitled “Feasibility of Space Rocketry.”3  
Truax identifies this study as the first U.S. space program – the document proposed the 
construction, launch and operation of an earth-orbiting satellite for scientific purposes. 
In contrast to the piecemeal, fragmented and under-funded U.S. rocket efforts, the 
German work during the late 1930s and early ‘40s was well funded, organized and 
centrally controlled by Dr. Werner Von Braun and German Army Captain Walter 
Dornberger.  The focus of Von Braun’s efforts was based on the outstanding work 
conducted by Dr. Goddard, and these evolutionary designs resulted in the remarkably 
capable V-2 rocket.  Though not used in a strategically significant manner by Germany, 
captured V-2s became test-bed platforms for scientific and military experiments in the 
U.S. following the end of the war.  In this way, evolutionary engineering from Goddard’s 
initial work in 1912 -1926 timeframe found its way back to provide the groundwork for 
ballistic missile research, and ultimately the U.S. space program. 
C. POST-WAR CUTBACKS AND COMPETITION 
Competition between the Army Air Corps (U.S. Air Force as of 1947) and the 
Navy space programs dates as far back as the effort to recruit Goddard – in 1942, when 
                                                 
3 Ted Wilbur. Navy Space.  Naval Aviation News. November 1970. pp. 20-21. 
http://www.history.navy.mil. June 2007. 
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Lieutenant Fischer approached Goddard with an employment offer, he was 
simultaneously being courted by the Army Air Corps to join their rocket/aviation 
development program.4  Though generally genteel, the competition among the military 
services, and later NASA, had multiple effects.  Specialization and focus on specific 
systems was one.  Where Army and Air Force space systems design were initially 
focused on dominance of the strategic space environment, Navy efforts ultimately 
evolved towards development and utilization of space-based systems to support terrestrial 
operations.  Early Army Ballistic Missile Agency work under Werner Von Braun 
(following the end of WWII, Von Braun worked for the U.S. Army) had the lofty goal of 
developing manned space stations, but eventually devolved to a counter-battery / anti-
ballistic missile mission.  The Air Force, even in these early years was focused primarily 
on providing force-enabling technologies to bolster their control of the “vertical 
dimension” and strategic bombing missions.   
Struggles for programmatic control and resources were another result of the inter-
service and inter-agency competition.   In 1946, when the Navy introduced a proposal to 
perform joint development of a system that could orbit a satellite, called the High Altitude 
Test Vehicle,5 the Army Air Force and RAND Corporation stalled negotiations while 
rapidly composing a ‘newer’ proposal on the same topic to gain control of the proposal 
with a ‘more current’ study.  To its credit, this particular RAND document, “Preliminary 
Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship” proved to be a seminal document, 
offering predictions regarding the importance of scientific instruments on orbital 
spacecraft and the public impact of national efforts to put men in space.  Additionally, the 
RAND report provided ammunition to the Air Staff of the Army that “…Army Air 
Forces should have primary responsibility for any military satellite vehicle, considering 
such activity to be essentially an extension of strategic air power.”  This statement set the 
stage for the next sixty years worth of competition between the Navy and the Air Force in 
the arena of strategic force application and the roles and responsibilities of the services. 
                                                 
4 Ted Wilbur. Navy Space.  Naval Aviation News. November 1970. p. 32. 
http://www.history.navy.mil. June 2007. 
5 Ibid., p. 34. 
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The late 1940s and early 1950s were characterized by sharply reduced defense 
budgets, the creation of the Air Force and Department of Defense under the National 
Defense Act of 1947 and an attempt to reduce commitments on the part of all of the 
military services.  1948, in particular, was a difficult year for Navy space efforts –  
After serious exploration of concepts for putting a satellite in orbit, the 
Navy’s committee for evaluating space rocketry folded in early 1948…, 
…the Navy proposed to undertake a joint project with the Air force to 
develop earth-orbiting satellites, a proposal that was rejected by the Air 
Force.  Proposals for space-related activity continued to be developed by 
the Navy, Army and Air Force, but all such proposals were opposed by 
Dr. Vannevar Bush, head of the powerful joint Research and Development 
Board.6 …In 1948, the Secretary of Defense reported, with respect to 
space:  The Committee on guided Missiles recommended that efforts in 
the field (of earth satellite vehicles) be limited to studies. 7 
Inter-service rivalries, particularly between the Air Force and the Navy developed 
during this time as the Air Force sought to define its mission and establish hegemony 
within its perceived sphere of influence, while protecting its programs from the effects of 
drastically reduced budgets.  In 1947 alone, the service-wide missile budget was reduced 
from $29 million to $13 million, killing 20 of 28 missile programs.8  While the Army and 
Navy regrouped and consolidated their efforts in traditional mission areas, the Air Force 
suffered the elimination of their only ballistic missile program and was in the process of 
standing up Strategic Air Command and developing a concept of operations for long-
range nuclear strike and defense/deterrence against the Soviet Union.9  Finally, as part of 
the Air Force’s efforts to define itself and identify its missions, in 1948 General 
                                                 
6 Eddie Mitchell. Apogee, Perigee, and Recovery:  Chronology of Army Exploitation of Space. A Rand 
Note. 1991.  p. 13.  
“In December 1945, Dr. Bush testified that it would be impossible for many years to develop a 3000-
mile high-angle rocket.  Dr. Bush, through the 1940s, maintained that the military was unable to provide an 
acceptable argument which would convince him that missiles or satellites could cost-effectively accomplish 
any warfighting requirement better than available aircraft or other ground systems.”  
7 Gary Federici.  From the Sea to the Stars.  Naval Historical Center. July 2003. Section 1.2. 
http://www.history.navy.mil/books/space/index.htm. May 2007. Emphasis appears in original publication. 
8 Eddie Mitchell. Apogee, Perigee, and Recovery:  Chronology of Army Exploitation of Space. A Rand 
Note. 1991.  p. 14. 
9 Air Force Historical Studies Office. Emergence of the Strategic Air Command. 
https://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/PopTopics/SAC.htm. June 2007. 
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Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, issued a policy statement that established 
satellite and space systems as an extension of strategic air power and extending that logic 
to place U.S. space operations under the umbrella of the Air Force.10 
D. THE SOVIET THREAT AND MILITARY PROGRAM RESURGENCE 
A return to active space systems development in the 1950s was the result of Dr. 
Von Braun’s “…aggressive lobbying of the U.S. government to develop a satellite launch 
vehicle using components available from the Army Ordnance Corps.”11  This project, 
initially called Orbiter, evolved into the Explorer 1 system - the first U.S. satellite on 
orbit.  Orbiter was intended by the Army to be a tri-service project from the beginning, 
but the Air Force “declined to participate.”12  The national competition to be first to orbit 
a satellite came to a head in 1955 when President Eisenhower announced that the U.S. 
would “launch small, unmanned, earth orbiting satellites.”13  This proclamation came as 
an acknowledgement of the U.S. efforts towards the planned celebration of the 
International Geophysical Year (1957-1958).  Additionally, Eisenhower intended the 
IGY project to be separate from the existing space systems under development by the 
armed forces.  Unfortunately, no depth of experience or engineering expertise in space 
systems existed outside the Department of Defense, so a compromise was reached that 
provided for personnel from the Army and Navy to design and field a new rocket and 
satellite separate from the military systems under development.   
The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) floated a proposal, called Vanguard to 
launch an NRL-developed payload on a booster stack comprised of a modified Viking 
sounding rocket,14 an Aerobee-derived second stage, and a newly designed third stage.  
Vanguard was in competition with a wholly Air Force program, Project World Series, 
                                                 
10 Paul B. Stares.  The Militarization of Space, U.S. Policy 1945-1948. 1985 p. 27. 
11 Gary Federici.  From the Sea to the Stars.  Naval Historical Center. July 2003. Section 1.4. 
http://www.history.navy.mil/books/space/index.htm. May 2007. 
12 Ibid., Section 1.4. 
13 Ted Wilbur. Navy Space.  Naval Aviation News. November 1970. p. 34. 
http://www.history.navy.mil. June 2007. 
14 The Viking rockets were Naval Research Laboratory research rockets based heavily on technology 
from the German V-2, which in-turn, traces its lineage back to Dr. Goddard’s designs. 
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based on the Atlas/Aerobee boosters and an Army program, Project Orbiter/Explorer 1, 
that used evolutionary models of the very successful Redstone rocket.  Because the 
Navy’s program was perceived as a “science and research” rocket system, it was chosen 
over the ballistic missile programs of the other services.  The Vanguard system, with 
three stages, gimbaled motors, and improved fuel pumps, represented a technological 
leap and deviation from the established rockets and consequently was higher risk than 
either the Army or Air Force proposals.15  Additionally, while the Navy had the expertise 
to design the satellite, and the Viking (first stage) was a proven system, the program had 
no launch pad – Army launch facilities at the Redstone Arsenal in Alabama were 
occupied with the Army’s ballistic missile program, Jupiter, and the Navy’s test range at 
Point Mugu, California was geared for cruise-missile tests, rather than the big orbital 
booster systems.  Ultimately, space and money was found to construct a dedicated pad at 
Cape Canaveral for Vanguard at the Air Force’s launch complex. 
While the Naval Research Laboratory tried to field Vanguard, the Soviet Union 
managed to launch Sputnik aboard an SS-6 Sapwood, a powerful, strictly military ICBM 
booster on 4 October 1957.  Validating the RAND report “Preliminary Design of and 
Experimental World-Circling Spaceship” negative American public reaction to the Soviet 
success was directed against the Vanguard project, which because of the array of 
unproven technologies involved, was well behind the Soviet schedule.  President 
Eisenhower responded to the Sputnik launch by establishing the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (ARPA, the predecessor to DARPA), and NASA in late 1957 and 1958. 
E. NASA, ARPA, AND THE MILITARY BRAIN DRAIN 
ARPA was created to act as the single-point for funding and development of 
weapons systems on the military side, and NASA was intended to be the owner of 
development of space systems “except…activities primarily associated with the 
development of weapons systems…”16 Intended to accelerate both the civilian and 
                                                 
15 Air University Space Primer. Chapter 1. Space History. 2003. http://space.au.af.mil/primer/. June 
2007. 
16 United States. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. 
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military development of U.S. space capabilities, the creation of these two entities further 
exacerbated the already competitive environment among Army, Air Force and Navy 
space experts.  ARPA’s 1957 charter under the Eisenhower administration severely 
restricted the Department of Defense’s activities in space systems development, and 
worse, poisoned the research environment between Department of Defense scientists, 
individual service technology development centers and NASA.  Additionally, despite the 
existence of viable space programs within all three services, ARPA awarded more than 
80% of available funding to the Air Force.17  As a consequence, in 1959, following the 
creation of NASA (1958), ARPA was relieved of its space projects research in 1959, and 
left to conduct only advanced science and technology research. 
The establishment of NASA was a further disruptive occasion for the military 
space efforts.  In 1958, the Navy transferred 300 scientists and technical personnel from 
the Naval Research Laboratory, and in 1960, the Vanguard program, with approximately 
200 personnel moved from NRL ownership to NASA Goddard, in Maryland.18  
Similarly, the Army suffered a “brain-drain” with the stand-up of NASA, when in 1960 
the Army transferred Dr. Werner Von Braun and the entire Army Ballistic Missile 
Agency Development Operations Division to NASA – including more than 150 of Von 
Braun’s engineers, 3900 support personnel and 2500 missile and satellite technicians.  
This transfer came on the heels of the re-designation of the Army’s Redstone Arsenal 
space development facility to NASA Marshall in 1958, as well as transfer of the Redstone 
and Saturn missile projects.  With the founding of NASA and ARPA, the age of 
independent military service development of space systems came to an end.  The 
centralization of funding under ARPA, the nascent bureaucracy of NASA, and the 
transfer of so much institutional expertise from the military services to NASA resulted in 
a watering-down of the culture that identified the individual military service efforts as 
unique.  
                                                 
17 Joshua Boehm and Craig Baker.  A History of United States National Security Space Management 
and Organization.  January 2001. Section IIB. http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/article03.html. June 2007. 
18 Gary Federici.  From the Sea to the Stars.  Naval Historical Center. July 2003. Section 1.5.1. 
http://www.history.navy.mil/books/space/index.htm. May 2007. 
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F. MILITARY PROGRAMS PRIOR TO 1961 
Vanguard, finishing development amidst the pressures of Soviet competition, 
negative public opinion, inter-service rivalry and the challenge of NASA’s standup, was a 
failure.  The first two full-scale launches of the system with a payload exploded on the 
launch pad, and 60 seconds into flight, respectively.  The third launch was successful, but 
by this point, the Secretary of Defense had ordered the Army and Werner Von Braun to 
prepare their Explorer program to launch atop a Jupiter-C ICBM.  Explorer 1 achieved 
orbit on 31 January, 1958.  In the meantime, a total of eleven launches of the Vanguard 
program were attempted, only two of which were successful. 
Following the two-year spasm of effort that comprised the Vanguard program, 
government investment and research in space scaled up dramatically.  As the money 
began to flow in, the individual services were able to diversify and de-conflict their 
efforts in utilizing the capabilities enabled by space development.  Army and Air Force 
efforts were split with the Army holding responsibility for development of missiles with 
ranges of 200 miles or less and the Air Force was given the mission of developing 
missiles with ranges of 200 miles or more.  Additionally, the Air Force had begun work 
under a 1954 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) charter to develop a capability to 
“provide surveillance of ‘pre-selected areas of the earth’ (read:  USSR) in order to 
determine the status of a potential enemy’s war making capability.”19  The shorter-range 
Army mission led to the development of the Nike series of continental defense surface-to-
air missiles and Army Signal Corps R&D efforts resulted in prototype solar-power cells, 
TV broadcasts from space, space-based radio transceivers, and ground-based phased-
array radar systems.20 
The Navy, meanwhile, set to developing navigational systems to support its blue-
water fleet in the escalating competition with Soviet forces and submarine-launched 
ballistic missile systems to ensure a role in strategic warfare.  A 1954 report to the 
                                                 
19 Gary Federici.  From the Sea to the Stars.  Naval Historical Center. July 2003. Section 1.5.4.1. 
http://www.history.navy.mil/books/space/index.htm. May 2007. 
20 Eddie Mitchell. Apogee, Perigee, and Recovery:  Chronology of Army Exploitation of Space. A 
Rand Note. 1991.  pp. 26-28. 
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Department of Defense chaired by MIT President, Dr. James Killian, recommended both 
the development of, and division of labor for, a ballistic missile force to counter the 
Soviet threat.  This report led to Air Force development of ICBMs (Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missile, 5000+ mile range), Army development of IRBMs (Intermediate Range 
Ballistic Missile, 1500 mile range) and a joint Navy/Army program to develop the Fleet 
Ballistic Missile (Polaris), a derivative of the IRBM.  The joint program leveraged the 
Army’s experience in booster development, and levied the requirement on the Navy to 
develop the sea-based launching system.  Initially beneficial for both the Army and Navy, 
the program provided the Army with a requirement to defend against Air Force 
encroachment, and the Navy a method to get into the strategic weapons business.  
Eventually, the partnership was dissolved by Navy development of solid fuels that were 
denser and more compact than the Army Jupiter propellant that powered the initial 
Polaris missiles.  The Polaris program was spearheaded by Captain Robert Freitag, an 
MIT-trained engineer and salesman par-excellence, along with Captain Robert Truax.  
Freitag and Truax, during the process of promoting the Polaris program, came to realize 
that the new missile system, in combination with other navy space programs like Transit 
(navigation) and Courier (communication), was about to change some of the fundamental 
practices of the entire Navy.21    They assisted in convening a cross-disciplinary board in 
1959 that established two space sections under OPNAV to better centralize policy and 
activity in Navy space development.   
The Transit satellite navigation system was a result of a surfeit of intellectual 
curiosity on the part of a pair of Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory personnel in 
1957.  APL researchers William Guier and George Wieffenbach, fascinated by the launch 
of Sputnik I, discovered that they could accurately track the satellite by processing 
Doppler shift data.22  With this capability, APL scientists realized that they could provide 
precise positional data for earth-bound navigation based on satellites with known 
position, timing data and Doppler information from a broadcast signal.  This APL                                                  
21 Ted Wilbur. Navy Space.  Naval Aviation News. November 1970. pp. 56-59. 
http://www.history.navy.mil. June 2007. 
22 Gary Federici.  From the Sea to the Stars.  Naval Historical Center. July 2003. Section 1.6.1. 
http://www.history.navy.mil/books/space/index.htm. May 2007. 
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concept was sponsored by the Navy in 1958, and proposed for development as the 
Transit system.  Transit was a groundbreaking development in that it was the first space 
system to be fielded as a method of addressing a specifically terrestrial problem.  As a 
predecessor to the Air Force’s NAVSTAR GPS system (contracted in 1974), 26 Transit 
satellites were launched between September of 1959 and October 1977.  This system 
evolved to support approximately 25-meter accuracy, but the wait time to get enough 
satellite passes to resolve position sometimes took minutes, making it unsuitable for fast 
moving receivers, like aircraft.  Requirements generated from Transit eventually found 
their way to the GPS program, helping refine Navy needs during the Air Force 
requirements definition process. 
G. FIRST ESTABLISHMENT OF THE “EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR SPACE” 
By 1961, the modern scheme of military satellite launch and operation had begun 
to emerge.  Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara signed Defense Directive 5160.32 in 
March of 1961, assigning the Air Force sole responsibility for development and 
acquisition of all U.S. military space systems.  The other services were permitted to 
perform research in space systems and technology, but were not allowed to field in-house 
developed systems.  Driven by a January 1961 report23 headed up by Dr. Jerome Wiesner 
of MIT (later, President Emeritus of MIT) that attributed the Soviet lead in space to lack 
of coordination and duplicated efforts by the U.S. military establishment, the Secretary of 
the Air Force lobbied the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the lead role in managing 
U.S. military space systems development.  Award of this mission to the Air Force 
resulted in the establishment of the Air Force Systems Command and appointment of the 
Secretary of the Air Force as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space.  
This appointment came as a surprise to the other services.  The Navy, in particular, 
already had congressional approval for its 1962 – 1965 space program budget and was in 
development and fielding of the Transit navigational system.24 
                                                 
23 Wiesner Committee,"Report to the President-Elect of the Ad Hoc Committee on Space." NASA 
History Office. 10 January 1961. http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/report61.html. June 2007. 
24 Gary Federici.  From the Sea to the Stars.  Naval Historical Center. July 2003. Section 2.1.2. 
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The 1961 Department of Defense Directive 5160.32 resulted in a decade-long 
slowdown in military space development as NASA budgets and manned space flight 
efforts took center stage in the space arena, and the Vietnam War absorbed budgets that 
the services had otherwise used for research and development.  Nonetheless, science and 
technology development, outside the purview of the Air Force’s Executive Agent status, 
continued in both the Army and Navy.   
The Army established the Strategic Communications Command, in 1964 to 
manage continuing Army R&D on the Defense Satellite Communication System 
(DSCS).25  DSCS is a protected, high-bandwidth satellite communications system 
developed by the Army, but procured, launched and operated by the Air Force.  
Originally a near-geosynchronous drifting satellite, twenty-six DSCS I satellites were 
launched by the Air Force between 1966 and 1968 to provide long-haul, high-bandwidth 
communications pipes to large, stationary Army forces.  DSCS in its present form, DSCS 
III and DSCS III SLEP (Service Life Extension Program), provides worldwide high data 
rate communications in the Super High Frequency (SHF) band for stationary and mobile 
platforms capable of mounting a four- to seven-foot antenna.  DSCS III satellites, 
launched from 1982 and later, are geosynchronous and are capable of communicating in 
protected and jam resistant modes.  DSCS is exceptionally important to the Navy, and 
provides the sole full-duplex, military high-bandwidth communication link to large-deck 
ships. 
Likewise, Navy science and technology development continued through the 1960s 
in the face of increasing Air Force domination of the space arena.  Navy experimentation 
in the fields of space surveillance (VHF Fence), ionospheric research (NASA Explorer), 
VLF communication (LOFTI), electronic intelligence (SURCAL) and space weather and 
solar observation (SOLRAD) continued through the decade.26  Additionally, engineering 
development on specialized satellite control systems and upper-stage technologies was 
                                                 
25 Joshua Boehm and Craig Baker.  A History of United States National Security Space Management 
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conducted by the Naval Research Laboratory.  NRL scientists developed gravity gradient 
stabilization techniques that were fielded aboard a Transit satellite in 1963, powerful 
cold-gas thrusters for stationkeeping that were launched on SOLRAD in 1965, and 
multiple-payload launches were pioneered with NRL assistance throughout the 1960s. 
Finally, the Transit navigation system, first launched in September 1959, was the most 
successful of the Navy science projects.  Transit technology, and the expertise acquired 
during its development became instrumental in the development of the NAVSTAR GPS 
system, and refinement of requirements for the GPS constellation to support the Navy 
user.27 
H. SPACE PROGRAM DIVERGENCE IN THE MILITARY SERVICES 
By 1970, a joint Army-Navy lobbying effort to overturn the 1961 DoD Directive 
was successful, allowing those services to return to active development of “specialized 
satellite systems for ocean surveillance, communication, navigation, meteorology, 
mapping, charting and geodesy.”28  The new 1970 DoD Directive 5160.32 permitted a 
great expansion of the Navy space effort, and led directly to the development of 
technologies enabling the current concepts of “FORCEnet”29 and “information 
superiority” – FLTSAT, UHF Follow-On (UFO), GEOSAT, and shipboard terminals 
supporting communication with the DSCS constellation. 
It was during this time, in the mid-1970s when Navy relations with Air Force 
program offices and program management fell to unprecedented lows.  The FLTSAT 
program, in particular, was plagued with problems between the specifications and 
requirements organization, the NRL, and the contracting organization, USAF Space and 
Missiles Systems Organization.  Air Force management practices were seemingly 
incompatible with Naval Research Lab organizational culture, and when technical 
difficulties arose in the construction and testing of the satellites, the Air Force’s 
                                                 
27 Gary Federici.  From the Sea to the Stars.  Naval Historical Center. July 2003. Section 3.4.3. 
http://www.history.navy.mil/books/space/index.htm. May 2007. 
28 United States. Department of Defense Directive 5160.32, March 1961. 
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Aerospace Corporation, brought in to resolve the problems, initially sought a solution by 
questioning the NRL base specifications for the satellite.30  Though exceptional 
compromise and cross-cultural team-building among a coterie of dedicated Navy and Air 
Force officers saved the program, this clash of organizational cultures was indicative of 
the forming institutional mentalities in the military space arena 
Resurgence in space capabilities and technological innovation leading to the 
modern era is traced by multiple authors31 to the late 1970s, with the inception of the 
TENCAP (Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities) program among all three 
services.  TENCAP was executed differently among the services, but generally, TENCAP 
efforts have been focused on high-technology efforts leveraging the capabilities of 
National systems to support tactical warfighting.  Navy TENCAP efforts trend towards 
scientific research and development, with less emphasis on acquisition and lifecycle of 
systems.  This “leveraging” of space systems and other service capabilities has become a 
hallmark of naval space applications in general, reducing the Navy’s required service-
specific investment in space while achieving the necessary capabilities to provide support 
to the fleet. 
I. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND AND 
GROWTH OF NAVAL SPACE 
Growing reliance on space as a medium to support terrestrial naval operations 
began to meet with high-level recognition in the Navy in the early 1980s, and in 1983, the 
Secretary of the Navy stood up Naval Space Command to centralize control of naval 
space efforts.  The founding of the Naval Space Command came at a time when increased 
attention by Congress on the progress and organization of U.S. space efforts was reaching 
a fever pitch.  The Air Force was an early victim of the congressional attention in the 
1980s, with the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Programs 
pushing for organizational efficiencies in the strategic combat arena, and Resolution 5130 
being introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman Ken Kramer (R, CO) 
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to rename the Air Force to the “Aerospace Force.”32  Finally, a Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report issued in January of 1982 was typically critical of 
the Department of Defense’s management of space capabilities, and recommended 
reorganization and consolidation of the various DoD space functions at the Consolidated 
Space Operations Center in Colorado Springs.33  Shortly thereafter, in September of 
1982, the Air Force founded the Air Force Space Command.   
The existence of consolidated Air Force and Navy Space Commands provided 
sufficient impetus for the creation of a joint service space command, and in September of 
1985, the Joint Chiefs of Staff created the United States Space Command.  Interestingly, 
U.S. Space Command came into existence in-part because of the institutional inertia 
developed during the early 1980s to centralize control of military space efforts, and also 
because of the extensive R&D being conducted for the Strategic Defense Initiative, 
President Ronald Reagan’s space-based weapons system for anti-ballistic weapons 
defense.  Doctrinal and policy developments that preceded the standup of 
USSPACECOM came in July of 1984, when the National Security Council conducted a 
review and update of the national space strategy.  Immediately following, in August of 
1984, the National Space Strategy National Security Decision Directive was released, 
paving the way for the establishment of U.S. Space Command. 
Meanwhile, the Army, which was in the midst of a baseline review of its fighting 
doctrine, was working to incorporate requirements for persistent overhead surveillance, 
beyond line-of-sight-communications and maneuver warfare.34  This doctrine, AirLand 
Battle (FM 100-5) relied extremely heavily on space systems infrastructure, and in 
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recognition of that requirement, by August of 1986, the Army had established the Army 
Space Agency (renamed Army Space Command in April 1988) as the Army component 
of U.S. Space Command. 
Despite the premise that the Naval Space Command (NAVSPACECOM) was to 
be the central point for Navy space effort, it did not function as the sole Navy entity in 
the arena.  NAVSPACECOM was instead the operational commander of a trio of 
organizations: 
• Navy Space Systems Division (OP-943) whose mission it was to validate 
and sponsor programs. 
• NAVELEXSYSCOM (PME-106) which executed contract programs and 
delivered space systems. 
• NAVSPACECOM to collect and validate requirements for satellite 
support of fleet operations.35 
Naval Space Command became a clearing-house for other Navy space-related 
organizations and the mission of training and educating Naval leadership.  Missions and 
subordinate commands up until its disestablishment in 2002 included: 
• Navy Astronautics Group (renamed Naval Satellite Operation Center in 
1990) 
• Naval Space Surveillance Center (capabilities turned over to the Air Force 
in 2003)36 
• Fleet Surveillance Support Command 
• Naval Space Command Reserve Units 
• Marine Corps Reserve Augmentation Unit 
• Naval Space Command Detachment, Colorado Springs (USSPACECOM 
Liaison) 
• Naval Space Command Detachment ECHO (DSP/JTAGS) 
• Navy TENCAP 
• Alternate Space Defense Operations Center (merged with Alternate Space 
Surveillance Center to create Alternate Space Control Center) 
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By the 1990s, the Naval Space Command had become an organization entrusted 
with a wide variety of combat support mission areas of critical importance to the fleet.  
The Naval Satellite Operations Center, for instance, though comprised of only 
approximately 150 personnel, was responsible for UHF communications for the 1990-
1991 Desert Shield/Desert Storm operations.  UHF communications, on FLTSAT and 
UHF Follow-On (UFO) satellites, comprised the only ‘tactical’ overhead 
communications service for ground forces at that time.  Additionally, Navy TENCAP, 
working with the Army, pushed for greater capabilities realization of the Defense Support 
Program assets (DSP was initially designed to sense ballistic missile launch in the Cold 
War era), and developed a system called JTAGS to monitor theater missile launch 
(SCUD) in the Desert Storm Area of Operations. 
J. THE CONTESTED MISSION AREA AND NATIONAL SPACE 
REORGANIZATION 
Navy space operations in the same vein as the DSP/JTAGS effort have met with 
stiff and growing resistance from the Air Force and their partners in the Intelligence 
Community.  As U.S. national space capabilities matured towards the end of the 20th 
century, the organizations that developed the greatest capability, acquired the largest 
budgets and established the most lengthy personnel rosters began to approach space as if 
it were their exclusive provenance.  This proprietary attitude hearkens back to the 1961 
DoD Directive naming the Air Force as the Executive Agent for Space and the 1960 
founding of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).  Notwithstanding the 
cancellation of this directive in 1970, as space budgets and programs migrated to these 
two organizations beginning in the 1960s, they forged an institutional mentality that 
much as the Navy ‘ownership’ of the seas was uncontested by the other services, the Air 
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Force should ‘own’ the “vertical dimension.”37  A Time Magazine article from March 
17th of 1961 details the implications clearly: 
Aerospace Force? 
The U.S. Air Force has been trying the name "U.S. Aerospace Force" on 
its tongue ever since the Eisenhower Administration assigned it prime 
responsibility for "space transportation." Last week the name sounded 
better than ever when Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, over the 
strangled cries of other services, flatly assigned "space development 
programs and projects to the Department of the Air Force except under 
unusual circumstances."  
No existing programs were changed. The Army will continue with its 
Advent communications satellite; the Navy will stick with its Transit 
navigation satellite. And each service, in Pentagon parlance, will have "the 
right to think," to do research on the problems of putting its weapons into 
space. But from now on, the Air Force is boss of the big boosters that 
make military space ventures possible.  
Despite this truce, there are still new galaxies to conquer before the 
Aerospace Force becomes the big cheese. There is still an ill-defined line 
between military projects and work done by the civilian National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration. Some day soon, the President will 
have to set up a single, economical space agency. Airmen are betting that 
it will belong to them.38 
Regardless of the fact that this article was written more than 45 years ago, it 
clearly summarizes an aim of the modern-day Air Force – exertion of organizational 
control over the air and space environments.  The specific “Aerospace” concept, 
however, has recently fallen into disfavor.  Since the later 1990s, semantic and 
organizational issues regarding the use of the “Aerospace” have been raised by Air Force 
officers as a dilution of the service’s primary mission of air superiority.  This has resulted 
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38 Time Magazine. Aerospace Force? 17 March 1961.  
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,894428,00.html. June 2007. 
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in funding battles between the air-breathing programs and the development and fielding  
of orbital and launch systems.  Current discussion and doctrine leans towards the 
identification of “Space-specific” forces, and the establishment of a “Space Warfighting” 
community or U.S. Space Force.39 
In the face of increasing Air Force space budgets, restrictions on service 
exploitation of the space arena and ambivalence from leadership, Navy space efforts are 
under-represented in comparison with the relative importance of space effects and space 
support to the fleet.  The mid-1990s represented the pinnacle of the modern Navy space 
organization.40  During these years, in the aftermath of Desert Storm, leadership and 
“warfighter” recognition of the Navy’s reliance on robust satellite systems for command, 
control, communications and intelligence (C³I) functions reached its peak.  Development 
of accurate, guided munitions, complex operations plans transmitted via computer 
networks, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace and expectations of instantaneous, 
pervasive, worldwide communications reinforced the understanding of senior leaders of 
the necessity for space-borne capabilities and expertise.  Unfortunately, sometime 
between the late 1990s and the present day this understanding disappeared. 
A possible source for the second decline in Navy space involvement may stem 
from the reorganization of Department of Defense space management during the Clinton 
Administration.  Fiscal year 1993 and 1994 Defense Authorization and Defense 
Appropriations Bills respectively mandated centralized space acquisition for the 
reduction of costs, and stated that then-current management structures within DoD space 
were inadequate.41  In response, the position of Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for 
Space (DUSD Space) was created to “…serve as the principal point of contact within 
                                                 
39 See McClintock and Harter. 
40 Joshua Boehm and Craig Baker.  A History of United States National Security Space Management 
and Organization.  January 2001. Section IIIB2. http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/article03.html. June 2007. 
 Following the merger of NAVSPACECOM with the Naval Space Surveillance Center, consolidated 
operations in Navy space included elements exercising control of operational management of space 
systems, operation of the Naval Space Surveillance Network, operational and tactical support to Naval 
forces and status as the Alternate Space Control Center for the U.S. Space Command.  Not since this time 
have all of these functions been consolidated under one command. 
41 United States. National Space issues:  Observation on Defense Space Program and Activities.  
Government Accountability Office. 16 August 1994.  GAO/NSIAD-94-253, 10. 
 20
OSD for space matters, to develop, coordinate, and oversee implementation of DoD 
space policy and to provide oversight over all DoD Space architectures and the 
acquisition of DoD space programs.”42  Rapid organizational changes followed: 
• 1995, March – DoD Space Architect established.  “This office was 
established to consolidate the responsibilities for DoD space missions and 
system architecture development, to eliminate “stovepiped” space 
programs, and to improve efficiencies in acquisition and future operations 
in support of U.S. military operations.”43  The DoD SA, an Air Force two-
star, worked “with” the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Space. 
• 1995, December – Joint Space Management Board (JSMB) established.  
Created jointly by the Secretary of Defense and Director of the CIA to 
“consolidate defense and intelligence space architecture functions into a 
single national space architecture.”44 
• 1997, January – Defense Reform Initiatives 11 and 42 announced.  
Intended to “streamline” DoD organization and infrastructure through the 
use of business practices, these two initiatives resulted in yet another DoD 
Space restructuring. 
• 1998, July – DoD Space Architect renamed National Security Space 
Architect.  Job description of DoD SA broadened to include incorporation 
of Intelligence Community assets and architectures into the DoD Space 
architecture. 
• 2001 – Space Commission releases report critical of DoD management of 
space organization and capabilities. 
• 2003, June – In an echo of the 1961 DoD Directive 5160.32, the U.S. Air 
Force is identified as the Executive Agent for Space in response to the 
2001 Space Commission report.  (DoD Directive 5101.2) 
The result of this gusty and shifting organizational climate seems to have resulted 
in disinterest and indifference on the part of senior Navy leadership.  On 11 July 2002, 
the Naval Space Command was disestablished and Naval Network Warfare Command 
(NETWARCOM) was established.  This new organization encompassed and superseded 
the strictly space-focused organization, incorporating space capabilities (primarily in the 
communications realm) as a portion of an overarching mission to provide networked 
                                                 
42 Joshua Boehm and Craig Baker.  A History of United States National Security Space Management 
and Organization.  January 2001. Section IIE1. http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/article03.html. June 2007. 
43 Joshua Boehm and Craig Baker.  A History of United States National Security Space Management 
and Organization.  January 2001. Section IIF2. http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/article03.html. June 2007. 
44 Ibid., Section IIF3. 
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communications and resources to the Navy.  Incorporation of the Naval Space Command 
into the NETWARCOM mission relegated the space mission area to a secondary and 
supporting status within the enterprise’s task hierarchy, and ultimately contributed to the 
incipient and crippling loss of direction in the Navy space community. 
When they were absorbed into NETWARCOM, the Naval Space Command 
numbered approximately 400 personnel.  At that time, the Air Force Space Command 
numbered approximately 33,600,45 and was charged with the lion’s share of the 
Department of Defense space budget.  Air Force-provided numbers for the space 
community, in the year 2000 read as shown in Table 1, below:  
Space Personnel 90% 
Space Budget 85% 
Space Assets 86% 
Space Infrastructure 90% 
 
Table 1.   Air Force Percentage of DoD Space Capabilities.46 
 
While critically reliant on space systems to perform its terrestrial mission, the 
Navy has seen fit to pursue a policy of leveraging the capabilities provided by other 
organizations to achieve its combat requirements.  Unfortunately, quality-of-service 
concerns in many facets of the National Security Space mission areas,47 relating to both 
USAF- and Intelligence Community-provided resources have plagued this relationship.  
                                                 
45 Bruce H. McClintock, Major, U.S. Air Force.  The Transformation Trinity. Air University Press, 
Maxwell AFB, Alabama. 2002. p.42. 
46 F.W. Peters & Michael E. Ryan. The Aerospace Force:  Defending America in the 21st Century…a 
White Paper on Aerospace Integration.  Department of the Air Force, Washington D.C.  2000.  p. 5. 
http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA381077&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. June 2007. 
47 The authors and editors of The Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities identify the 
following six mission areas – ISR, METOC, TBMD, Communications, PNT, and Space Control, while the 
National Security Space Office identifies a larger, more granular group of missions including – 
Surveillance and Warning, MilSatCom, Navigation, Environmental Monitoring, ISR, Space Surveillance, 
NMD/Counterspace, Space Forces Support, Force Application, General Support and Technology RDT&E. 
http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/roadmap/irm/rmindex.htm. June 2007. 
 22
Incompatible mindsets between space-resource operators - who in many cases viewed 
their mission as an end-unto-itself - and the operational user of space-sourced 
functionality led to dissatisfaction on the part of the end user, and a perception on the part 
of the space systems operator that their resources were being misused.  Fortunately, 
restructuring initiatives in the late 1990s, resulting from DoD and congressional concerns 
about space support to military forces during the 1991 Gulf War, relieved some of the  
friction.  Although elements of this problem persist, operational space support of the 
terrestrial warfighter has improved dramatically since this restructuring of management 
of National Security Space functions in the late 1990s.48  Most notably, mandates to 
“…facilitate the cross-coordination of both classified and unclassified space 
products…”49 and allocation and future plans for communications resources have served 
to spread oil on troubled waters. 
With increasing reliance on outsourcing to provide space-based capabilities and 
services, the Navy has demonstrated a progressively diminishing interest in the business 
of space in recent years.  Program management of communications satellites in the UHF 
band reflects the last vestige of a dedicated Navy commitment to acquiring space 
systems, and even these programs comprise Navy involvement for primarily historical 
reasons.  In the present day, ever-increasing reliance on high-bandwidth communications 
systems force the Navy to use systems acquired and operated by the Air Force and Army 
(MILSTAR, DSCS) or services provided by commercial vendors.  Likewise, overhead 
surveillance, navigation, weather and science and technology needs that in the past were 
developed by the Navy to meet internal needs are coming from other organizations.  This 
decline in institutional involvement in space reflects a larger struggle, as the Navy 
attempts to define a role for itself in an era of asymmetric warfare and largely land-based 
counter-insurgency operations.50  Focus of effort and funding at the highest levels is 
                                                 
48 United States. Space Program Executive Overview for FY1998-2003.  Department of Defense. 
March 1997.  http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/sp97. June 2007. 
49 United States. Space Program Executive Overview for FY1998-2003.  Department of Defense. 
March 1997.  http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/sp97. June 2007. 
50 George Galdorisi, Dr. Stephanie Hszieh and Terry McKearney. SPAWAR Supports the Navy's 
Global Maritime Partnership. CHIPS. April-June 2007.  
http://www.chips.navy.mil/archives/07_Jun/web_pages/Maritime_Partnership.html. June 2007. 
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concentrated on purchases of traditional equipment, even when the utility of $4 billion 
aircraft carriers and submarines becomes increasingly dependent on network-centric 
concepts of operations51 and its attendant space systems.52 
In an environment of meager budgets, minimal manpower and apparent 
leadership disinterest, modern-day maintenance of space capabilities has primarily been 
the result of dedicated individuals and isolated pockets of corporate expertise.  
Preservation of a full-spectrum effort in space systems development, fielding and 
operation no longer makes sense – the Navy focus for future space efforts should be 
sharpened and refined, separating unnecessary services and functions from those that best 
support the institution’s goals and ability to perform its core warfighting responsibilities.  
 
                                                 
51 David S. Alberts, John J. Garstga and Frederick P. Stein.  Network Centric Warfare: Developing 
and Leveraging Information Superiority. CCRP. 2001. 
52 National Research Council. Committee on the Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future 
Capabilities. The Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities. The National Academies Press 
2005. Executive Summary. http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11200&page=1. June 2007.  
This document identifies Navy efforts in nine out of sixteen areas of space expertise as displaying “…little 
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II. SIGNIFICANT DEFINITIONS 
As Department of Defense space efforts continue to evolve and transform, so do 
the doctrines and instructions relating to those activities.  Directly connected to the DoD 
efforts, the United States Navy’s doctrine, organizations and publications relating to 
space are also evolving.  This chapter is intended to enhance understanding of the 
numerous publications, organizations and doctrines fundamental to the Navy space 
program in an effort to establish a baseline for further discussions in the following 
chapters. 
This chapter is broken down into two major segments:  Organizations and 
Concepts.  The first segment essentially describes the fundamental structure of the 
different services and joint space organizations.  The second segment focuses on the 
conceptual ideology and doctrine relating to the Department of Defense and specifically 
the Navy’s space efforts. 
A. ORGANIZATIONS 
1. January 11, 2001 U.S. Commission to Assess National Security Space 
Management and Organizations (2001 Space Commission)  
The 2001 Space Commission was established in 1999 by an amendment to the FY 
2000 defense authorization bill.  Senator Bob Smith (R-N.H.) was the point person in 
Congress for the creation of the Space Commission.53  Smith believed that the annual 
defense budgets were continually short-changing space programs.  He also noticed that 
military personnel without space backgrounds were being promoted faster than those 
with space experience and he alleged that treaties had negotiated away the U.S. 
advantages in space.  The thirteen-member commission was chaired by Donald Rumsfeld 
prior to his appointment as Secretary of Defense.  Among other issues, the commission 
sought to determine if changes needed to be made to improve the United States' national 
security posture and capabilities in space.  Six months of research and interviews with the 
                                                 
53 Tom Barry. Rumsfeld Space Commission. International Relations Center Right Web. 21 May 2004. 
http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/2820. June 2007. 
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country's leading space experts convinced the commission that space should be elevated 
to the status of a top national security priority. A Rumsfeld Space Commission news 
release called the likelihood of future conflict in space "a virtual certainty.”  As a result, 
the commission determined that the United States should take immediate steps to develop 
superior space capabilities.54 
2. Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM) 
Naval Network Warfare Command creates warfighting and business options for 
the Fleet to fight and win in the information age.  They deliver and operate a reliable, 
secure and battle-ready global network.  They lead the development, integration and 
execution of Information Operations effect for the Fleet.  Additionally this command is 
charged with the mission of ensuring the Navy fully leverages and influences national 
space capabilities.  NETWARCOM increases the naval commanders’ warfighting 
capabilities through the use of cumulative space effects in maritime operations as 
measured by a maturity model.55 
In May of 2005, the Chief of Naval Operations released the Navy Space Policy 
Implementation (OPNAV Instruction 5400.43) designating Commander, NETWARCOM 
as the Space Type Commander (TYCOM) and Space Cadre Functional Authority for the 
United States Navy.  NETWARCOM is responsible for developing, maintaining and 
overseeing the Navy Space Human Capital Strategy, SSFA, PEO Space Systems and the 
Space Cadre Advisor.  NETWARCOM is under the command of U.S. Fleet Forces 
Command.  The U.S. Fleet Forces Command acts as the U.S. Navy functional component 
                                                 
54 Gerry J. Gilmore. ’Space Increasingly Important,’ SPACECOM Chief Says. American Forces Press 
Service. 5 April 2001. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45030. May 2007 
55 Department of the Navy. Naval Network Warfare Command Strategic Plan 2006-2010…a 
framework for decision-making. Executive Summary Version 2.0. Naval Network Warfare Command. 23 
March 2007. 
http://www.netwarcom.navy.mil/NETWARCOM%20Strategic%20Plan_Executive%20Version%202_1%2
011.pdf. June 2007 
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to U.S. Strategic Command for Space.56  NETWARCOM is tasked with standing up the 
NETWARCOM Maritime Operations Center (MOC) Space Cell,57 an organization 
intended to provide the fleet with space effects and other space related products.   
3. NETWARCOM (NNWC) Maritime Operations Center (MOC) Space 
Cell  
Located at NETWARCOM Headquarters is the NNWC Maritime Operations 
Center Space Cell.  The Space Cell provides NNWC with internal space situational 
awareness while synchronizing with the MOC IO and NETOPS (Network Operations) 
cells for synergistic effects.  The MOC Space Cell was stood up to provide fleet forces 
with a single point of reach back connectivity with regards to fleet space needs and 
operational integration.  At the operational level, the NNWC MOC Space Cell provides 
reach-back support to fleet MHQ/MOC Staffs, to include planning augmentation and 
theater level synchronization.  At the tactical level, the cell provides tailored reach-back 
support to CSG/ESG Staffs incorporating space situational awareness reports and Space 
Effects Packages with a maritime domain focus.  This product is low bandwidth-
compatible to enable transmission and receipt in a bandwidth-challenged environment.58 
4. Naval Satellite Operations Center (NAVSOC) 
NAVSOC is responsible for operating, managing and maintaining assigned 
satellite systems; providing reliable satellite services for the Navy in direct support of the 
warfighter.  NAVSOC Headquarters are in Point Mugu, California.  Currently, they 
control the spacecraft bus for eight UFO (UHF Follow-On), two Polar EHF, two 
FLTSAT/FEP, one GFO, and four NIMS satellites.  NAVSOC maintains operational 
                                                 
56 Department of the Navy. OPNAVINST 5400.43A, Navy Space Policy Implementation. 12 February 
2007. p. 9. 
https://doni.daps.dla.mil/Directives/Forms/AllItems.aspx?RootFolder=%2fDirectives%2f05000%20Genera
l%20Management%20Security%20and%20Safety%20Services%2f05%2d400%20Organization%20and%2
0Functional%20Support%20Services. May 2007. 
57 Formerly known as the Network, Information Operations, and Space Center (NIOSC) Space Cell. 
58 Julie Niedermaier, Commander, U.S. Navy. Navy Space Cadre Update (SSFA Space 
Indoctrination). PowerPoint Brief. March 2007. 
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control of these satellites from five different remote ground stations, shown in Figure 1, 
below, throughout the United States and Guam.  
 
Figure 1.   NAVSOC Satellite Operations Locations59 
 
 
Table 2, below, provides a detailed list of the functions that NAVSOC performs 
for each satellite under their respective control. 
 HQ LP ALFA CHARLIE DELTA 
FLTSAT TT&C  TLM Collection, EHF Term Ops, 
TLM Collection, 
EHF Term Ops TT&C 
UFO TT&C  TLM Collection, EHF Term Ops 
TLM Collection, 
EHF Term Ops TT&C 















NIMS T&C     
Table 2.   NAVSOC Functional Control by Location60 
                                                 
59 Paul M. Insch, Captain, U.S. Navy. NAVSOC Command Brief. Naval Satellite Operations Center. 
PowerPoint Brief. June 2006. Slide 11. 
60 Ibid., Slide 38. 
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In addition to the legacy systems listed above, NAVSOC is the planned 
controlling authority for the Mobile-User Objective System, the follow-on to the UFO 
systems.  The orbital component of the MUOS system is scheduled to be operational by 
2010.  NAVSOC is poised to take control of the bus for five MUOS satellites by the year 
2015. 
5. Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center (MHQ-
MOC) 
The concept of a Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center 
(MHQ with MOC) evolved from Flag-level deliberations concerning the 
roles and capabilities of the US Navy at the operational-level of war 
(OLW).  There is a breach between the current tactical expertise of the US 
Navy and enduring CCDR requirements to support theater-wide strategies 
and national objectives.  The Navy must modify command organizations 
in Echelons II and III (NCCs, Numbered Fleet commanders and principal 
headquarters commanders) to better support operational-level planning, 
execution and assessment.  The establishment of MHQs with MOC will 
support execution of the National Strategy on Maritime Security (NSMS), 
comply with CNO 2006 Guidance, and fulfill CCDR requirements 
specified in the Unified Command Plan (UCP).   The Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT) demands a responsive MHQ with MOC capability. It 
requires fully-networked naval C2 of joint operations and supporting 
activities incorporating the concept and capabilities of centralized 
guidance, distributed/collaborative planning, and decentralized execution, 
which synchronizes the Navy across all areas of responsibility (AOR). 61 
6. Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 
The Carrier Strike Group is a flexible maritime combat-force organization 
construct centered on the aircraft carrier and its assigned Carrier Air Wing.  The term 
“Carrier Strike Group” replaced the term “Carrier Battle Group” in 2003 by CNO 
directive.  The CSG typically consists of one aircraft carrier (CVN), one Aegis guided 
missile cruiser (CG), two Aegis guided missile destroyers (DDG), one attack submarine 
(SSN) and usually one fast combat supply ship (AOE).  The CSG Staff is embarked 
aboard the carrier and is led by a one- or two-star admiral.  
                                                 
61 Department of the Navy. Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center Concept of 
Operations (CONOPS), Final DRAFT Version. 15 May 2006. p. ii. 
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7. Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) 
The JSpOC is the operational command and control (C²) center that 
provides Commander, Joint Forces Component Command, Space (CDR 
JFCC Space), via the Commander, Joint Space Operations (CDRJSO), the 
capability to plan, task, direct, synchronize, and assess the activities of 
assigned and attached space forces (as well as those space forces made 
available for tasking)… CDR JFCC Space executes OPCON of space 
forces via the JSpOC at Vandenberg AFB, CA.62 
The JSpOC maintains a twenty-four hour watch floor with reach-back capability 
for the NNWC MOC Space Cell and Navy Space Cadre.  They conduct strategic 
planning and operational tasking for space effects across the entire DoD space spectrum.  
Similar to that of an Air Tasking Order (ATO), the JSpOC is responsible for the weekly 
publishing of a Space Tasking Order (STO) in which they assign weekly requirements for 
space assets throughout the globe.  They are also responsible for publishing the special 
instructions (SIPNS) for all joint space activity. 
8. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 
accountability of the federal government for the American people.  GAO 
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help 
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions.  GAO’s 
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 
accountability, integrity, and reliability.63 
Two GAO reports will be referenced within this thesis, both pertaining to 
Congressional follow-up of DoD activities resulting from the 2001 Space Commission 
findings. 
 
                                                 
62 Department of the Air Force. Air Force Operational Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 2-3.4, 
Joint Space Operations Center (Draft). 20 January 2006. 
63 United States. Report to Congressional Committees: DEFENSE SPACE ACTIVITIES: Additional 
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9. Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR)  
SPAWAR and its five systems centers provide much of the tactical and non-
tactical information management technology required by the Navy to complete its 
operational missions.  Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center San Diego (SSC San 
Diego) is the U.S. Navy's research, development, test and evaluation, engineering and 
fleet support center for command, control and communication systems and ocean 
surveillance. SSC San Diego provides information resources to support the joint 
warfighter in mission execution and force protection.64 
10. Program Executive Officer (PEO) Space Systems 
The Program Executive Officer for Space Systems (PEO Space Systems) 
is a Navy Echelon II acquisition organization charted by the secretary of 
the Navy to manage and procure narrowband communications satellites in 
support of the Department of Defense (DoD).  The PEO Space Systems 
organization was formally established 5 May 2004.  The PEO Space 
Systems Headquarters staff is located in Chantilly, Virginia, with 
additional staff members located in San Diego, California. 
The PEO Space Systems mission is to develop, acquire, integrate, 
produce, launch, test, and provide operational support to reliable, 
affordable, flexible, effective, and seamless space systems that support 
DoD and U.S. Agencies to enable joint, coalition, combined, and Naval 
operations.  The PEO Space Systems coordinates all Department of the 
Navy (DoN) space research, development, and acquisition activities. 
The PEO Space System reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN(RDA)) for executing 
acquisition responsibilities for assigned programs.  The PEO Space 
Systems provides executive management and oversight to the 
Communications Satellite Program Office (PMW-146) for assigned 
Leased Satellite (LEASAT), Ultra High Frequency (UFO) Follow-On 
(UFO), and Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellite 
communications (SATCOM) programs.  Additionally, the PEO Space 
Systems serve as the DoN’s space program executive officer as called for 
in the DoD National Security Space Acquisition Policy (NSSAP) 03-01, 
reporting to the Under Secretary of the Air Force as DoD Executive Agent 
for Space and Milestone Decision Authority for major space acquisition 
                                                 
64 Department of the Navy. Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command Center San Diego. 
http://www.spawar.navy.mil/sandiego/. June 2007. 
 32
matters and programs.  The PEO Space Systems reports to the chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) and Commandant Marine Corps (CMC), through 
the Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
(SPAWAR), for matters pertaining to in-service support for its assigned 
programs.  The Program Executive Officer also provides a unique 
interface to other national security space organizations through his 
concurrent assignments as Commander, SPAWAR Space Field Activity 
(SSFA) and as Director, Communications Directorate, National 
reconnaissance Office (NRO), enabling a continuing partnership and 
effective integration of space systems expertise and best practices across 
the Navy-DoD-Intelligence Community interface.65   
Figure 2, below, diagrams the command and acquisition relationship of major 




Figure 2.   PEO Space Systems in the Context of Space Systems Acquisition 
 
11. Navy Communications Satellite Program Office (PMW-146) 
The mission of the Navy's Communications Satellite Program Office 
(PMW-146) is to acquire space based communications systems for the 
fleet and joint users.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Vision 2020 and 
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Chief of Naval Operations' Information Technology for the 21st Century 
(IT-21) provide the strategic direction for future acquisitions.  PMW-146 
is the Navy's only major buyer of communications satellites, building on a 
strong and successful heritage of the Navy in Space, including FLTSAT, 
LEASAT, and the UHF Follow-On (UFO) programs.  PMW-146 is 
continuing to satisfy the warfighters' emerging communication 
requirements using innovative military and commercial technology 
advances.  Launching one more UFO satellite in 2003, the present UFO 
constellation will continue to provide UHF, SHF, EHF communications 
and Ka Global Broadcast Service well into the new millennium.  PMW-
146 is a dynamic example of acquisition reform and a proven award 
winning advocate of commercial partnering and cooperative ventures to 
streamline acquisition.66 
12. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) 
The NRO designs, builds and operates the nation's reconnaissance 
satellites. NRO products, provided to an expanding list of customers like 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense 
(DoD), can warn of potential trouble spots around the world, help plan 
military operations, and monitor the environment.  As part of the 16-
member Intelligence Community, the NRO plays a primary role in 
achieving information superiority for the U. S. Government and Armed 
Forces.  A DoD agency, the NRO is staffed by DoD and CIA personnel. It 
is funded through the National Reconnaissance Program, part of the 
National Foreign Intelligence Program.67 
13. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) 
NRL is the corporate research laboratory for the Navy and Marine Corps and 
conducts a broad program of scientific research, technology and advanced development.  
NRL has served the Navy and the nation for over 80 years and continues to meet the 
complex technological challenges of today’s world.  The NRL has five site locations, all 
of which work to field new, innovative technologies for the fleet.68 
 
                                                 
66 Department of the Navy. PMW-146 Mission Statement. Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
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14. Navy Center for Space Technology (NCST) 
In its role to preserve and enhance a strong space technology base and 
provide expert assistance in the development and acquisition of space 
systems that support naval missions, the activities in Naval Center for 
Space Technology extend from basic and applied research through 
advanced development in all areas of interest to the Navy Space program. 
These activities include developing spacecraft, systems using these 
spacecraft, and ground command and control stations. Principal functions 
of the Center include understanding and clarifying requirements; 
recognizing and prosecuting promising research and development; 
analyzing and testing systems to quantify their capabilities; developing 
operational concepts that exploit new technical capabilities; system 
engineering to allocate design requirements to subsystems; and 
engineering development and initial operation to test and evaluate selected 
spacecraft subsystems and systems. The Center is a focal point and 
integrator for those divisions at NRL whose technologies are used in space 
systems. The Center also provides systems engineering and technical 
direction assistance to system acquisition managers of major space 
systems. In this role, technology transfer is a major goal and motivates a 
continuous search for new technologies and capabilities and the 
development of prototypes that demonstrate the integration of such 
technologies.69 
B. CONCEPTS 
1. Sea Power 21 
The 21st century is clearly characterized by dangerous uncertainty and 
conflict. In this unpredictable environment, military forces will be 
required to defeat a growing range of conventional and asymmetric 
threats.  
"Sea Power 21" is the Navy’s vision to align, organize, integrate, and 
transform to meet the challenges that lie ahead. It requires us to 
continually and aggressively reach. It is global in scope, fully joint in 
execution, and dedicated to transformation. It reinforces and expands 
concepts being pursued by the other services—long-range strike; global 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; expeditionary maneuver 
warfare; and light, agile ground forces—to generate maximum combat 
power from the joint team.  
                                                 
69 Department of the Navy. Navy Center for Space Technology Mission Statement. Naval Research 
Lab. http://www.ncst.nrl.navy.mil/HomePage/Mission.html. June 2007.   
 35
"Sea Power 21" will employ current capabilities in new ways, introduce 
innovative capabilities as quickly as possible, and achieve unprecedented 
maritime power. Decisive warfighting capabilities from the sea will be 
built around:  
Sea Strike—expanded power projection that employs networked sensors, 
combat systems, and warriors to amplify the offensive impact of sea-based 
forces;  
Sea Shield—global defensive assurance produced by extended homeland 
defense, sustained access to littorals, and the projection of defensive 
power deep overland;  
Sea Basing—enhanced operational independence and support for joint 
forces provided by networked, mobile, and secure sovereign platforms 
operating in the maritime domain.  
ForceNet is the "glue" that binds together Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea 
Basing. It is the operational construct and architectural framework for 
naval warfare in the information age, integrating warriors, sensors, 
command and control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, 
distributed combat force. 
The powerful warfighting capabilities of "Sea Power 21" will ensure our 
joint force dominates the unified battlespace of the 21st century, 
strengthening America's ability to assure friends, deter adversaries, and 
triumph over enemies—anywhere, anytime.70 
2. Coordinating Authority 
The Unified Actions Armed Forces Joint Publication 0-2 defines Coordinating 
Authority as: 
A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating 
specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military 
Departments, two or more joint force components or two or more forces of 
the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to 
require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the 
authority to compel agreement.71 
 
                                                 
70 Vern Clark, Admiral, U.S. Navy. Sea Power 21. Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities. Naval 
Institute Proceedings. October 2002. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/proceedings.html. June 2007.   
71 United States. Joint Publication 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). Department of 
Defense, Joint Staff. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. GL-6. 
 36
3. Space Authority 
To facilitate unity of the theater/joint operations area (JOA) space effort, 
the supported combatant commander or a joint force commander (JFC) 
may designate a space authority. The space authority will coordinate space 
operations, integrate space capabilities, and have primary responsibility 
for in-theater joint space operations planning. The coordinating authority 
typically will be the joint force air component commander, joint force land 
component commander, or joint force maritime component commander. In 
this position, the space authority designated by the JFC will coordinate 
space support of established objectives and act on behalf of the combatant 
commander with primary responsibility in theater for joint space 
operations planning.72 
4. Space Coordinating Authority (SCA) 
The Joint Force Commander within a specified theater, area of responsibility or 
operation will delegate space coordinating authority to the component commander with 
the biggest play and expertise in space.  This component commander has always been the 
Air Force, thus the J/CFACC is usually designated the space coordinating authority 
within the theater, AOR or operation.  The JFC still maintains overall space authority 
control at the Joint Task Force level.  Responsibilities of the SCA include:73  
• Determine, deconflict, and prioritize military space requirements for the 
JTF. 
• Recommend appropriate command relationships for space to the JFC. 
• Help facilitate space target nomination. 
• Maintain space situational awareness. 
• Request space inputs from JTF staff and components during planning. 
• Ensure optimum interoperability of space assets with coalition forces. 
• Recommend JTF military space requirement priorities to JFC. 
 
 
                                                 
72 United States. Joint Staff. Joint Publication 3-14: Joint Doctrine for Space Operations. Department 
of Defense. p. ix. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf. June 2007. 
73 Department of the Air Force. Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Operations and Organizations. 
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 27 June 2006. pp. 62-63. 
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5. Joint Warfighting Space (JWS) 
The JWS concept features the delivery of responsive space and near-space (i.e., 
area above the earth from ~ 65,000 to 325,000 feet altitude, sub-orbital) capabilities to 
directly support the joint force commander (JFC) in a theater across the range of military 
operations, with emphasis at the operational and tactical warfighting levels.  It is 
envisioned as a rapid reaction, networked set of space and near-space capabilities 
dedicated to the JFC and integrated with National Security Space (NSS) and organic 
theater systems.74  Figure 3 shows the envisioned JWS concept. 
The Joint Warfighter Space organization will require dedicated, knowledgeable 





Figure 3.   Joint Warfighter Space Operational Vision75 
                                                 
74 Department of the Air Force. Operating Concept for Joint Warfighting Space (Draft). 13 Jan 2005. 
p. 1. 
75 Department of the Air Force. Operating Concept for Joint Warfighting Space (Draft). 13 Jan 2005. 
p. 15. 
 38
6. Space Effects and Space Effects Packages 
Though these terms are interpreted in many ways, an effect is simply something 
designed to produce a distinctive or desired impression.  A space effect is the utilization 
of both space force application and enhancement to provide the warfighter and/or 
commander with necessary products to ensure mission success.  In the Fleet, space 
effects are outlined and produced through the use of the Space Effects Package (SEP).  
This SEP is defined within the Fleet Space Handbook as “a systematic process that 
applies all available Space capabilities to support Strike Group operations.”76  The SEP 
process consists of a Space Assessment and Space Operations Plan.   
The Space Assessment considers the following: Space System Status, 
Space Weather, GPS and SATCOM EMI, and Space Vulnerabilities.  The 
Space Operations Plan takes the Space Assessment and Strike Group 
mission requirements to tailor a plan for use of all space capabilities to 
support the mission.77 
Knowledge gained from exposure to the definitions and concepts that encompass 
the United States Navy space efforts provides a functional baseline of understanding for 
future arguments contained in follow-on chapters within this thesis.  Comprehension and 
recognition of space terminology and conceptual ideology are necessary to appreciate the 
full effect of these arguments.  In addition, exposure to the numerous and sometimes 
confusing Navy space policy documents and instructions is also necessary to ensure 
desired effects are achieved when pondering the proposed argument of redefining Navy 
space efforts. 
                                                 
76 Department of the Navy.  Naval Network Warfare Command. Fleet Space Handbook.8. 2007. p. 13. 
77 Ibid., p. 13. 
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III. U.S. NAVY SPACE CAMPAIGN 
Between 2003 and 2007, the United States Navy’s space efforts have undergone a 
significant transformation as the organization attempts to maintain space support to the 
operational maritime domain in a network-centric warfare environment.  As stated in the 
2005 Naval Space Campaign Plan, “The Naval Space Campaign is operational and 
aggressive, focused on delivering space capabilities to the warfighter to increase combat 
effectiveness.”78  This chapter will investigate the origins and evolution of the Naval 
Space Campaign, focusing on the policies that help generate it, the current status of the 
campaign, and the future efforts implied by the Naval Space Campaign.   
A. POLICY 
1. Background and Current Policies 
The evolution of the current Naval Space Campaign can be traced to the 2001 
Space Commission findings and the after-effects felt throughout the Department of 
Defense with regards to those findings.  From a doctrine and policy perspective, 
Department of Defense Directive 5101.2, dated June 3, 2003, designated the Air Force as 
Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space.  Secretary of Defense Memorandum 
dated October 18, 2001, Subject: National Security Space Management and Organization, 
tasked Secretaries of the Military Departments to, “maintain a sufficient cadre of space 
qualified professionals…to ensure each Service retains the ability to develop, plan, 
program, and acquire space systems uniquely required by individual service missions.”79  
In July 2002, the CNO approved the establishment of a Navy Space Cadre and directed 
funding for that endeavor. 
 
 
                                                 
78 Department of the Navy. Naval Space Campaign Plan 2005-2007 ‘Space Capabilities for the 
Warfighter’. Naval Network Warfare Command. 13 November 2005. pp. 3-4. 
79 Ibid., p. 4. 
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a. SECNAVINST 5400.39C (April 6, 2004) 
On April 6th, 2004, the Secretary of the Navy officially released the 
Department of the Navy Space Policy (SECNAVINST 5400.39C): 
The United States Navy and Marine Corps must maintain their ability to 
tactically exploit the capabilities provided by space systems and 
participate in all appropriate aspects of the changed NSS environment in 
order to function as an integrated member of the Nation’s joint 
warfighting team…the DoN must continually reassess its approach and 
investment to ensure that naval forces receive the maximum benefit of 
space-based capabilities.80  
The SECNAVINST describes the need for “DoN space requirements to be 
represented at joint deliberations on future space systems…provide the resources and 
manpower necessary to formulate, articulate and defend naval requirements for space.”81  
It further acknowledged the need for DoN Space representation in the joint processes for 
space system architecture and requirements development: 
To achieve its space goals, the DoN will recruit, educate, qualify, and 
retain a professional space cadre…DoN Space Cadre personnel will 
compete for all appropriate senior leadership positions in joint, national, 
and naval space programs and organizations.82 
The instruction also notes that DoN representation must also be present 
within the joint and National space arena - to include establishing a mutually beneficial 
relationship with the DoD Executive Agent for Space.  To this end, the instruction clearly 
favors the need for a robust and competent Navy Space Cadre, one capable of 
accomplishing the above mentioned requirements.  Of note, when discussing the Navy’s 
need to acquire, control and fly their own satellites, the instruction states: “When 
appropriate, developing, acquiring, and operating space-based assets and associated 
                                                 
80 Department of the Navy. SECNAV Instruction 5400.39C: Department of Navy Space Policy. 6 
April 2004. p. 2. http://ftp.fas.org/irp/doddir/navy/secnavinst/5400_39c.pdf. April 2007.  
81 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
82 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
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capabilities to satisfy joint, national, or naval operational requirements.”83  Liberal 
interpretation of this verbiage lends credence to an organizational structure that permits 
the Navy to focus the majority of its space program efforts on establishing, educating and 
maintaining a robust Navy Space Cadre, even at the expense of operating it’s own space-
based assets - identified as relevant only ‘when appropriate’ in this instruction. 
b. CJCSI 6250.01B (May 28, 2004) 
This Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction outlines the use and management of 
all DoD SATCOM.  Explicit in the instruction is direction to the Services regarding use 
and management of DoD controlled communication satellites.  It mandates impartial 
treatment and consideration for use of assets and prohibits the notion that the more 
satellites an individual Service acquires or operates, the more SATCOM time and 
allocation they will receive.  “This instruction provides high-level, operational policy, 
guidance and procedures for the planning, management, employment and use of satellite 
communications (SATCOM) resources for the Department of Defense.”84  The 
instruction also provides a SATCOM priority table in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
directs the precedence of use for communication satellites.  Again, no preference in 
operation is given to the agency holding asset ownership.  
c. Navy Space Cadre Human Capital Strategy (December 2004) 
“Successful application of space in the Navy translates to a healthy and 
robust Navy Space Cadre.”85  In response to the SECNAVINST 5400.39C directive for 
the establishment of a Navy Space Cadre, in December of 2004, the DoN released its 
Human Capital Strategy for the implementation of this new cadre.  
                                                 
83 Department of the Navy. SECNAV Instruction 5400.39C: Department of Navy Space Policy. 6 
April 2004. pp. 3-4. http://ftp.fas.org/irp/doddir/navy/secnavinst/5400_39c.pdf. April 2007. Emphasis 
added. 
84 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  CJCSI 6250.01B: Satellite Communications.  28 May 2004. 
p. 1. 
85 Department of the Navy. Navy Space Cadre Human Capital Strategy, Version 1.1. 27. Naval 
Network Warfare Command. December 2004. p. 1. 
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This HCS supports and complements the National Security Space’s 
Human Capital Resource Strategy (HCRS) dated February 2004 and the 
DoN HCS dated June 2004.  The objective of the Space Cadre HCS is to 
groom and shape the workforce to fill major decision-making positions 
across the Navy, Joint, and National Security Space assessment, 
requirements, science & technology/research & development, acquisition, 
and operational arena in order to maximize return on investment in 
meeting evolving Naval requirements...Proper management and placement 
of Navy Space Cadre personnel will allow the Navy to gain huge return on 
investment and leverage more than $12B per year spent on unclassified 
space systems by the Air Force and other services.86   
d. OPNAVINST 5400.43 (May 20, 2005) 
This CNO instruction was implemented to establish procedures and clarify 
roles and responsibilities for implementing the Department of the Navy Space Policy per 
SECNAVINST 5400.39C.87  Contained within the discussion section of this instruction is 
the description of the Navy Space Cadre.  “Success is dependent on a solid foundation of 
Space Cadre and a forward leaning Navy Space Team that actively coordinates Navy 
space needs, priorities, and innovative capabilities within the Navy, the wider NSS and 
the civil space community.”88  
The policy set forth in OPNAVINST 5400.43 consists of three distinctive 
sections – the Navy will: 
i) Integrate the essential capabilities provided by space systems at every 
appropriate level throughout the naval force;  
ii) Shape the outcome of joint deliberations on future space capabilities to ensure 
the combat effectiveness of naval force; and  
iii) Recruit, educate, qualify, and retain a professional space cadre.89  
                                                 
86 Department of the Navy. Navy Space Cadre Human Capital Strategy, Version 1.1. Naval Network 
Warfare Command. 27 December 2004. p.2. 
87 Department of the Navy. OPNAVINST 5400.43A Navy Space Policy Implementation. 12 February 
2007. p. 2. 
https://doni.daps.dla.mil/Directives/Forms/AllItems.aspx?RootFolder=%2fDirectives%2f05000%20Genera
l%20Management%20Security%20and%20Safety%20Services%2f05%2d400%20Organization%20and%2
0Functional%20Support%20Services. May 2007. 
88 Ibid., p. 3. 
89 Ibid., p. 3. 
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The Deputy CNO (Manpower and Personnel/CNO N1) is responsible for 
managing the Navy Space Cadre to include designating the Navy Space Cadre Advisor to 
act in a virtual community manager role for the Space Cadre.  Naval Network Warfare 
Command is responsible for review and formulation of Navy Space Policy, oversight of 
Navy space activities, and is designated as the Space Type Commander and Space 
Functional Authority per SECNAVINST 5400.39C.  NETWARCOM is also responsible 
for developing, maintaining and overseeing the Navy Space Human Capital 
Strategy…coordinating with the fleet on best distribution of space expertise in afloat 
billets.  Furthermore, this instruction identifies NETWARCOM as the United States 
Navy functional component to USSTRATCOM for Space.  Supporting USSTRATCOM 
functional component for JFCC Space as required.90  The wording of this instruction 
suggests a number of interpretations.  One suggestion is a clear and unmistakable 
requirement for an established, educated and robust Navy Space Cadre.  Less concrete is 
direction provided regarding Navy requirements or benefits to be gained from internal 
acquisition and operation of space systems. 
On February 12, 2007 the CNO released OPNAVINST 5400.43A.  Only a 
few changes were added to the original instruction, primarily focusing on space effects 
integration into the FORCEnet architecture. 
e. Naval Space Campaign Plan 2005-2007 (November 13, 2005) 
The Naval Space Campaign Plan was published in an effort to further 
clarify and officially establish the Navy’s policy and guidance with regards to naval 
space efforts. 
The Naval Space Campaign is fleet-centric, designed to improve space 
processes across the naval enterprise.  To best accomplish this, Naval 
Space Campaign efforts are synchronized with naval space strategy 
development and the Navy Space Cadre Human Capital Strategy.  The 
Naval Space Campaign serves as a forcing function for the naval space                                                  
90 Department of the Navy. OPNAVINST 5400.43A Navy Space Policy Implementation. 12 February 
2007. p. 8. 
https://doni.daps.dla.mil/Directives/Forms/AllItems.aspx?RootFolder=%2fDirectives%2f05000%20Genera
l%20Management%20Security%20and%20Safety%20Services%2f05%2d400%20Organization%20and%2
0Functional%20Support%20Services. May 2007. 
 44
strategy and is dependent upon the space cadre human capital strategy to 
put the right space skill set in the right place at the right time.91   
The objectives contained within the plan are critical to the current and 
future success of fleet operations around the globe.92   
• Develop Maritime-specific Space Requirements:  Develop space 
requirements based on current capabilities and limitations of space 
systems. 
• Satisfy Maritime Requirements: Ensure space systems provided by the EA 
for Space and National Security Space sector provide desired effects to 
meet maritime requirements, and provide feedback through the Naval 
Capabilities Development Process if they do not.  
• Increase Space Knowledge: Promote a better understanding in the fleet of 
how space-provided effects support maritime operations and scheme of 
maneuver. 
• Improve Combat Effectiveness: Improve fleet combat effectiveness with 
smarter, more aggressive use of space-based capabilities, focusing on 
maximizing effects for the Carrier Strike Group.  
• Improve Human Capital: Cultivate Navy Space Cadre expertise for 
assignment into joint space and National Security Space (NSS) billets.  
• Ingrain Cultural Change: Harvest space-related best practices from Naval 
Space Campaign lessons learned and institutionalize them through 
doctrine and policy.  
• Understand Space System Vulnerabilities: Ensure Navy seniors 
understand the vulnerabilities of space systems and mitigation options.  
 
Like the OPNAV and SECNAV Instructions, the Navy Space Campaign 
Plan does not explicitly mention the requirement for the U.S. Navy to acquire, operate, 
control or perform management of narrow-band communications satellites or resources.   
The foundation of the Naval Space Campaign is the expertise and 
professional knowledge of the Navy and Marine Corps Space Cadre.  
Success is dependent on a solid foundation of Navy Space Cadre…that  
 
 
                                                 
91 Department of the Navy. Naval Space Campaign Plan 2005-2007 ‘Space Capabilities for the 
Warfighter’. Naval Network Warfare Command. 13 November 2005. pp. 3-4. 
92 Ibid., p. 8. 
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actively coordinates naval space needs, priorities, and innovative 
capabilities with the Navy, Marine Corps, the wider NSS and the civil 
space community.93 
NETWARCOM is currently working on a “Navy Space Concept of 
Operations” (CONOPS) document that will supersede the Navy Space Campaign Plan.  
This document is currently in draft format and not available for public consumption.   
f. U.S. National Space Policy (August 31, 2006) 
“The president authorized a new national space policy on August 31, 2006 
that establishes overarching national policy that governs the conduct of U.S. space 
activities.”94  Just like the SECNAVINST 5400.39C, OPNAVINST 5400.43 and the 
Naval Space Campaign Plan, the President ordered the development of space 
professionals to ensure the United States continues to sustain excellence within the 
dominion of space.   “Develop Space Professionals…Department and agencies that 
conduct space related activities shall establish standards and implement activities to 
develop and maintain highly skilled, experienced, and motivated space professionals 
within their workforce.”95 
2. Positive Aspects of the Navy’s Space Policy 
There are many constructive features in the prose of recent Navy Space 
documents and  policies: Establishment of a Navy Space TYCOM; Establishment of the 
Navy Space Cadre; Increases in space effects awareness throughout the fleet; Inception of 
the CSG Space Officer; and initial publication of the Fleet Space Handbook. 
The designation of NETWARCOM as the Navy’s Space Type Commander has 
the potential to be a significant step forward for Navy space efforts in the presence of a 
space-savvy commander.  As a three-star admiral, NETWARCOM has more influence 
                                                 
93Department of the Navy. Naval Space Campaign Plan 2005-2007 ‘Space Capabilities for the 
Warfighter’. Naval Network Warfare Command. 13 November 2005. p. 14. 
94 United States. United States National Space Policy. 31 August 2006. 
http://www.ostp.gov/html/US%20National%20Space%20Policy.pdf. May 2007. p. 1. 
95 Ibid., p 3. 
 46
than has been previously fielded in the Naval space community.  This promotion of 
command allows for greater representation of Navy space efforts not only in the naval 
arena, but in the joint and national space environment as well. 
Another positive aspect to the composition and publication of these policy 
documents is that both SECNAVINST 5400.39C and OPNAVINST 5400.43 provide the 
naval forces much-needed definition of responsibilities with regards to Naval space 
activities.  Supporting that guidance is the creation and direction of the Navy Space 
Cadre.  The Navy Space Cadre Human Capital Strategy and the Naval Space Campaign 
Plan both outline the need for a vigorous and hearty Navy Space Cadre and enunciate the 
benefits that could be realized with the development of this type of core space proponent. 
Finally, the policies paved the way for the first-ever CSG Space Officer.  The 
results of this experiment have not been officially released, but preliminary indications 
point to notable successes for the implementation of space effects at the operational level, 
and validation of the concept of a “space-enabled staff.”96 
3. Negative Aspects of the Navy’s Space Policy 
The Navy’s space policies and plans lack sufficient clarity as to the current 
structure, status, ownership and operation of Navy controlled satellites.  Further, there are 
omissions regarding the articulation of naval usage and allocation of unclassified space 
assets, to include commercial communications satellites.  Though not always contained in 
high-level policy, correction of these omissions could have been incorporated within the 
Naval Space Campaign Plan 2005-2007 as an effort to provide the target audience with 
an opportunity to understand the current and future status of naval space activity.   
Another shortcoming in the campaign is the absence of a consolidated Navy space 
command and control architecture.  Confusion and uncertainty are rampant when trying 
to discern a possible flow of command and control for operations, effects, acquisition and 
requirements definition.   
                                                 
96 Zigmond Leszczynski, Commander, U.S. Navy. EISENHOWER Strike Group (IKESG) End-of-
Deployment Report, Space Segment. Carrier Strike Group 8. May 2007. 
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These policies are also lacking significantly in direct guidance relating to an 
implementation strategy for the establishment and maintenance of a robust Navy Space 
Cadre.  The Naval Space Campaign Plan, DoD Directive 5101.2 (DoD Executive Agent 
for Space), OPNAV Instruction 5400.43 (Navy Space Policy Implementation) and 
SECNAV Instruction 5400.39 (Department of the Navy Space Policy) all mandate a 
“sufficient cadre of space-qualified personnel”, but no instruction is given regarding the 
execution of that objective.  
Similarly, insufficient instruction and guidance in the realm of joint space 
endeavors are available.  Though not clearly identified as critical to the service, the 
Navy’s role in the joint space sector is worthy of at least honorary mention.  Again the 
Navy’s space policies, procedures and instructions are deficient in their ability to provide 
guidance and direction in the joint space effort.  This is one of the greatest shortcomings 
of the Navy’s space policy as the entire DoD conducts business within the joint-centric 
arena. 
These failings in policy pose an impediment to the success of the Navy Space 
Campaign.  The lack of guidance and direction, in conjunction with platitudes regarding 
network centric warfare and party-line rhetoric, needs to be addressed and reevaluated by 
senior Navy leadership.  In order to assure success in current and future Navy Space 
operations, leadership must jump-start space requirements and processes with a critical 
revision of Naval Space policy. 
B. NAVY SPACE CAMPAIGN COMMAND AND CONTROL CONSTRUCT 
Though the SECNAV and OPNAV instructions mentioned above clearly define 
the roles and responsibilities of those directorates which control the different space 
elements, the overall Navy-wide space Command and Control (C²) hierarchy and 
organizational graphic representation have never been formally published.  The current 
C² for Navy space is one of the most perplexing, splintered and continually evolving of 




simplified reporting structure specific to the Naval Satellite Operations Center, and 
represents one of the only historical command relationship organization charts available 
in this field.  
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Figure 4.   C² Historical Flow Chart for the Naval Satellite Operations Center97 
 
This diagram illustrates the transformation of just one of the numerous Navy 
space components.   
Instead of spotlighting the traditional C² methods within the Navy space realm, 
the next section will focus on the C² of Space effects in an effort to understand how those 
effects get to the warfighter and how Navy Space Cadre representation within that C² 
structure plays a critical role in the success of naval space effects.  “Knowledge of how 
space effects get to the CSG and ESG is critical to ensuring warfighters have required 
space effects.”98  Figure 5 (below) shows the current C² flow for supplying space effects 
                                                 
97 Paul M. Insch, Captain, U.S. Navy. NAVSOC Command Brief. Naval Satellite Operations Center. 
PowerPoint Brief. June 2006. Slide 44. 
98Department of the Navy. Naval Space Campaign Plan 2005-2007 ‘Space Capabilities for the 
Warfighter’. Naval Network Warfare Command. 13 November 2005. p. 10. 
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to the operational naval warfighter.  CSG-8, the fleet Executive Agent for the Navy Space 
Campaign, returned from a milestone deployment in May of 2007, during which they 
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Figure 5.   CSG-8 C²  Space Effects Operational Flow Chart modified by authors to reflect 
Navy Space Cadre Representation Requirements99 
 
The official End-of-Deployment Report for CSG-8 is a classified document 
published and located on the SIPRNET CSG-8 homepage.  The lessons learned from this 
endeavor will be incorporated in the new Navy Space CONOPS tentatively scheduled to 
be released by the end of 2007.  The benefits from this C² Space Effects construct were 
identified as essential to CSG-8’s incorporation of space effects into daily operations.   
CSG-8/IKESG has benefited greatly from our journey as the fleet EA for 
space.  We are smarter towards our use of space capabilities and better 
recognize our vulnerabilities in that regard as well.  As such we are better 
prepared to prevail in conflict.  While deployed in the CENTCOM AOR,  
                                                 
99 Julie Niedermaier, Commander, U.S. Navy. Navy Space Cadre Update (SSFA Space 
Indoctrination). PowerPoint Brief. March 2007. Slide 19. 
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Commander, IKESG could say with confidence that every bit of space 
capability available was brought to bear in support of designated 
operational events.100   
It is important to note that the success of this C² construct and the 
accomplishments of CSG-8 rely heavily on the use and proper staging of Navy Space 
Cadre members – Navy Space personnel in the right place at the right time.   
C. FUTURE ENDEAVORS 
One of the major upcoming milestones for the Naval Space Campaign is to 
officially publish and employ the Fleet Space Operations CONOPS.  Some of the delay 
in the processing and publication is due to NETWARCOM’s desire to include CSG-8 
experiences and post deployment lessons learned into the CONOPS.101  Further ventures 
for the Navy Space Campaign include:   
• NIOSC Support through ESG/CSG Work-ups 
• Formalization of Navy Space Education and Training 
• Space in Turnaround Training Plans (TTP) 
• Warfare Commander’s Conference 
• CSG Space Operations Course 
• NSSI Billets dedicated to CSG/ESG Training 
• Formalization of Space “Play” in CSG/ESG Fleet Response Training Plan 
• Master Scenario Event List (MSEL)/Naval Mission Essential Tasks 
(NMET) development with Strike Force Training, Atlantic 
• Formalization of space “Play” in all Navy exercises 
• Posturing to make Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander 
(JFMCC) the Theater Space Coordinating Authority 
Just as the Department of Defense is undergoing a transformation process, so is 
the Navy’s Space Campaign.  Within the current construct of the campaign lies the 
foundation for the Navy Space Cadre, the establishment of a Navy Space TYCOM and 
                                                 
100 Zigmond Leszczynski, Commander, U.S. Navy. EISENHOWER Strike Group (IKESG) End-of-
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the first ever CSG Staff Space Officer.  The shortfalls associated with the current 
campaign reside in its lack of an implementation strategy, ambiguity of intent for Navy 
space usage, and the Navy’s role in the joint space environment.  Good, bad or otherwise, 
the Navy Space Campaign is underway, and only through sound decision making and 
aggressive leadership will the Navy space community be able to navigate through the 
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IV. NAVY SPACE CADRE 
The Navy space cadre was founded by order of the Secretary of the Navy on April 
6th, 2004102 as a response to the July 2003 Department of Defense Directive 5101.2, 
which mandated that:   
The Heads of the DoD Components shall: 
Develop and maintain a sufficient cadre of space-qualified personnel to 
support their Component in space planning, programming, acquisition, 
and operations.  Support the DoD Executive Agent for Space with space 
cadre personnel to represent their Component in DoD-wide planning, 
programming, and acquisition activities.103 
The creation of the Navy Space Cadre has been established in a parallel but 
unequal effort with the Air Force, Army and Marine Corps Space Cadres.  The 
differences among the service efforts in constructing their organizations of “space 
experts” is instructive as to the assessed cost-benefit relation that each branch assigns to 
its use of space, and relative leadership understanding of the impact of space effects. 
This chapter examines the continuing formation of the Navy’s Space Cadre, its 
expected roles in the National Security Space arena, and a comparison with the 
organization, roles and responsibilities of the other services’ Space Cadres. 
A. ORIGIN 
1. DoD-wide Policy 
The 2001 “Commission to Assess United States National Security Space 
Management and Organization” (otherwise known as the ‘2001 Rumsfeld Space 
Commission,’ or ‘2001 Space Commission’) kicked off the most recent round of 
reorganization within the U.S. Department of Defense Space Community with the 
following focus and statements:  
                                                 
102 Department of the Navy.  SECNAV Instruction 5400.39C: Department of the Navy Space Policy. 6 
April 2004. 
103 United States. Department of Defense Directive 5101.2, DoD Executive Agent for Space. July 
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The Commission examined the role of organization and management in 
developing and implementing national-level guidance and in establishing 
requirements, acquiring and operating systems, and planning, 
programming and budgeting for national security space capabilities. The 
review concentrated on intelligence and military space operations as they 
relate to the needs of the national leadership as well as the needs of the 
military in conducting air, land and sea operations and independent space 
operations. 
… while organization and management are important, the critical need is 
national leadership to elevate space on the national security agenda.104 
The same document reaches the following conclusion on the subject of 
organization and management:  
Second, the U.S. Government—in particular, the Department of Defense 
and the Intelligence Community—is not yet arranged or focused to meet 
the national security space needs of the 21st century. Our growing 
dependence on space, our vulnerabilities in space and the burgeoning 
opportunities from space are simply not reflected in the present 
institutional arrangements. After examining a variety of organizational 
approaches, the Commission concluded that a number of disparate space 
activities should promptly be merged, chains of command adjusted, lines 
of communication opened and policies modified to achieve greater 
responsibility and accountability. Only then can the necessary trade-offs 
be made, the appropriate priorities be established and the opportunities for 
improving U.S. military and intelligence capabilities be realized. Only 
with senior-level leadership, when properly managed and with the right 
priorities will U.S. space programs both deserve and attract the funding 
that is required.105 
Finally, the following “U.S Objective for Space” is stated:  
5. Create and Sustain a Cadre of Space Professionals 
Since its inception, a hallmark of the U.S. space program has been 
worldclass (sic.) scientists, engineers and operators from academic 
institutions, industry, government agencies and the military Services. 
Sustained excellence in the scientific and engineering disciplines is 
                                                 
104 United States. Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space 
Management and Organization.  Department of Defense. 12 January 2001. p. 5. 
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/spaceintro.pdf. June 2007. 
105 Ibid., p. 9. This is the second conclusion of five unanimous “matters of key importance” that the 
authors of the commission reached. 
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essential to the future of the nation’s national security space program. It 
cannot be taken for granted. Military space professionals will have to 
master highly complex technology; develop new doctrine and concepts of 
operations for space launch, offensive and defensive space operations, 
power projection in, from and through space and other military uses of 
space; and operate some of the most complex systems ever built and 
deployed. To ensure the needed talent and experience, the Department of 
Defense, the Intelligence Community and the nation as a whole must place 
a high priority on intensifying investments in career development, 
education and training to develop and sustain a cadre of highly competent 
and motivated military and civilian space professionals.106 
Taken together, these positions and statements, as well as other recommendations 
contained within the 2001 Space Commission document, resulted in Department of 
Defense Directive 5101.2, released on 3 June 2003.  DoDD 5101.2 re-established the 
Secretary of the Air Force as the Executive Agent for Space (first specified in 1961, 
DoDD 5160.32, cancelled in 1970) and mandated the creation of individual service 
component Space Cadres to:  
…support their Component in space planning, programming, acquisition, 
and operations.  Support the DoD Executive Agent for Space with space 
cadre personnel to represent their Component in DoD-wide planning, 
programming, and acquisition activities.107 
2. The Navy Response 
The Navy ostensibly got the jump on the 2003 DoD Directive, with Chief of 
Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark approving creation of a “cross-community” Navy 
Space Cadre in July 2002, following the 2001 Space Commission report.  The intent of 
the Navy Space Cadre effort has been, from the beginning, to function as a strict 
subspecialty occupation, subordinate to the primary warfare designation or functional 
area to which the personnel were assigned.  The “cross-community” nature of this 
establishment was proposed as analogous to the Defense Acquisition Community,108 
                                                 
106 United States. Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space 
Management and Organization.  Department of Defense. 12 January 2001. p. 18. 
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/spaceintro.pdf. June 2007. 
107 United States. Department of Defense Directive 5101.2, DoD Executive Agent for Space. July 
2003. Section 6.3.5.  http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/510102.htm. June 2007. 
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where expertise in the field is acquired through formal educational opportunities and the 
members of the community move back and forth between tours with their parent  
warfighting community and tours in the space arena.  While consistent with other Navy 
“subspecialty communities” this method of organization differs substantially from the 
methods used by the other military services.   
The human resources approach to the Space Cadre in the Navy has unfortunately 
led to a lack of organizational momentum and resultant deficiencies in Human Capital 
Strategy.  These deficiencies were most critically noted in an August 2004 GAO report 
on the development of Space Personnel.109  This GAO report identifies Department of 
Defense efforts in developing and implementing an integration plan for national security 
space personnel as inadequate, and varying widely by service.  More specifically, the 
2004 GAO report states that: 
The Air Force and Marine Corps have taken significant actions to develop 
and manage their space cadres; however, the Army’s and Navy’s actions 
have been limited because these two services do not have clear goals and 
objectives for their space cadres or focal points designated to manage the 
cadres.”110 
Absence of goals, objectives, and focused action were further identified in the 
GAO report as stemming from the non-centralized nature of the Navy Space Cadre.  The 
basic concept of space expertise spread across the full variety of Navy warfighting 
specialties is perceived within the Navy as promoting flexibility and supporting existing 
promotion paths and policies within individual Space Cadre members’ parent 
communities.111  Unfortunately, at that time, in 2004, more than two years after the 
                                                 
108 Victor See, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy. CHIPS Interview.  CHIPS. January 2006. 
http://www.chips.navy.mil/archives/06_Jan/web_pages/RADM_SEE.htm. June 2007. 
109 United States. Report to Congressional Committees:  Defense Space Activities:  Additional Actions 
Needed to Implement Human Capital Strategy and Develop Space Personnel.  Government Accountability 
Office.  August 2004.  http://www.gao.gov/new.itmes/d04697.pdf. June 2007. 
110 Ibid., p. 3. 
111 Victor See, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy. CHIPS Interview.  CHIPS. January 2006. 
http://www.chips.navy.mil/archives/06_Jan/web_pages/RADM_SEE.htm. June 2007. and:United States. 
Transcript of House Armed Services Committee Hearing No. 108–40, Hearing on Space Cadre/Space 
Professionals. House of Representatives. One Hundred Eighth Congress, Second Session. 22 July 2004. p. 
18. http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has204290.000/has204290_0f.htm. June 2007. 
 57
creation of the Navy Space Cadre, the distributed approach to composition of the 
organization had failed to achieve any of the organizational goals set forth in the 2001 
Rumsfeld Space Commission report.  Indeed, Navy efforts to formally organize, educate, 
certify or manage its space personnel, seemed nonexistent.  Vice Admiral James 
McArthur, the commander of the Naval Network Warfare Command 
(NETWARCOM)112 at the Space Cadre/Space Professionals House Armed Services 
Committee hearing on 22 July 2004 was unable to respond in a clear and unambiguous 
manner to questioning regarding core and critical skills,113 certification procedures,114 
and general organization and leadership of the Navy Space Cadre. 
B.   COMPARISONS -- OTHER DOD SPACE CADRE 
The individual services each approach the issue of their Space Professional 
communities differently, but the Navy strays farthest from the other three branches.  The 
Navy decision to forego a specific community and designation for space qualified 
personnel resulted in a dilution of institutional support for the mission, absence of 
quantifiable processes for the organization, and absence of appropriate funding.  Only in 
the Navy are space-trained personnel not routinely assigned to space-related positions or 
belong to a Space Cadre that has the authority to assign personnel to specific positions.  
Instead, Navy Space Cadre members move into space jobs only as their career 
progression in their parent community permits.  Assignment to a space-coded billet is 
implicitly secondary to the requirements of an individual’s warfighting specialty.  At the 
opposite end of the spectrum, the Air Force has an established career path for personnel 
from initial accession through retirement.  Space is considered a career-field unto itself, 
and therefore has the established policies and procedures that are expected of a 
standardized organization.  This approach, however, has not necessarily yielded a 
                                                 
112 NETWARCOM is the U.S. Navy organization charged with command and control of Navy space 
efforts and programs. 
113 United States. Transcript of House Armed Services Committee Hearing No. 108–40, Hearing on 
Space Cadre/Space Professionals. House of Representatives. One Hundred Eighth Congress, Second 
Session. 22 July 2004. p. 18. 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has204290.000/has204290_0f.htm. June 2007. 
114 Ibid., p. 24. 
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pervasive and uniform level of operational expertise throughout the Air Force’s space 
cadre.  The mindset of many Air Force space operators reflects an institutional focus on 
the term “operational” as pertaining to controlling, maintaining and operating satellites 
and their attendant systems.  Without exposure to kinetic warfare and combat experience, 
space “operators” can be prone to miss the boat with regards to terrestrial warfighter 
requirements and needs.115  Remediation of problems caused by this lack of satellite 
operator warfighting acumen must occur on the ground, usually in theater, through the 
efforts of experienced space products users like Army FA-40s and Marine Corps Space 
Cadre members.  Perhaps as a consequence of the extreme differences between the Air 
Force and Navy approaches to space cadre, the Army and Marine Corps take an approach 
somewhere between these two poles, sourcing their officer space expertise at the mid-
grade level, after service in another, more fundamental career track.  Both the Marines 
and Army establish a new Military Occupational Specialty for space-savvy officers, and 
for Army FA-40s, once assigned to the services’ Space Cadre, the remainder of their 
service time is spent in that functional area.  The Army, especially, has developed a 
robust and integrated program for the use of their FA-40 space cadre members, defining 
theater-level space support requirements and job descriptions, as well as concepts of 
operation for organic and attached space team assets.116  This clear and careful 
establishment of roles and responsibilities for Army space personnel seems to stem not 
only from Governmental Accountability Office criticism, but also from a degree of 
frustration with the internal Air Force perception of their own space “operators”, the 
divergent interpretation of the use of the term “operator” and a requirement to meet 




                                                 
115 Bruce H. McClintock, Major, U.S. Air Force.  The Transformation Trinity. Air University Press, 
Maxwell AFB, Alabama. 2002. pp .45-49. 
116 Daniel P. Arthur, Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy and Dennis G. Wille, Major, U.S. Army.  “A 
Proposed Architecture for Theater Coordination of Global Space Capabilities.”  Naval Postgraduate 
School Thesis, Monterey, CA. 2006. pp. 35-41. 
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1. Government Accountability Office and the Executive Agent for Space 
These differences are highlighted in the 2004 GAO report.  It focuses on 
implementation failings in the DoD Space Human Capital Resources Strategy, both at the 
DoD, as well as individual service levels.  The strategy, as published, contained strategic 
goals and objectives, but did not contain an implementation plan with specific actions, 
timeframes and goals.  The timeframe and release of the DoD Space Human Capital 
Resources Strategy and the 2004 GAO report bear a close relationship, and examination 
of the timing and recommendations resemble a ping-pong match:  
• Service:  February 2004 – DoD Executive Agent for Space releases DoD 
Space Human Capital Resources Strategy. 
• Volley:  August 2004 – Government Accountability Office releases report 
on DoD Space Human Capital Resources Strategy. 
• Volley:  December 2004 – DoD Executive Agent for Space releases DoD 
Space Human Capital Resources Implementation Strategy. 
The Executive Agent for Space managed to release its Space Human Capital 
Resources Implementation plan before the close of 2004 - an exceptionally quick 
response for a policy and doctrine publication.  Clearly, the criticisms in the 2004 GAO 
report were considered valid, important and addressable by the Executive Agent for 
Space. 
The rapid response to the GAO report on the part of the Secretary of the Air Force 
is indicative of the seriousness which that service (Air Force) approaches space planning 
and policy.  Indeed, the 2004 GAO report is as, if not more, critical of shortcomings in 
U.S. Navy and Army implementation of Space Cadre planning and execution as it is of 
the Department of Defense as a whole. 
2. The Good… 
For comparison, by August 2004, the Air Force had an approved strategic Space 
Cadre plan with delineated implementation objectives, and was in the neighborhood of 
completing 90% of their goals – to include:  
• Identification of all of the personnel making up the cadre (more than 
10,000 members at that time). 
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• Development and implementation of an education and training program, 
as well as a progression plan professional development. 
• Identification and definition of Space Cadre positions along with 
certification and educational requirements for those jobs. 
• Identification of financial resources for implementation of Space Cadre 
initiatives. 
• Designation of a certification program for personnel. 
• Establishment of a permanent space professional management function.117 
Similarly, the Marine Corps evidenced a clear institutional understanding of their 
needs for space-savvy professionals, and the 2004 GAO report details the Marine strategy 
which includes the following list of ten objectives for developing space professionals:  
• Establish an identifiable cadre of space-qualified enlisted and civilian 
marines. 
• Create and staff additional space personnel positions in the operating 
forces. 
• Create and staff additional space positions at national security space 
organizations. 
• Improve space operations professional military education for all Marine 
Corps officers. 
• Focus the graduate education of Marine Corps space operations students to 
support Marine Corps needs 
• Leverage inter-service space training to ensure the development and 
proficiency of the space cadre 
• Develop a management process through which interested officers can be 
assigned to multiple space-related positions during their careers and still 
compete for promotion with their peers. 
• Develop a process and structure for space professionals in the Marine 
Corps reserves through which they can support operations, training, and 
exercises through augmentation and mobilization 
• Fully participate in the DoD Executive Agent for Space’s efforts to create 
a space cadre 
• Incorporate appropriate space professional certification processes into the 
management of the Marine Corps’ space cadre.118 
                                                 
117 United States. Report to Congressional Committees:  Defense Space Activities:  Additional Actions 
Needed to Implement Human Capital Strategy and Develop Space Personnel.  Government Accountability 
Office.  August 2004. pp. 13-14. http://www.gao.gov/new.itmes/d04697.pdf. June 2007. 
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The Air Force and the Marine Corps could not be more different in their approach 
to space systems, effects and utilization.  The Air Force identifies space as a core 
competency of the service in general,119 and is responsible for the full spectrum of space-
related endeavors, from engineering design and construction of space systems, to the full 
spectrum of strategic, operational and tactical utilization of those assets.  DoD 
membership in the Air Force Space Cadre currently numbers 7,434, both officer and 
enlisted ranks.  The Marine Corps, by contrast, has a space cadre membership of only 110 
active and reserve members (as of September 2005), whose mission it is to provide 
Marine Corps representation in the requirements definition process for acquisition of 
space systems, and to leverage space systems in support of Marine Corps missions.120  
Though startlingly different in scope and service philosophy, the Air Force and Marine 
Corps’ share a critical commonality in their construction of Space Cadres and the 
composition of their Space Cadre Human Capital Strategies.  These two institutions have 
a clear understanding of the capabilities, roles and requirements of space systems in their 
respective warfare areas.  As a result, they exhibit a fundamental comprehension of what 
roles they expect their personnel to execute in the management and operation of space-
related capabilities, and they plan, staff and spend accordingly. 
3. …the Bad… 
In marked contrast to the clear and unobstructed view of the Air Force and Marine 
Corps with respect to their Space Cadres’, the Navy of 2004 was navigating through thick 
fog, uncertain of where its Space Cadre was destined, much less the roles, missions and 
tasks required to reach a destination.  The document governing Navy Space Cadre efforts 
                                                 
118 United States. Report to Congressional Committees:  Defense Space Activities:  Additional Actions 
Needed to Implement Human Capital Strategy and Develop Space Personnel.  Government Accountability 
Office.  August 2004. pp. 15-16. http://www.gao.gov/new.itmes/d04697.pdf. June 2007. 
119 United States. Joint Publication 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities. Department of Defense. 13 October 
1999. pp. vi-vii. 
120 United States. Statement of Brigadier General Thomas A. Benes, Director, Strategy and Plans 
Division. Plans, Policies, and Operation Department. Headquarters, United States Marine Corps.  House 
Armed Services Committee.  Space Budget Activities.  9 March 2005. p. 3. 
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at that time was a Secretary of the Navy Instruction, SECNAVINST 5400.39C, 
Department of the Navy Space Policy, released 6 April 2004.  This instruction, reflecting 
the criticism of the 2004 GAO report, contains only policy generalities and platitudes on 
the subjects of Sea Power 21,121 the National Security Space organization, and inter- 
agency relations.  It failed to identify critical space billets, required numbers of space 
personnel, performance measures, required resources and a central organizational 
manager for the community. 
The Army suffered similar criticism in the 2004 GAO report, with gaps identified 
in centralization of management functions for their cadre, lack of critical billet definition, 
and identification of civilian and enlisted personnel as Space Cadre members.  The Army 
however, had established a specific and tangible career path for space operations officers, 
education and training requirements for the same, and had studies underway to identify 
the proper numbers of these personnel and the billets with the highest fill requirements.  
As of the summer of 2007, the Army has completed identification of their space cadre 
personnel and required positions, had has studies ongoing to refine training needs, job-
task analysis and continues to perform data collection and tracking.122  
4. …and the Ugly 
Although not specifically branded by the Government Accountability Office as 
the DoD component with the most lackluster space-qualified personnel management 
system, one of the implications of the 2004 GAO report was that the Navy had the 
farthest to go in developing an effective Space Cadre.  Absent any sort of metrics-based 
space policy, Space Cadre Human Capital Strategy, and concrete, goal based Space 
Policy, implementation of an effective Navy Space Cadre substantially lagged the other 
services in meeting the requirements of the DoD Directive 5101.2. 
 
                                                 
121 Vern Clark, Admiral, U.S. Navy. Sea Power 21. Naval Institute Proceedings. October 2002.  
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/proceedings.html. June 2007. 
122 Army Space Cadre Space Enabler Nomination and Selection Effort (SENSE).  30 January 2007.  
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C.   GROWTH AND MATURATION OF THE NAVY SPACE CADRE. 
1. Navy Space Human Capital Strategy 
In response to the criticism and recommendations of the August 2004 GAO 
report, and the evident problems within the Navy space arena, the Department of the 
Navy stepped up its efforts to more effectively use its Space Human Capital between 
2004 and 2007.  Following closely on the heels of the GAO report, in December of 2004, 
the Navy issued its Navy Space Cadre Human Capital Strategy.  This document, while 
lacking the clarity of (for example) the Marine Corps Space Strategy, expands greatly 
upon the Department of the Navy Space Policy (SECNAVINST 5400.39C), establishing 
specific missions and purposes for the Cadre as a whole, identifying membership and 
makeup of the Navy Space Cadre, specifying membership requirements, limited 
personnel tracking mechanisms and approximate size, delineating roles and 
responsibilities for selected Space Cadre leadership positions, and stating specific goals 
for the strategy.   Perhaps most importantly, the Navy Space Cadre Human Capital 
Strategy clearly identifies the tasks inherent in the following space/space cadre-related 
positions: 
• Functional Authority (Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command) 
• Space Cadre Advisor 
• Assistant Space Cadre Advisor 
Centralization of organization and planning for the Navy Space Cadre, an issue 
identified as a major topic heading in the August 2004 GAO report,123 achieved an 
obvious high priority in the Navy’s space professional efforts.  Appointment of 
Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command (NNWC) as the Space Cadre Functional 
Authority effectively ties the implementation of Navy Space Cadre policy and Human 
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Capital Strategy to operational requirements at the network, Fleet, and Joint levels.124  
Moreover, as the heir to the disestablished Naval Space Command, NETWARCOM is 
the natural functional authority for the “virtual community”125 of Navy Space Cadre 
personnel. 
2. Navy Space Cadre Advisor 
Identification and selection of the Navy Space Cadre Advisor and the newer 
Assistant Space Cadre Advisor are evidenced as essential from the standpoint of Navy 
leadership.  To date, all three of the Naval officers that have served as the Space Cadre 
Advisor have been high-profile, highly-educated, proven performers who brought 
ambition and drive to the otherwise stagnant Navy efforts at codifying the requirements 
and responsibilities of the Navy Space Cadre.  Composition of the Navy Space Cadre 
Human Capital Strategy, analysis and enunciation of Navy Space officer billets, 
construction of a notional career path, integration of reserve officer space experts, 
identification of Civil Service Component space experts, development of the NNWC 
MOC Space Cell and development of proposed training pipelines have all occurred 
between 2004 and 2007.  Additionally, fit and fill rates (metrics to identify personnel 
placed in a job for which they have appropriate training, and to identify the percentage of 
the total number of Navy Space jobs filled, respectively) for Navy Space Cadre personnel 
have climbed significantly since the codification of the Navy Space Human Capital 
Strategy (for a representative Operations-specific example, see Figure 6, below). 
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Figure 6.   Space Systems Operations Subspecialty Historical Fit and Fill Rates.126 
 
3. Shortfalls 
The Navy Space Cadre Human Capital Strategy does not, however, address the 
following issues – issues of great import when viewed against the background of the fully 
established, mission-oriented Space Cadre of the Air Force, and the revised 2006 
National Space Policy: 
• Articulation of required Core Competencies for Navy Space personnel. 
• Composition of a list of "Best Practices" for the Navy Space community. 
• Establishment of a list of billets critical to the Navy Space community. 
• Construction and validation of a Navy Space Cadre Professional 
Certification. 
                                                 
126 Julie Niedermaier, Commander, U.S. Navy. Navy Space Cadre Update (SSFA Space 
Indoctrination). PowerPoint Brief. March 2007. Slide 6. 
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• Integration of enlisted space experts within the service into the Navy 
Space Cadre. 
• Proposal of a notional “virtual” career progression for the various parent 
communities hosting Space Cadre members. 
• Description of a career-long training program to establish a baseline 
knowledge requirement for Space Cadre personnel. 
• Clarification of the relationship between the “virtual community 
manager”127 of the Navy Space Cadre and the formalized parent 
community detailers for Space Cadre members. 
• Management of, or input to the promotion of Space Cadre personnel for 
the purpose of maintaining an educated senior leadership in the 
community. 
• Validation of the above measures by senior Navy leadership.  
All of these measures are shortfalls noted within the Navy Space Human Capital 
Strategy, identifying them as clearly within the radar horizon of the community 
leadership, but beyond the sensor range of senior Navy leadership.  Additionally, these 
shortfalls in the Navy’s strategy are notable in that they have all been solved by other 
services.  For example, Air Force and Army Human Capital Strategies have progressed to 
the point where the Air Force has developed a training program at the National Security 
Space Institute128 that fills joint requirements for space training and, as of 2005, 
supported a student population that was disproportionately comprised of services other 
than the Air Force.129  The Army uses a three-level certification program for its space 
professionals that was designed by and for the Air Force, and even recognizes the award 
of the Air Force qualification badges for wear on Army uniforms.  Career progression, 
critical-fill jobs, core competencies and full manpower integration are clearly solvable 
                                                 
127 The term “virtual community manager” appears on OPNAVINST 5400.43A, 12 Feb 07, page 3.  It 
is used in the sense of a collaborative group of individuals from disparate backgrounds and warfighting 
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is also an intrinsic component of the “cross-designator community.” 
128 Located in Colorado Springs, CO, previously the Air Force Space Operations School. 
129 2005 NSSI composition breakdown was 79% USAF, 21% Other.  This is in contrast to the total 
number of space positions in the DoD – 94% USAF, 6% Other.  United States.  Report to Congressional 
Committees:  Defense Space Activities:  Management Guidance and Performance Measures Needed to 
Develop Personnel.  Government Accountability Office.  September 2005.  pp. 19-21. 
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problems.  The shortfalls or gaps in the Navy Space Cadre Human Capital Strategy result 
more from high-level leadership dysfunction and lack of understanding than inability on 
the part of the Space Cadre to solve them. 
Indeed, the mention of other services’ solutions to implementing the requirements 
of Department of Defense Directives brings to the fore a broad-scope question - If other 
services have accepted the notion of joint training and education, core competencies, 
career requirements, and common certifications, why has the Navy not acknowledged 
these solutions? 
D.   CONTINUANCE AND PROMOTION OF THE NAVY SPACE CADRE  
1. Promotion Board Precept Language 
As one facet of the effort to ensure broad distribution of space proficiency 
throughout the fleet, and to enhance representation of the Navy Space Cadre at more 
senior levels, officer promotion boards since 2003 have included language that highlights 
the need to promote and retain personnel with space education and experience.130  
Promotion and retention of Navy personnel with extensive space training is critically 
important to the future of the Navy Space Cadre, as fluctuations in the promotion rates or  
perception of “glass ceilings” for community members has the potential to detract from 
future space cadre membership.  The text of the message to the promotion boards is 
included below: 
PRECEPT LANGUAGE FROM FY07 AD 04/05/06 LINE BOARDS 
Success of naval operations is dependent on the capabilities of national, 
DoD and commercial space support.  It is imperative that the Navy 
develops a significant cadre, comprised of the URL and RL communities, 
that is competent in relating the areas of operations, requirements, 
development and acquisition to space.  Members of this cadre may have 
atypical career paths because of specialized education, training and 
assignments outside of the Navy.  This cadre will continue to represent the 
Navy in mid-level and senior joint billets, as well as be assigned to Navy 
billets in direct support of space requirements and acquisition.  When 
selecting the best and fully qualified officers to meet the needs of the 
                                                 
130 Department of the Navy.  Navy Space Cadre Human Capital Strategy.  27 December 2004. p. 16. 
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Navy, you must view the quality of performance of offices in the Space 
Cadre as having weight equal to that ordinarily given to the quality of 
performance of other members of their respective communities who have 
followed more traditional career paths.131 
This effort has evidently borne fruit, as the promotion rates for O-5 and O-6 
Space Cadre members has been generally slightly higher than rates for their 
contemporaries without the Space Cadre subspecialty.  (See Figure 7, below.) 
In-Zone Promotion Rates
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Figure 7.   In-Zone Promotion Rates for Navy Space Cadre Personnel.132 
 
2. Additional Qualification Designations and Subspecialty Codes 
In an effort to codify the accomplishments of Space Cadre personnel within the 
community and present this information to promotion boards, a four-level Additional 
                                                 
131 Julie Niedermaier, Commander, U.S. Navy. Navy Space Cadre Update (SSFA Space 
Indoctrination). PowerPoint Brief. March 2007. Slide 25 Notes. 
132 Ibid., Slide 25 Notes. 
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Qualification Designator (AQD) scheme was introduced following the 2003 promotion 
board.  The four levels are as follows: 
• VS1 – Recruit:  Requires only Space Certificate, no experience 
• VS2 – Apprentice: Requires space-related undergraduate degree or 18 
months of experience in a space billet 
• VS3 – Journeyman: Requires space-related undergraduate degree plus 18 
months of experience or space-related masters’ degree or 36+ months of 
experience. 
• VS4 – Expert: Requires space-related masters’ degree plus 18 months of 
experience or space-related PhD or 10 years of experience. 
Although these AQD codes are in place in the Navy personnel system and Officer 
Service Records, it is unclear as to whether the addition of these codes is sufficient to 
identify exceptionally qualified Space Cadre personnel for promotion.  The Navy Space 
Cadre Human Capital Strategy specifically identifies this as a topic requiring 
assessment.133 
Confusion in the qualification process and identification of Navy space personnel 
stems in part from the labeling system. AQDs may be earned through either certificate 
programs or experience. Subspecialty Codes may also be earned through experience or 
formal education.  Either a Subspecialty Code or an AQD is required for assignment to a 
Space-coded billet, but completion of a space-coded job is necessary for the award of 
some AQDs and Subspecialty Codes.  The two Subspecialty Codes are 5500 (Space 
Systems Engineering) and 6206 (Space Systems Operations).  Officer billets in Navy 
space are identified by these two codes, and as of 2007, there were 315 of these positions 
available, primarily in the 6206 specialty.  Officers with Space Cadre Subspecialty Codes 
are further differentiated through the use of a suffix to the four-digit code, “T” for 
officers currently enrolled in a Space Systems educational curricula, “P” for officers who 
have completed educational requirements for the code, but have not yet served in a space-
coded billet, “S/R” for Subspecialty Codes awarded on the basis of experience, and 
“N/Q” for officers with who have both an approved Space Systems degree and have filled 
a space-coded billet.  Clearly, the system could use some refinement and clarification. 
                                                 
133 Department of the Navy.  Navy Space Cadre Human Capital Strategy.  27 December 2004.  p. 16. 
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E.   CURRENT SPACE CADRE PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT EFFORTS 
Of the 315 Navy Space Cadre Billets, 70 are at-sea billets and 208 are Joint 
billets.  This apparent skew toward ashore positions (approximately 78%) itself poses a 
problem for the credibility of the Space Cadre with seagoing “warfighter” communities.  
In an era of increasingly lean budgets and support to expeditionary warfare missions, the 
Navy perceives potential for cost savings and efficiency gains in personnel assignment by 
eliminating shore-based jobs in favor of manning positions aboard ships and in the 
Arabian Gulf region. 
1. The Sea – Shore Rotation Conundrum 
The threat posed by potential elimination of Navy presence in shore billets, and 
especially joint shore billets, cannot be overstated.  As the Navy influence in space 
systems and operations has waned, the Space Cadre personnel filling positions where 
they have ready contact with members of the greater DoD space community are the only 
remaining leverage that the Navy has to apply to fulfill needs supported by space 
systems.  Without input provided by operational, military Navy space personnel, Navy 
needs for space systems will be unfilled, as the requirements and acquisition process for 
these systems proceeds.   
On the flip-side of the coin, officers positioned in space billets must have a close 
and abiding connection with operational Navy forces.  The default position of the existing 
Navy Space community leadership is that this connection to Fleet operations must be 
accomplished through at-sea, operational experience.134  The current Navy Space Cadre 
Advisor states: 
In order to foster an understanding of Space Operations within the Fleet, it 
is essential for Space-qualified officers to return to the fleet, where they 




                                                  
134 Victor See, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy. CHIPS Interview.  CHIPS. January 2006. 
http://www.chips.navy.mil/archives/06_Jan/web_pages/RADM_SEE.htm. June 2007. 
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these personnel to come up with innovative solutions to warfighting gaps.  
To accomplish this, Space Cadre officers must have significant operational 
experience.135 
Plainly, it is desirable for Space Cadre personnel assigned to operational and 
seagoing units to possess a degree of expertise in space systems and operations.  From the 
standpoint of the formally educated Navy Space Cadre members, use of the degree 
provided by the Naval Postgraduate School is largely wasted.  Amongst the graduates of 
the 2002 to 2007 Space Systems Operations curricula, only 21% of Navy officers were 
assigned to a space-coded billet immediately after graduation.  The achievement of a 
masters’ degree is of great potential value to the Navy, but attainment of true space 
expertise cannot occur exclusively in an educational setting.  Experience and interaction 
with members of the greater DoD space community in the fielding and operation of 
satellite systems is necessary to ripen the fruits of formal education.  Further, the space 
systems that the Navy depends upon for communication, navigation, surveillance, and 
forecasting are largely acquired and operated by other services – without joint interaction 
prior to Navy-specific operations, Navy Space Cadre members will have an inadequate 
understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the systems and effects they will be 
expected to provide.  The resulting uphill battle in attempting to provide commanders 
with the information, capabilities and services they desire at the operational level will 
prove a frustration to both commanders and operators alike.  Worse, the lack of 
functional expertise and resulting weak job performance will diminish the credibility of 
the Space Cadre as a whole, exacerbating the problem of leadership ambivalence with 
regard to space-provided capabilities.   
2. Seagoing Space Cadre Support and the CSG-8 Space Team 
In the current Navy environment, application of space knowledge at the 
operational level is very much in its infancy.   Though billets requiring space 
Subspecialty Codes and AQDs are being established at seagoing staff and large-deck 
shipboard levels, realization of the capabilities and proficiencies that are supposed to be 
                                                 
135 Julie Niedermaier, Commander, U.S. Navy. Navy Space Cadre Update (SSFA Space 
Indoctrination). PowerPoint Brief. March 2007. Slide 8 Notes. 
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innate to Space Cadre members lags the personnel management paperwork.  The primary 
reason for the gap between the on-paper requirement for space know-how afloat and the 
actual implementation of that know-how is the fact that the space jobs are, without 
exception, collateral duties shipboard.  Herein lies another major shortcoming with the 
“cross-designator community” concept of the Navy Space Cadre.  In the typical 
shipboard environment, the officer’s focus of effort must be on their primary duty.  
Collateral duties, by nature, are secondary to the primary job assignment.  For this reason, 
space subspecialty coding for particular billets at sea is generally a paper tiger, with only 
as much bite as an individual has spare time to focus on that secondary mission. 
A notable exception to this de-facto standard is the rollout of the Naval Space 
Campaign and concept implementation of the Carrier Strike Group 8 (CSG-8), Fleet 
Executive Agent for Space deployment.  While the staff manning and structure for the 
Carrier Strike Group 8 Staff (embarked in USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, CVN-69) 
remained unchanged from the standard embarked staff, CSG-8 was selected to receive a 
very robust series of space-related training and education courses, site visits to space 
support and effects providers (primarily national systems/organizations), and extensive 
information/capabilities training for the Strike Group Commander.136  This “space 
superuser” staff was chartered as a portion of the Naval Space Campaign Plan to validate 
the following objectives:  
• Develop Maritime-specific Space Requirements: Develop space 
requirements based on current capabilities and limitations of space 
systems.  
• Satisfy Maritime Requirements: Ensure space systems provided by the 
Executive Agent (EA) for Space and National Security Space sector 
provide desired effects to meet maritime requirements, and provide 
feedback through the Naval Capabilities Development Process if they do 
not.  
• Increase Space Knowledge: Promote a better understanding in the fleet of 
how space-provided effects support maritime operations and scheme of 
maneuver.  
                                                 
136 Zigmond Leszcynski, Commander, U.S. Navy. NNWC Space Training, Education, Cadre 
Turnover.  PowerPoint Brief. Carrier Strike Group 8. March 2005.  
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• Improve Combat Effectiveness: Improve fleet combat effectiveness with 
smarter, more aggressive use of space-based capabilities, focusing on 
maximizing effects for the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) and Expeditionary 
Strike Group (ESG).  
• Improve Human Capital: Cultivate Navy Space Cadre expertise for 
assignment into joint space and National Security Space (NSS) billets.  
• Ingrain Cultural Change: Harvest space-related best practices from Naval 
Space Campaign lessons learned and institutionalize them through 
doctrine and policy.  
• Understand Space System Vulnerabilities: Ensure Navy seniors 
understand the vulnerabilities of space systems and mitigation options.137  
The recognition and success that the CSG-8 experiment achieved can be traced to 
the uncommon efforts of one individual on that staff.  In much the same way as recent 
refinement and development of the Navy Space Cadre can be traced to the current Space 
Cadre Advisor, the CSG-8 Air Operations Officer, a Space Cadre member functioned as 
the Deputy, Space Warfare Commander to the Commander, Carrier Strike Group 8.  The 
status of this position, a collateral duty as noted above, was significantly elevated for the 
purpose of the Naval Space Campaign effort, yet the officer assigned to the position 
continued to perform both his “warfare specialty” job as a primary assignment and his 
Space Cadre job at superlative levels.  Apparent boundless energy was evidenced in the 
production of daily space-effects briefs and leadership of a space planning team between 
2004 and 2007.  Presence of this high level of commitment to exercise of available space 
resources and leadership attention to the capabilities inherent in space-enabling the staff 
led directly to improved situational awareness on the part of the Strike Group 
Commander.   
Unfortunately, this level of commitment and energy, while desirable, is not 
sufficiently pervasive in any community, or sustainable for an individual.  The space 
after-action report from CSG-8’s deployment specifically recommends not only 
continuation of the training program for deployed staffs, but also that…  
…the Navy support establishment of Space Operations Officers in Strike 
Groups and MOCs (Maritime Operations Centers) to ensure close 
                                                 
137 Department of the Navy. Naval Space Campaign Plan, 2005-2007. pp. 4, 8.  13 November 2005. 
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coordination with the Theater Space Coordinating Authority and 
consistency of Navy space operations in theater.138 
Validation of the premise that a dedicated Space Operations officer should be 
assigned to Strike Group Staffs may be a foregone conclusion when considering that the 
experiment was chartered by the Navy Space Campaign.  That the recommendation is 
internally consistent with the Navy Space Cadre Human Capital Strategy does not, 
however, invalidate it – one of the stated goals of the Strategy is to “Gain senior 
leadership support throughout the Navy”,139 and that leadership support can come only 
with a point of focus within the operational staff that simultaneously provides space 
effects and can promote the cause of the Navy Space Cadre. 
3. Navy Space Cadre in the Joint and National Environment 
As a result of the efforts of the Navy Space Cadre leadership between 2004 and 
2007, the community has grown substantially in numbers, potential billets and influence.  
As of February 2007, the Navy Space Cadre numbered approximately 1500 personnel, 
grouped as follows: 
• 780 Active Duty Officer 
• 100 Reserve Officer 
• 140 Civil Service Civilian 
• 500 Enlisted (not yet fully integrated into Navy Space Cadre).140 
This population is up from 511 personnel identified for the September 2005 GAO 
report. 
The growth in the Navy Space Cadre, or more properly, identification of 
personnel with the required skill-set to qualify for Space Cadre membership, contrasts 
most vividly with Air Force membership.  By 2005, the Air Force had essentially 
completed identification of their Space Cadre personnel, and reported 7,434 personnel, 
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comprised of 6,051 Officers and 1,383 Enlisted.  This almost order-of-magnitude 
difference in Cadre size is only the tip of the iceberg.  The Air Force identifies 7,195 
space positions for their personnel base, representing a 97% utilization rate for their 
Space Cadre.141  The Army has a similar utilization rate for its Space Cadre.  In contrast, 
because of the “cross-community” nature of the Navy Space Cadre, more than half of 
Navy officers with space training and qualifications are employed in jobs that are 
unrelated to space and have no requirement for the training these personnel possess. 
Across the DoD, only 315 positions for Navy Officer Space Cadre members exist, 
providing a 40% utilization rate for this community.  This gross mismatch of availability 
of space-trained personnel with the number of space-related jobs under Navy control is a 
necessity under the current Navy Space Cadre “cross community” construct, but 
represents a waste of training, education and manpower resources when those personnel 
are employed outside of space-related billets.  
Additionally, because of the allocation of funding and resources for space within 
the DoD, Navy Space Cadre are under-represented within their own service.  66% of 
positions available to Navy Space Cadre are located within the Joint arena, outside of the 
Navy organization.142  With approximately 93% of the entire DoD budget for space 
under their purview, 143 the Air Force “owns”, or has the primary historical tie to most of 
the Joint commands that manage DoD space.144  
In combination with service dominance of military space efforts, extensive Air 
Force education, training, certification, policy and doctrine, and personnel management 
                                                 
141 United States.  Report to Congressional Committees:  Defense Space Activities:  Management 
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systems already in place have the potential to provide a sound structure for Navy Space 
Cadre formalization efforts .  Navy acceptance and officially sanctioned use of some of 
the methods and systems in place in the Air Force not only could contribute to the cause 
of enhancing jointness, but also reduce redundancies in planning, execution and 
management of the service-specific Space Cadre.  As an example, Army acceptance of 
Air Force training and certification as part of their Space Cadre professional development 
is an outstanding example of simplicity and synergy.  Use of National Security Space 
Institute education and Certified Space Professional standards supply the Army with a 
method for meeting DoD Space Cadre requirements, and neatly centralizes the expertise 
required to produce space-smart personnel.  Further, accepting the established Air Force 
solutions with respect to personnel eliminates non-core-competency tasks from the 
Army’s slate.  In an era of declining budgets and business-outsourcing, strategic 
integration of service efforts in maintaining and furthering their Space Cadres is viable 
option. 
For the Navy, specifically, full development and utilization of experts in space 
systems and operations is a necessity.  Though direct Navy involvement in the business 
of space has waned, reliance on the services and products provided by space systems 
continues to grow.  Operators, managers and leadership throughout the Navy need to be 
supported by a community of space experts.  Further, the time and commitment required 
to acquire and implement that know-how must not be detrimental to promotion of those 
experts.  The current trend of growing recognition of these facts must be nurtured, and 
funded commensurate with the field’s importance to Navy operations in a asymmetric, 
networked combat environment.  The evidence clearly indicates that highly trained 
personnel with substantial space expertise placed in positions where they can affect 
leverage on national space efforts promote the cause of the Navy Space Cadre, Navy 
Space Campaign, Sea Power 21 and the national interest. 
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V. NAVY SPACE:  CORE BUSINESSES AND OUTSOURCING 
Institutional inertia and organizational culture can represent reasons why 
bureaucracies behave in certain ways, but do not necessarily validate methods and 
practices.145  With an established and valued history in the space arena, persistence and 
maintenance of a corporate “space culture” is a source of pride to the Navy.  Additionally 
the Navy and its space community have an established history of scientific and research 
excellence, and despite recent downturns in the fortunes of Navy space, pockets of that 
excellence and expertise still exist. 
Those few remaining enclaves of “space-smarts” within the Department of the 
Navy however, are overshadowed by the pulverizing force of a bureaucracy without a 
clear concept of the intricacies and necessity of space operations or the leadership 
understanding to implement it.146  Benign neglect and relegation of space to the status of 
a non-critical supporting function have threatened the last remnants of the Navy’s 
tradition of space excellence.  Without a steering force applied to the institution and a re-
assessment of what space missions are of critical value to the Navy, the remaining 
corporate knowledge inherent in the Navy’s scattered space organizations and nascent 
Space Cadre is likely to fragment and disappear entirely. 
This chapter will focus on the Navy’s existing space systems operation, space 
support to operational forces, and acquisition programs.  Emphasis on the organizations 
that perform those missions and the relative validity of current focus of effort and 
structure will be examined.  Present Navy use of and requirements for space will be 
considered, and alternatives for achieving those aims discussed. 
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A. REDUNDANCY IN THE REALM OF CONTROL 
The current Department of Defense construct for flying communications satellites 
defies description.147  Like other functions that are a result of historical legacy, methods 
for command and control of satellite systems are as convoluted and scattered as the flight 
of an inebriated butterfly.148  Operation of the various components of a single orbital 
object may be conducted by multiple agencies, with only minimal coordination amongst 
the parties involved.  Worse, the vast majority of the personnel, funding and facilities 
used for satellite operation belong to the Air Force, but only very rarely is the Air Force 
the sole stakeholder in satellite resource transactions, or indeed, the sole owner of all of 
the various subsystems and packages onboard the satellite vehicle.  Further, in an attempt 
to provide satellite services to their deployed forces, the individual armed services 
perceive a need for service-specific operation of portions of the satellite control segment 
in order to apply leverage to get the support and products their forces require.  As a 
result, the Army, Navy and Air Force each maintain their own satellite operations 
commands, infrastructure, and fragmentary space operations missions when it comes to 
satellite communications.   
A much more appropriate business structure to accomplish the missions of 
satellite operation and control is to consolidate all of these functions under one 
organization, with appropriate representation from the various service stakeholders.  
Consolidation can produce cost reductions through the use of shared administration and 
overhead, and single-entity operation of space systems reduces the internal command 
complexities inherent in service-specific space operations organizations.  As an added 
benefit, shared service responsibilities for manning a centralized, joint satellite operations 
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and C² organization offers an opportunity for common and cross training of space cadre 
from all services, and improved stakeholder input to the operations of those systems.  
The Air Force, with the lion’s share of space-borne assets and tasking has the 
largest space operations presence, with the 50th Space Wing (50th SW), and their 
subordinate 50th Space Communications Squadron (50th SCS) involved in the operation 
of more than 170 Department of Defense satellites.  
The wing operates satellite operation centers at Schriever AFB and remote 
tracking stations and other command and control facilities around the 
world. These facilities monitor satellites during launch, put the satellites in 
their proper orbits following the launch, operate the satellites while they 
are in orbit and keep them functioning properly.149 
More specifically, the 50th Space Communications Squadron claims the following 
mission areas: 
50th SCS executes command and control functions supporting $50 billion 
in national satellite and terrestrial systems for the President, United States 
of America, allied and coalition forces. The squadron operates and 
maintains communications-computer systems establishing real-time global 
connectivity to more than 170 satellites comprising the Global Positioning 
System, Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, Defense Satellite 
Program, Defense Satellite Communications System, Milstar, Fleet 
Satellite Communications System, Ultra High Frequency Follow-On 
System, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Defense Advanced Research 
Program Agency and test system satellites through the $8.2 billion Air 
Force Satellite Control Network.150 
With some evident overlap in claimed mission area with the 50th Space 
Communications Squadron, the Naval Satellite Operations Center asserts the following 
missions:  
• UHF Follow-On (UFO) satellite constellation that provides the military 
UHF narrow-band voice and data communications.  
• Polar satellite that is equipped with an Enhanced EHF (EEHF) capability.  
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• Geodetic Satellite (GEOSAT) Follow-On (GFO) radar altimeter satellite 
that provides ocean surface height information to Naval meteorological 
centers.  
• Navy Ionospheric Monitoring System (NIMS) satellites, known also as 
Transit Follow-on (TFO) and originally used for global navigation as the 
precursor to GPS. The four remaining satellites now support upper 
ionospheric research.  
• Mobile Users Objective System (MUOS) satellites, a system being 
developed as a replacement for the UFO constellation.151  
Finally, the Army through its 1st Space Brigade and subordinate 53rd Signal 
Battalion at Camp Roberts, California,152 executes the proportionally smallest satellite 
operations mission, yet again overlapping the claimed Air Force mission:  
The battalion (53rd Signal Battalion) plans and controls the payload of the 
Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) satellites.153 
These stated assignments fail to adequately define the actual scope of specific 
operations under a given service’s control.  The details of satellite system control are 
convoluted, with operation of the orbital craft partitioned for reasons that stem from 
engineering design, stand-alone legacy satellite command and control systems and 
historical basis.  The following is an example of the scheme of control, specific to the 
satellites operated (in part) by the Naval Satellite Operations Center (NAVSOC). 
…NAVSOC controls the bus for UFO (which includes the 
UHF/EHF/EEHF/GBS packages) and will do the same for MUOS. 
NAVSOC also controls the bus for FLTSAT (which includes UHF/EHF 
packages).  However, NAVSOC only monitors and commands to the Polar 
EHF Payload.  The bus is on a classified host and we have no visibility 
into its Health and Status… 
…NAVSOC actually doesn't control the payload in an allocation sense, 
meaning we do not manage users or control what gets sent from the S/C 
(spacecraft) or what is sent to the S/C… 
                                                 
151 Department of the Navy. NAVSOC Mission Statement. Naval Satellite Operations Center. 
http://www.nbvc.navy.mil/navsoc/mission.html. June 2007. 
152 Similar operations are conducted by Army units around the world at Fort Detrick, Maryland, Fort 
Meade, Maryland, Fort Buckner, Japan, and Landsthul, Germany.   
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…NAVSOC's only relationship with the payload is to monitor payload 
health and status and, when directed, help in troubleshooting by turning 
transponders on/off or reconfiguring the payload to switch to a redundant 
mode.154    
With physical and logical control of the myriad of spacecraft functions, payload 
functions,155 and use of the variety of Department of Defense satellites divided 
functionally, organizationally, geographically, and by specific system interface, there are 
unquestionable redundancies inherent in the current satellite control construct.  While the 
Air Force is already in control of approximately 93% of the DoD Space Budget,156 
continuation of the status quo (in terms of service-specific satellite operations programs) 
is senseless.  The current satellite control construct exists to provide each service 
programmatic access to the requirements definition process for new systems and as a 
historical throwback to the post-World War II era, when independent space programs 
existed within each of the services.  In the modern era of hyper-expensive, long-lead 
systems and mandatory joint military activity, these legacy motives are no longer valid.  
To eliminate the redundancies and overhead intrinsic to the fragmented satellite control 
structure, the Navy should divest itself of the missions performed by NAVSOC and 
transfer its remaining satellite operation and control responsibilities to the Air Force’s 
50th Space Wing.  
B. NAVY SATELLITE SYSTEMS OPERATIONS 
As there is no documented mandate for Navy organizations or personnel to 
operate satellite systems, limited financial and personnel resources should be targeted to 
better operational leverage.  Policy guidance within the Navy is currently constructed as 
follows: 
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The United States Navy and Marine Corps must maintain their ability to 
tactically exploit the capabilities provided by space systems and 
participate in all appropriate aspects of the changed NSS environment in 
order to function as an integrated member of the Nation’s joint 
warfighting team. Consequently, the DON must continually reassess its 
approach and investment to ensure that naval forces receive the maximum 
benefit of space-based capabilities. The DON will: (1) integrate the 
essential capabilities provided by space systems at every appropriate level 
throughout the naval force; and (2) shape the outcome of joint 
deliberations on future space system capabilities to ensure the combat 
effectiveness of naval forces.157 
As such, by policy, not just actual practice, the Navy is fulfilling a role in the 
Department of Defense space arena as a “‘ruthless customer’ of NSS capabilities.”158  
Importance of effects and resources provided by these systems is of primary importance, 
with minimal consideration given to who the “service provider” is.  Whether intentional 
or not, implementation of this policy by expunging satellite control from the Navy’s 
operational lexicon relieves the Navy and the Network Warfare Command of a peripheral 
function, and opens the door to other operations for achieving requisite space-based 
capabilities.  
There is little disagreement regarding the proud heritage of the Naval Satellite 
Operations Center.  “…NAVSOC personnel pioneered space system operations when 
they developed, tested, and implemented the procedures to operate and manage the first 
operational American space system….”159  But just as the GPS system closed the book 
on the world’s first satellite navigation system, TRANSIT, so the United States Air Force 
Space Command has engulfed the DoD space world to such a degree that NAVSOC’s 
efforts are increasingly marginalized.  In-house NAVSOC efforts in commanding and 
controlling satellites have devolved to a 146-person effort for the Point Mugu, California 
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organization.160  Once a manpower-intensive, 24-hour-a-day operation, automation and 
mission reduction have relieved requirements for personnel, and NAVSOC efforts are 
very limited in scope, with only 23 satellites under mostly contractor control161 as of 
early 2006.162  
Elimination of the Navy component of the satellite command and control function 
is an almost trivial undertaking, and can assist in a tidy centralization of satellite 
operation efforts.  The equipment, infrastructure and operational presence required to fly 
and operate the NAVSOC satellite inventory already exists at the Air Force’s 14th Air 
Force and subordinate 50th Space Wing.  Additionally, from an organizational structure 
standpoint, NAVSOC currently falls under the tactical control (TACON) of the Joint 
Space Operations Center (JSpOC), another organization subordinate to Commander, 14th 
Air Force.  Years of command cooperation and careful definition and nurturing of 
command relationships could allow for the addition of Navy representation at the 50th 
Space Wing and 14th Air Force to ensure Navy requirements previously met by the 
NAVSOC are met.  Providentially, NAVSOC Detachment DELTA is located at 
Schriever AFB and currently serves as the alternate Satellite Operations Center to the 
Point Mugu Headquarters.163  This proposed merger is supported by existing facilities 
and command relationships. 
 
                                                 
160 Paul M. Insch, Captain, U.S. Navy. NAVSOC Command Brief. Naval Satellite Operations Center. 
PowerPoint Brief. June 2006. Slide 12. 
161 Joel Hicks.  Commander, U.S. Navy.  Email to the authors: Re:  Questions regarding NAVSOC. 15 
June 2007.  
“You might be interested to know that NAVSOC is now being operated by contractors.  NAVSOC 
underwent a Commercial Activities Study in 2005 and the government bid (called the Agency Tendered 
Offer) was underbid by a company called Rome Research Corp.  Except for some key "Inherently 
Governmental" positions, all operations will be performed by contractors.”  
162 Paul M. Insch, Captain, U.S. Navy. NAVSOC Command Brief. Naval Satellite Operations Center. 
PowerPoint Brief. June 2006. Slide 41. 
163 Naval Satellite Operations Center. Modern Satellite Operations, NAVSOC Fact Sheet. 
http://www.nbvc.navy.mil/navsoc/docs/FactSheet.pdf.  NAVSOC Detachment DELTA is located at 
Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The Detachment operates a backup Satellite 
Operations Center (SOC), which shares the load of daily satellite operations with the Headquarters SOC. 
Detachment DELTA also provides an on-site liaison with the Air Force Satellite Control Network and other 
units within the 50th Space Wing when required.”   
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1. Facilities & Locations 
Composition and location of the NAVSOC organization and its detachments are 
displayed in Figure 1 (Chapter II).  The functional control of each of those individual 
locations is presented in Table 1 of the same chapter.  Each of these installations serve 
the NAVSOC mission and therefore could continue to perform those same missions 
should the operation of NAVSOC be transferred over to the 50th Space Wing.  In fact, all 
of the NAVSOC remote detachments are co-located with existing Air Force AFSCN 
locations.  Under this proposed reassignment of responsibilities, the 50th Space Wing 
would take control of all NAVSOC locations and detachments to incorporate existing 
infrastructure to support their new mission set.   
2. Personnel   
Table 3 (below) outlines NAVSOC manning.  Worldwide, the command employs 
146 personnel, of which only 28% are active-duty Navy personnel.  As holders of Navy-
specific space expertise, re-assignment of these personnel to joint or Air Force activities 
in support of Navy space needs is an obvious alternative.  Detailing some of those forces 
into the 50th Space Wing will aid in this effort and afford the opportunity for continued 
representation at the appropriate levels.  Re-assignment or elimination of civilian and 
contractor workforce redundant to existing Air Force satellite operations efforts should be 
accomplished in line with appropriate Department of Defense business practices. 
L O C A T IO N  O F F IC E R S  E N L IS T E D  C IV IL IA N S  O n -S i te  S u p p o r t  T O T A L  
C a lif o rn ia  8  1 3  4 8  4 3  1 1 2  
M a in e  1  1 0  3  *5  1 9  
G u a m  1  7  0  1  9  
C o lo ra d o  1  0  3  2  6  
T O T A L  1 1  3 0  5 4  5 1  1 4 6  
  




                                                 
3 Paul M. Insch, Captain, U.S. Navy. NAVSOC Command Brief. Naval Satellite Operations Center. 
PowerPoint Brief. June 2006. Slide 11.  
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3. Operations 
Daily operations depicted in Figure 8 (below) show the standard daily functions 
performed by NAVSOC.   
Naval Satellite Operations Center Underway With The Fleet, Supporting the Joint Warfighter
30
“A Day in the Life…”
Satellites / Payloads /  Contacts
207 3117Totals                                              
8(T&C)Research – Doppler4NIMS
13(TT&C)METOC - Radar Altimetry1GFO
1(T&C)COMM - 2 EHF2POLAR
45(TT&C)COMM - 2 UHF/2 EHF COMM2FLTSAT






Figure 8.   A Snap Shot of Daily Operations at NAVSOC164 
 
Clearly, when contrasted with the massive volume of Air Force Satellite Control 
Network daily events (more than 10,000 per day), the small quantity of systems and 
contact events the NAVSOC manages pose no impediment to the Air Force absorbing 
these functions.  The scope of 14th Air Force efforts in space systems operations as 
described below is approximately two orders of magnitude greater than Navy efforts: 
The 14th Air Force is comprised of five wings and a Joint Space Air 
Operations Center (JSpOC), including 155 units at 44 locations 
worldwide.  The 50th Space Wing is located at Schriever Air Force Base, 
Colo., and operates satellite control centers at Schriever AFB, and 
                                                 
164 Paul M. Insch, Captain, U.S. Navy. NAVSOC Command Brief. Naval Satellite Operations Center. 
PowerPoint Brief. June 2006. Slide 30.  
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command and control facilities and remote tracking stations around the 
world.  These control centers monitor satellites during launch, early orbit 
tests, and operate the satellites while they are in orbit and fix satellite 
anomalies when they occur.  Crew members conduct 24-hour operations 
to monitor the status of and control satellite systems.  The Air Force 
Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) consists of eight subordinate tracking 
stations located around the world and provides on-orbit tracking, 
telemetry, commanding and mission data retrieval services to support the 
NASA, civil, allied, and DoD satellite operations.  The satellite systems 
the wing operates include the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System, the 
Defense Satellite Communications System, NATO/Skynet, and Milstar. 
The wing also supports the Defense Support Program, Mid-course Space 
Experiment, NASA's Advanced Composition Explorer, and the Defense 
Meteorological Satellite Program, as well as manages the Air Force 
Satellite Control Network.  The wing is made up of approximately 3,200 
military, civilians and contract personnel in its workforce.165 
Incorporating NAVSOC operations into 14th Air Force and 50th Space Wing, 
responsibilities streamlines the organizational command and control of SATCOM 
systems, and enables greater simplicity in the overall U.S. space architecture. 
4. Benefits 
What does the Navy gain from the daily operations at NAVSOC?  There is no 
clear evidence that indicates NAVSOC can produce a superior level of service or higher 
system reliability than the Air Force.  Allocation of the resources provided by NAVSOC 
spacecraft payloads is not under NAVSOC control, so Naval users derive no capability 
benefit from NAVSOC operations.  NAVSOC itself claims a lower cost-per-satellite 
operation rate than the 50th Space Wing,166 and greater efficiencies in common computer 
interface control of multiple satellite platforms167 but these arguments fail to take into 
account the elimination of mult-service administrative overhead, and some of the more 
                                                 
165 Department of the Air Force. 14th Air Force Fact Sheet. 
http://www.vandenberg.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=4684. 20 June 2007. 
166 Paul M. Insch, Captain, U.S. Navy. NAVSOC Command Brief. Naval Satellite Operations Center. 
PowerPoint Brief. June 2006. Slide 41. 
167 Joel Hicks. Commander, U.S. Navy.  Email to the authors: Re:  Questions regarding NAVSOC. 15 
June 2007.  NAVSOC operates all of their satellites on a common Integrated Satellite Control System 
(ISCS), meaning that monitoring and commanding can be performed on a single operating system. 
 87
recent Air Force initiatives in fielding consolidated command and control systems.168  
The sole advantage to the presence of a Naval Satellite Operations entity seems to be the 
institutional prestige inherent in the tradition of Navy space operations. 
In contrast, incorporation of NAVSOC missions into the Air Force satellite C² 
architecture eliminates a non-core business from the Navy’s slate of missions, centralizes 
responsibility and authority for the operation of space systems, simplifies funding and 
administration and eliminates redundancy.  Further, proper consideration and 
construction of multi-service positions within the Air Force’s satellite control 
organizations could open the door to improved representation and fulfillment of service-
specific needs with regards to satellite resources and products. 
Existing friction among the services with regards to the role of satellite resources 
service providers and satellite resources consumers is a recognized problem with this 
organizational construct, and the topic is deserving of more than a hand-waving 
approach.  In-depth study of that issue is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.  
Considering the existing overwhelming “market share” the Air Force possesses in its role 
as a supplier of satellite resources to the other military services, continuation of this trend 
to its logical conclusion poses no great intellectual leap.  Addressing the complaints of 
the satellite user community may require a completely new organizational structure 
internal to the Air Force, or possibly a new structure external to existing organizations, 
with a focus and mission dedicated to support to the forward-deployed satellite system 
user. 
C. NAVY OPERATIONAL SPACE SUPPORT 
NETWARCOM’s Maritime Operations Center is a recently founded and renamed 
organization, located at NETWARCOM headquarters in Little Creek, Virginia.  
Established as the NIOSC “fusion center” in 2005, the renamed NNWC MOC: 
…is a brand new, state-of-the-art operations center that will manage 
worldwide naval operational and technical support across strategic, 
                                                 
168 David Ulrich, Colonel, U.S. Air Force. MILSATCOM Satellite Communications Overview Brief. 
PowerPoint Brief. June 2007. Slide 13. 
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operational and tactical levels. Ultimately, the NIOSC (sic.) will promote 
data sharing and foster an environment of collaboration required to plan 
and respond to current and future threats.169 
The NNWC MOC Space Cell missions vis-à-vis space operations include: 
…functions as a true reachback staff element for deployed Strike Groups 
and forward Maritime Headquarters. The space planners in the NIOSC 
(sic.) broker maritime operational and exercise space needs with the Joint 
Space Operations Center at Vandenberg AFB and assist the theater Space 
Coordinating Authorities as they develop the space support requests for 
their AORs. This insures that the desired DoD and National Technical 
space effects are delivered in support of Fleet activities.170 
Without consideration of the NetOps and Information Operations missions, the 
space-coordination function, embodied in a sub-unit of the NNWC MOC called the 
“Space Cell” is completely superfluous and redundant to the Joint Space Operations 
Center (JSpOC).  Navy forces reachback for space support, planning and effects through 
the Space Cell introduces a completely unnecessary layer to the space support hierarchy 
and re-directs information flow through an additional, needless loop.  (Refer to Figure 5, 
page 49). 
The NNWC MOC Space Cell is critically dependent upon space-related 
information provided and brokered by the JSpOC, and serves only as a conduit and 
middleman to transfer that information to afloat forces.  The Space Cell, upon receiving 
requests for information from maritime users, merely reaches to the JSpOC with the 
query, and then forwards the JSpOC-sourced information back to the user who made the 
original request.  Further, joint manning requirements designed to support the full 
spectrum of users – ground forces, afloat units and air forces – have already been 
implemented at the JSpOC, with attendant attention paid to the need for maritime-
specific expertise on the watch-floor. 
                                                 
169 Dean Wence. Increasing the Fleet’s Capabilities with Reach Back. CHIPS. October-December 
2005 Issue.  http://www.chips.navy.mil/archives/05_oct_dec/web_pages/maritime_center.htm. June 2007. 
170 James D. McArthur, Admiral, U.S. Navy.  Statement Before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee on FY 2008 Defense Budget Authorization Request for Space 
Activities.  19 April 2007.  http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2007/April/McArthur%2004-19-
07.pdf. June 2007. 
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The logical and proper information structure eliminates the NNWC Space Cell 
from the loop, with maritime users reaching directly to the JSpOC for space resource 
assistance.  To allay the concerns of the Navy user regarding defense of Navy-specific 
space requirements, manning adjustments at the JSpOC should be considered, with 
increased numbers and insertion of appropriate expertise sourced from the Navy Space 
Cadre.  This solution poses a win-win from the perspective of both the Air Force space 
operations community and the Navy Space Cadre, providing needed personnel for 
manning, cross-cultural training and experience for the Space Cadre, and multi-service 
legitimacy for the JSpOC as operational usage increases. 
The need for NETWARCOM’s internal situational awareness with regards to 
Navy space efforts could be fielded by the refinement of the space function within the 
NNWC MOC.  A single watch station or terminal dedicated to providing critical space-
related information to NETWARCOM decision makers could draw on resources at the 
JSpOC as needed.  In turn, the fostering of a robust Navy presence or Space Cell within 
the JSpOC will provide greater fluidity in the dissemination of operational Navy space 
needs.  The removal of the NNWC MOC Space Cell from the operational support 
information path streamlines the efforts of the forward-deployed Naval space user.  The 
effectiveness of Space Cadre members in performing operational space support is 
enhanced by the ability to reach back to a single point of contact within the joint space 
world.  Further, enhanced Navy presence in the JSpOC provides timely and influential 
input regarding Navy space needs and requirements within the JSpOC’s joint working 
environment.  
Elimination of the NNWC MOC Space Cell and attendant organizational 
redundancy poses no threat to the distribution of resources and information required by 
the space-enabled Navy, and indeed, presents a more streamlined and efficient path for 





D. NAVY SATELLITE SYSTEMS ACQUISITION 
Overarching policy direction for the armed forces to participate in space systems 
acquisition is included in DoDD 5101.2, the DoD Executive Agent for Space directive.  
This document mandates that: 
6.3. The Heads of the DoD Components shall: 
6.3.7 Continue to develop, acquire, and fund space research, development 
and acquisition programs that meet DoD Component requirements and 
submit such program information to the DoD Executive Agent for Space 
in accordance with this Directive.171 
The Department of the Navy Space Policy requires participation in National 
Security Space organization activities, to include acquisition when appropriate.172  In 
line with these requirements, the Program Executive Office (PEO) Space Systems was 
established in May 2004, and charged with the coordination of all Department of the 
Navy space research, development and acquisition activities.173  Reporting to PEO Space 
Systems is the Communications Satellite Program Office, PMW-146, whose mission it is 
to “acquire space based communications systems for the fleet and joint users.”174 
PEO Space Systems more generally works to coordinate with the Under Secretary 
of the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office to ensure the Navy is 
purchasing appropriate space systems to support the larger National Security Space goals.  
PMW-146 is the only directorate reporting directly to PEO Space Systems, and is directly 
responsible for the acquisition and fielding of communications-specific satellite 
capabilities. 
 
                                                 
171 United States. Department of Defense Directive 5101.2, DoD Executive Agent for Space. July 
2003. Section 6.3.  http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/510102.htm. June 2007. 
172 Department of the Navy. SECNAV Instruction 5400.39C: Department of Navy Space Policy. 6 
April 2004. Section 4b.(3)(a). http://ftp.fas.org/irp/doddir/navy/secnavinst/5400_39c.pdf. April 2007. 
Emphasis added.  
173 Department of the Navy. SPAWAR PEO Space Systems Webpage. 
http://enterprise.spawar.navy.mil/body.cfm?type=c&category=26&subcat=54. June 2007. 
174 Department of the Navy. SPAWAR Website.  
http://enterprise.spawar.navy.mil/pd14/PMW146/Mission/mission_statement.htm. June 2007. 
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1. Background and Specifics 
While PEO Space Systems is relatively new, PMW-146 is a historical outgrowth 
of Naval Research Laboratory work on the FLTSATCOM project in the early 1970s.175  
PMW-146 has executed the acquisition and fielding of all of the modern Department of 
Defense narrowband (UHF) satellite systems under the Navy’s charter as the lead agency 
for narrowband.  PMW-146 is currently focused primarily on the task of fielding the 
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), the upcoming generation of UHF 
communications satellites.  The effort for design and acquisition of MUOS is lauded as a 
high-quality acquisition program amidst a panoply of spectacular failures in space 
systems acquisition.176  
PMW-146 was rolled under the new PEO Space Systems when that organization 
was stood up in 2004.  The establishment of a Program Executive Office for Space was 
an outgrowth of increasing attention in the Department of the Navy to space issues 
following the 2001 Space Commission Report and a desire to centralize the functions that 
support space systems and operations within the Navy.  In a sense, it is a similar construct 
to the Navy Space Systems Division, OP943, which was chartered in 1981, and resulted 
in the Naval Postgraduate School Space Systems Operations and Engineering degree 
programs, and Space Subspecialty billet codes.177  PEO Space, however, has inter-agency 
coordination requirements for a persistent relationship with the Under Secretary of the 
Air Force for the purposes of space systems acquisition.178 
 
                                                 
175 Navy Communications Satellite Programs Fact Sheet.  Ultra High Frequency Follow-On (UFO) 
Program. 1 March 1999. http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/1999/uhf_follow-
on_fact_sheet.pdf.  June 2007. Gary Federici.  From the Sea to the Stars.  Naval Historical Center. July 
2003. Section 3.3.4. http://www.history.navy.mil/books/space/index.htm. May 2007 
176 Taylor Dinerman. The U.S. Navy:  lost in space?  The Space Review. 24 October 2005. 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/480/1. June 2007.  Taylor Dinerman. United States Space Force: 
sooner rather than later 27 February 2006. .http://www.thespacereview.com/article/565/1.  June 2007. 
Witness the disasters in the TSAT and SBR programs.   
177 Gary Federici.  From the Sea to the Stars.  Naval Historical Center. July 2003. Section 4.1. 
http://www.history.navy.mil/books/space/index.htm. May 2007 
178 United States. National Security Space Acquisition Policy. 03-1.  Department of Defense. 27 
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2. True Acquisition Reform… 
Regardless of the relative success of the MUOS program and history of 
narrowband satellite expertise, the Navy no longer has the motives to champion UHF 
communications that brought it into the narrowband satellite communications arena in the 
1970s.  When UHF satellite communications were conceived, they were intended to 
provide afloat users with very narrow bandwidth command and control links via the 
Information Exchange Subsystem179 family of satellite links.  UHF was chosen as an 
appropriate frequency range because it permitted installation of reasonably small 
antennas on the already crowded superstructure of ships.  Today, bandwidth requirements 
shipboard far exceed the ability of UHF to deliver data.  Instead, the disadvantaged 
mobile user, typically assessed as troops on the ground, is the intended beneficiary of the 
“last-mile” MUOS system.  In an environment where more than 90% of satellite control 
and operation efforts are accomplished by the Air Force, and Navy forces’ reliance on 
UHF is superseded by commercial and high-bandwidth systems, might not the Navy 
relieve itself of this program? 
DoD Directive 5101.2 identifies eight major responsibilities for the individual 
service components to accomplish with regard to National Security Space programs.  Of 
these eight responsibilities, a committee of the Naval Studies Board identifies four 
(including the responsibility for acquisition programs) as having “…little or no evidence 
of responsive naval management actions.”180  The Naval Studies board uses this critical 
evaluation to advocate increased emphasis across the entire spectrum of requirements of 
the 2001 DoD Directive, yet manpower and resources to accomplish the entirety of that 
effort are not identified and presumably unavailable, as current Department of Defense 
priorities are rather more focused on the immediate challenges of the Global War on  
 
                                                 
179 TADIXS, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/tadixs.htm.  OTCIXS, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/2001/compendium/OTCIXS.htm,  SSIXS, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/ssixs.htm 
180 National Research Council. Committee on the Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future 
Capabilities. The Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities. The National Academies Press 
2005. p. 68.. http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11200&page=68. June 2007. 
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Terrorism.  Instead, divestiture of this apparently inadequate and redundant acquisition 
effort by the Navy will permit more appropriate focus of resources on other Department 
of Defense space requirements. 
In the same way that the various services should turn to the Air Force as the 
service provider for satellite operations and bandwidth, so should the Navy relinquish its 
development and acquisition of satellite systems to the Air Force.  With “historical 
imperative” as the primary rationale for continuing to field and acquire satellites, the 
Navy needs to divest itself of this non-core operation. 
Programmatic funding and reallocation is a concern under this construct.  Planned 
annual unclassified Navy expenditures on space-related activities each year between FY 
2004 and FY 2009 are approximately $1.3 billion.  Nearly 90% of these funds support 
Navy satellite communications, but more specifically, program operation and acquisition 
of narrowband satellite communications comprises almost 50%.   
The Navy’s space-related budget is allocated to the following:181 
• Communications satellites (UFO, MUOS), 49.8% 
• Satellite communications terminals, 38.7% 
• NAVSOC, 5.2% 
• Global Positioning System receivers and equipment, 2.8% 
• Spectrum management and interference reduction, 1.5% 
• Navy TENCAP and the Ground Moving Target Indication Advance 
Concept Technology Demonstration, 1.1% 
• Meteorology and oceanography, 0.9% 
• Missile warning, 0.005% 
Transfer of the communication satellites line item from Navy PEO Space and 
PMW-146 control to the Air Force’s Space and Missile Center (SMC) will likely 
represent a complete loss of these funds for the Navy.  In an era of ballooning 
expenditures for support of day-to-day combat operations and tightly controlled budgets 
                                                 
181 National Research Council. Committee on the Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future 
Capabilities. The Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities. The National Academies Press 
2005. p. 23. http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11200&page=23. June 2007. 
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across the Department of Defense, the panorama of overall DoD outlays must take 
precedence over service-specific programs and turf battles.  In the National Security 
Space “big-picture” view, transfer of these narrowband satellite communication programs 
to Air Force control may achieve cost savings in the aggregation of related missions with 
existing programs at SMC.  Redundancies in overhead, from administration to physical 
infrastructure and facilities are easily identified, and encompass only a thumbnail sketch 
of savings when compared to potential efficiencies gained through process and 
production standardization. 
While the shift of programmatic and acquisition responsibilities to the Air Force 
represents a loss of funds to the Navy, recovery of the human resources from PEO Space 
and PMW-146 presents an excellent opportunity for the strengthening of both the Navy 
Space Cadre as well as the real historical core competency182 of the Navy’s space efforts 
– scientific research and technology development. 
E. REINVORGATION OF NAVY SPACE S&T AND UTILIZATION OF THE 
NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY 
As evidenced by the vast array and number of awards and accomplishments 
garnered by the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), the organization has served the Navy 
well as the preeminent developer of space and science and technology research for the 
enterprise.183   From initial high altitude atmospheric research, to the fielding of the 
Vanguard program in response to the launch of Sputnik in 1957, the NRL has a legacy of 
space systems development stretching back more than a half century.  Though it yielded 
up its rocket design expertise to NASA in 1958, continuation of research and 
development efforts in orbital systems established a superlative reputation for 
engineering expertise and rigorous space science.  A variety of internal re-structuring, 
divisional re-coding and re-naming have occurred since the late 1950s, however, the 
                                                 
182 Gary Federici.  From the Sea to the Stars.  Naval Historical Center. July 2003. Various. 
http://www.history.navy.mil/books/space/index.htm. May 2007.  Summary verbiage in Chapter 5 
emphasizes the U.S. Navy’s scientific legacy and “long pole of technical and scientific competence.”  
http://www.history.navy.mil/books/space/index.htm. 
183 Department of the Navy, Naval Research Laboratory Website. 
http://www.nrl.navy.mil/content.php?P=PATENTS. June 2007. 
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present form of NRL’s space science and technology organization has been in existence 
since 1986.  In October of that year, the Space Systems and Technology division was re-
named the Naval Center for Space Technology (NCST), and assigned oversight duties for 
the Space Systems Development Department, the Spacecraft Engineering Department, 
and the Space Systems Technology Department.184 
1. Mission & Focus of Effort 
Specifically included in the mission statement for the NRL with regards to space 
is identification of its position within the Department of the Navy: 
• “Serves as the lead Navy activity for space technology and space systems 
development and support.” 
…and… 
NRL, the Navy's single, integrated Corporate Laboratory, provides the 
Navy with a broad foundation of in-house expertise from scientific 
through advanced development activity. Specific leadership 
responsibilities are assigned in the following areas:... 
• Space and space systems technology, development, and support.185 
 
A fairly small organization, employing approximately 2500 personnel, the NRL 
has a narrower focus on research and science than the existing organizations responsible 
for developing, acquiring and operating space technology.  NCST efforts, and related 
NRL work – in space environments, space science, high-bandwidth communications, and 
remote sensing – are more accurately aligned with the Navy’s traditional “leveraged 
funding”186 and “ruthless customer” paradigm than the large-scale programmatics of the 
existing Program Executive Office system in place. 
                                                 
184 Department of the Navy. Naval Research Laboratory Website, NCST Homepage.  The Origin of 
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185 Department of the Navy. Naval Research Laboratory Website.  
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186 Gary Federici.  From the Sea to the Stars.  Naval Historical Center. July 2003. Section 4.14.1. 
http://www.history.navy.mil/books/space/index.htm. May 2007. 
 96
The Naval Center for Space Technology is positioned and focused to perform 
fundamental advanced science and technology for both the Navy and the greater National 
Security Space community.  Without the burden of needing to support Navy-specific 
acquisition, personnel and efforts could be used to fulfill Navy needs in space187 at the 
technology development level rather than the systems deployment level.  Use of this 
extensive intellectual talent pool with relief from the political considerations and 
Byzantine maneuvering of systems acquisition permits more productive research, with 
corresponding improvements in systems refinement and development time.  Additionally, 
technology transfer is simplified in this model.  With all Navy space technology under 
development in-house at NCST, and all contracting and acquisition taking place at the 
Air Force’s Space and Missile Center, communication requirements for multiple R&D 
and contracting organizations are eliminated.  Further, protocols between these two 
expert organizations, working exclusively within their area of competence, might be 
simplified, and partnering relationships taking advantage of the authoritative nature of 
each organization could be constructed. 
2. Recovery of Capabilities 
Intelligence Satellite Development by the Naval Research Laboratory 
In a sense, the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) became a victim of its 
own success.  Beginning in 1960, the nation’s investment in space-based 
systems expanded tremendously.  The expansion was far beyond anything 
that an organization even as large as NRL could cope with.  Although 
NRL developed and launched some 80 satellites in the four decades 
between 1960 and 2000, the number was only 1 or 2 percent of the total 
national effort. NRL’s expertise in sensor technology and scientific 
research caused the expertise of its staff to be sought out and funded by a 
long list of non-Navy organizations (the Air Force, Army, Missile Defense 
Agency, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Security Agency, 
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), National Science Foundation, 
predecessors of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and others). 
The support that NRL received from all of these non-Navy organizations 
was sufficient to allow it to build up a large and very competent staff. 
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Through the early 1980s, NRL’s largest effort was in support of the 
development of classified prototype surveillance satellites.  These 
developments were indeed successful, to the degree that the sponsoring 
agency (NRO) decided to go into serial production of such satellites.  
Since NRL was a research laboratory and not a manufacturing facility, the 
production of the next generation of satellites was transferred to an 
industrial organization.  This transfer left many members of the NRL staff 
without sponsor support and necessitated a rather traumatic drawdown in 
the number of NRL personnel available to manage the development, 
acquisition, and launch of full satellite systems.  The difficulty was that 
the Navy (through the Office of Naval Research) only provided funds to 
cover NRL’s basic research activities.  In the past three decades, no Navy 
funds have been provided to NRL to develop and launch new satellite 
systems. As a consequence, NRL’s ability to develop and deploy satellite 
systems that offer the Navy new warfighting capabilities has diminished 
by a significant amount.188 
Returning the Navy to active participation, funding and use of its own premier 
space systems research and development organization is a crucial step in centralizing and 
simplifying the complex mish-mash of space systems requirements articulation, 
capabilities experimentation and systems design and development.  Through a 
renaissance in S&T, and recognition of that function as a core competency of the Navy’s 
space efforts, representation of the Navy’s needs in space can be more clearly articulated 
to organizations acting as service providers. 
3. Human Capital Re-Use 
In addition to the Navy-provided funding required to re-invigorate the NRL and 
NCST, use of the talent pool and expertise currently scattered throughout Program 
Offices within the NRO and the Navy is imperative.189  NETWARCOM, in its 2007 
Strategic Plan, establishes a goal to: 
• Ensure Navy fully leverages and influences Space capabilities. 
With the following major supporting strategies: 
                                                 
188 National Research Council. Committee on the Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future 
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• Improve human capital:  Cultivate Navy Sapce Cadre expertise for 
assignment in Navy, as well as Joint space and national Security Space 
(NSS) billets. 
• Ingrain cultural change:  Harvest space-related best practices from Naval 
Space Campaign lessons learned and institutionalize them through 
doctrine and policy.190 
Use of Navy Space Cadre officers, reassigned PEO Space and PMW-146 
personnel, and pure science and technology researchers within the umbrella of the Naval 
Research Laboratory provides an opportunity for cross-cultural learning, improved 
communication between system developers and warfighters, clearer understanding of 
system capabilities and limitations, and ultimately, more complete, accurate and lucid 
requirements definition to the Air Force in an acquisition and service provider role.   
Revitalization of the role of the NRL and NCST as the “center of excellence” for 
Navy Space provides not only an organizational hub for the ad-hocracy that describes the 
larger Navy Space organization, but also supports Department of Defense requirements to 
maintain space skills in an expert cadre.191  Formalization of the Navy’s focus for space 
within the realm of science and technology, with corollary requirements in 
experimentation and technology transfer, demands levels of expertise not only in the 
academic environment, but also within the uniformed members of the Space Cadre.  
Rotation of military, and even civilian scientists, from within the developmental center of 
the NCST to a variety of jobs in fields such as operational requirements definition and 
systems acquisition provides for a broad-spectrum distribution of knowledge, skills and 
critical abilities.  Additionally, unification of personnel who provide expertise in 
requirements generation with technical experts provides a method to allay fears of lack of 
Navy involvement during the requirements definition phase of the acquisition process.  
Through proper positioning of these key, cross-trained personnel within joint acquisition 
                                                 
190 Department of the Navy. Naval Network Warfare Command Strategic Plan.  Executive Summary, 
Version 2.0. Naval Network Warfare Command.  23 March 2007. p.12. Cited strategies comprise only two 
of eight identified initiatives. 
191 United States. Department of Defense Directive 5101.2, DoD Executive Agent for Space. July 
2003. Section 6.3.5.  http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/510102.htm. June 2007. 
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and program offices, the Navy Space Cadre can be used to defend Navy interests in large 
national and DoD satellite programs throughout their entire lifecycle. 
F. SELLING THE FARM…AND BUYING A NEW ONE. 
Navy efforts in the broad spectrum of space endeavors for much of the last two 
decades have been decentralized, fragmented and characterized by a lack of rudder 
authority.  Alignment of operational Navy space efforts under NETWARCOM at its 
inception in 2002 exacerbated the drift in Navy space functions as that organization 
struggled with its initial sense of mission and the demands of a newly “network-centric” 
operating concept.  Large-scale Navy policy efforts from 2002 on have been largely 
predicated on the concept of Sea Power 21.  This four-part strategy relies both in part and 
in its entirety on products, services and capabilities provided by space systems.  Within 
the space products and capabilities required by Sea Power 21 are a variety of Navy-
unique requirements, without which the construct becomes unworkable.  Analysis of 
critical dependencies on space infrastructure indicate that, without clear and 
unambiguous requirements definition on the part of the Navy for future space systems, 
participation in future conflicts will be restricted by unmet needs.192  Under the existing 
hash of internal and external acquisition procedures and agencies, satellite operations and 
resource providers, and Navy specific space requirements generation processes,193 the 
Navy’s needs for space-provided resources will clearly not be met. 
It is time for the Navy to transfer its programmatic and acquisition efforts to 
another agency, and invest exclusively in a two pronged approach consisting of science 
and technology R&D and the promotion of a robust, effective Navy Space Cadre.  The 
alternative is for the concentration of effort in Navy space to remain unfocused, 
irrelevant, and mired in historical raison d'être.  
                                                 
192 National Research Council. Committee on the Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future 
Capabilities. The Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities. The National Academies Press 
2005. Various. Executive Summary, Chapter 3, Chapter 4. 
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11200&page=157. June 2007. 
193 For an overview of the Navy’s method of operational input for space related requirements, see The 
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VI. FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. THESIS SUMMARY 
Navy efforts in the space arena have a storied history and comprise a valued 
contribution to national security space efforts.  Achievements of the past permit the 
prestige of the present, but it is time to look to the future from the perspective of 
appropriate resource use, not nostalgia.  In line with the current Department of Defense 
force transformation and restructuring, U.S. Navy space efforts are in a state of flux.  
Prompted by policy requirements and a sort of institutional peer-pressure, the Navy’s 
space community has attempted to maintain a certain status within the DoD, ease 
pressures coming from Capital Hill regarding the need for a Space Cadre, and perpetuate 
an institutional legacy of space excellence.  In this venture, however, the selected 
approach and accepted organizational goals lie at cross purposes with sober business 
considerations and functionality.  The time has come for the Navy to relinquish its 
redundant operational control of communication satellites and re-focus on science and 
technology research.  Secondly, current efforts by NETWARCOM and senior Navy 
leadership to establish a solid Navy Space Cadre fall short when compared to other 
services’ efforts.  The future success of Navy space is dependent on the growth and 
empowerment of a vigorous Navy Space Cadre.  Finally, to ensure the maximum 
effectiveness of future Navy space efforts, the Navy must redefine its role in the 
acquisition process by eliminating the PEO Space Systems office, to include PMW-146, 
and reinvest in the NRL, ensuring continuation of necessary S&T research and 
advancements.  These proposed restructuring efforts can pave the way to the realization 
of the full potential of the Navy space enterprise.   
In an effort to aid in the decision-making process required to contemplate such a 
proposal, exposure to the definitions, concepts, instructions and policies associated with 
the Naval Space Campaign is required.  Current Department of Defense and Department 
of the Navy policy statements are a constructive step in promoting the necessary and 
critical nature of space operations and have produced positive, but limited results.  
Unfortunately, the high-level statements lack sufficient clarity in some areas, and that 
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ambiguity has resulted in a lack of accomplishment in some details.  The establishment of 
NETWARCOM as the Navy Space Type Commander, formalization of the Navy Space 
Cadre, composition of the Naval Space Campaign, and the trial run of the first ever CSG 
Staff Space Officer comprise highlights of Navy space efforts in the face of vague 
doctrine and apparent senior-level disinterest.  Additional clarity in the Navy space 
doctrinal library regarding an implementation strategy and consolidated Navy space 
architecture is needed, as well as leadership involvement and guidance in the joint space 
environment. 
 Literature regarding DoD space cadre activity has been critical of the U.S. Navy’s 
efforts in establishing and implementing an effective strategy for their space cadre 
program.  As a response to the 2001 Space Commission report, the Secretary of the Navy 
mandated the establishment of a ‘cross-community’ Navy Space Cadre to meet 
requirements stated in that document and subsequent DoD Directive 5101.2.  From the 
beginning, the Navy Space Cadre has been considered a subspecialty occupation, 
secondary to the individual’s primary profession.  Currently there are approximately 800 
active duty officers, 120 reserve officers and 300 civilian personnel that make up the 
cadre.  Though the Navy Space Cadre Advisors have recently made strides to improve 
the Navy’s utilization of the expertise contained within the membership of its cadre, the 
Navy still lags other services’ space efforts.  Disregard of this state of affairs at senior 
levels seems to be endemic, perhaps overshadowed by other pressing concerns of 
institutional mission, asymmetric warfare and budget struggles.  Proposals for cost-
savings and more efficient human capital use would therefore seem to be timely and 
appropriate. Proper utilization of the Navy Space Cadre is a continuous struggle.  The 
detailing processes, creation of billets and training/education have plagued cadre 
leadership, and pose a roadblock to the task of building and maintaining a robust space 
cadre.   
 In the traditional, blue-water mission area, the Navy Space Cadre is just beginning 
to receive operational employment.  Recent undertakings by the first CSG Staff Space 
Officer have provided the cadre with a senior, operational commander convinced of the 
importance of space effects for the seagoing military force.  Leverage of this operational 
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advocacy provides the necessary muscle to influence future deliberations regarding the 
need for Navy Space Cadre use, improvements and growth.  The Navy Space Cadre’s 
ongoing struggle for validation and respect will continue until senior Navy leadership 
recognizes space as an indispensable ‘force multiplier’ and allocates resources 
commensurate with that status. 
The Navy should establish new, more efficient and cost effective methods to 
achieve its requirements for space effects.  The current construct for operation and 
control of space-borne assets no longer provides tangible benefits to the Navy, and should 
the Navy transfer possession of these satellites to the Air Force, it would streamline the 
organizational command and control of SATCOM systems and enable greater simplicity 
in the overall U.S. space architecture.  Additionally, disestablishment of PEO Space 
Systems and PMW-146 and subsequent reinvestment in science and technology efforts 
more clearly focus and bound the scope of Navy space efforts.  To ensure the Navy’s 
needs and requirements are represented and fielded in this new structure, the Navy must 
carefully position Navy Space Cadre personnel in key positions to influence and direct 
Navy space efforts throughout the DoD and civilian space environment. 
B. FURTHER EXPLORATION 
The United States has become increasingly reliant on space.  Space is a critical 
center of gravity for the military, as well as a vital link in the modern networked civilian 
world.  Planning and execution of operations, at the strategic, operational and tactical 
levels are dependent upon space.  
Space power provides military leaders, operators, and planners with 
enormous force-enhancement effects that multiply joint combat 
effectiveness in prosecuting theater campaigns. Space systems 
significantly improve friendly forces’ ability to strike at the enemy’s heart 
or COGs, paralyzing an adversary to allow land, sea, and air forces to 
achieve rapid dominance of the battlespace.194 
                                                 
194 Mark E. Harter, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force. “10 Propositions Regarding Space Power, The 
Dawn of a Space Force.” Air and Space Journal-Summer 2006. 1 June 2006. 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/sum06/harter.html. 27 June 2007. 
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Much work remains to be done with regard to the DoD’s future efforts concerning 
space utilization and exploitation for warfighting.  As a medium, the unlimited potential 
of space has captured the imagination of generations of Americans.  Novelists, scientists, 
filmmakers, and military theorists have all endeavored to address the latent promise of 
the ‘ultimate high ground’.  Stupendous effort and study to develop implementable 
military theories for space use remains, and this thesis only scratches the surface of that 
narrow, ongoing debate.  In the broadest military context, analysis is required to aide in 
the determination of the direction of future DoD space activities, and as a subset of that 
work, the Navy’s future course in space must be established.  This section contains 
recommended future research in line with that subject. 
1. Navy Space Officer (NSO)  
Establishment of a separate career path and designation for Navy space-qualified 
officers is a topic that deserves rigorous analysis.  To date, all formal efforts in Navy 
space personnel management have revolved around the central concept of the ‘cross-
designator’ community.  Specific analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of this concept 
have been touched upon in this thesis, but the full scope and potential impact of founding 
a separate career path for Navy Space Officers remains unexplored.  Arguments for such 
an approach to future Navy space manning can be categorized in terms of return-on-
investment,195 low opportunity cost,196 and improved representation within senior 
leadership forums.  Counter-arguments can be framed as cost-benefit relations, overlap 
with existing community missions,197 and potential loss of space expertise within line 
officer communities. 
                                                 
195 Training and education for existing personnel filling space-qualified billets should be considered a 
sunk cost. 
196 exempli gratia: Re-designation of “homeless” officers from disestablished communities like F-14 
or S-3 squadrons. 
197 Information Warfare, Intelligence and Information Professional communities already share large 
numbers of Space-qualified officers with overlapping mission and assignments. 
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The opportunity for continued research and consideration of a new Navy space 
designator is available for those that wish to ensure the Navy continues in its efforts to 
maximize the use of space in support of the fleet.   
2. United States Space Force 
Though discussion regarding creation of a U.S. Space Force dates back to early 
debates on the missions of the U.S. Air Force,198 recent internal Air Force discussion in 
Air University, National Space Studies Center,199 and  Air Force periodicals has raised 
the intensity and volume of this dialogue. 
The strength of space contributions in strategic military, commercial, and 
economic operations is undeniable. Space power is not just a continuation 
of airpower; space is a unique, distinct, war-fighting medium. Continuing 
to restrain US space power from developing its own identity, culture, 
theory, and doctrine is to confine a powerful dimension of war fighting 
available only through the fourth medium of space. Undisputed combat 
space power is drawing near, and the United States may be on the brink of 
unleashing decisive military space operations, ushering in the era of a 
separate space force. The reality is that, as in the evolution of airpower, 
the true potential of a nation’s military space power will come to fruition 
only when a separate space force is created, complete with its own space-
competent leadership, organization, doctrine, theory, policy, and 
resources.200 
A Navy perspective on the subject and potential structure of a U.S. Space Force 
would be of value to this ongoing debate. 
With its own budget, the space service will be able to concentrate on 





                                                 
198 Time Magazine. Aerospace Force? 17 March 1961.  
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,894428,00.html. June 2007. 
199 See the National Space Studies Center website for a consolidated listing of U.S. Space Force and 
U.S. Air Force discussion: http://space.au.af.mil/cadre.htm. 
200 Mark E. Harter, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force. “10 Propositions Regarding Space Power, The 
Dawn of a Space Force.” Air and Space Journal-Summer 2006. 1 June 2006. 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/sum06/harter.html. 27 June 2007. 
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support possible. The Army, Navy, Marines, Coast Guard, and others who 
use America’s military space assets will not have to worry about 
institutional favoritism…201 
Examination of potential benefits for the United States Navy in regards to the 
argument for a new Space Force provide an excellent opportunity for future research and 
should be considered for inclusion in the Space Systems Operations curricula at the 
Naval Postgraduate School.   
C. CONCLUSION 
 Leadership in modern military space efforts is less about an organization’s ability 
to field equipment and orbital systems, and more about effective and rapid policy 
implementation, institutional focus and clear, concise requirements definition.  In recent 
years, the Navy has fallen short in these undertakings.  Senior Navy leadership seems to 
perceive space-related missions as an on-demand service, without a grasp of the 
complexities inherent in the operation of the required architectures.  Policy and doctrine, 
though enunciated at the appropriate levels, lacks clarity and specifics and provides 
insufficient guidance for the naval planner of space systems.  Knowledge and hard-
earned experience in naval space operations are rare within the Naval officer corps, and 
individuals possessed of these qualities are sought after for reasons other than their space 
know-how.  
 Efforts like the Naval Space Campaign and Navy Space Cadre Human Capital 
Strategy are steps in the right direction to correct the deficiencies of current Navy space 
endeavors.  These successes, however, need to be extended through careful refinement of 
the Navy’s overall mission with regard to space.  Policy revision, human capital and 
budgetary allocation and outsourcing of non-core tasks must be considered to enable 
organizational success as measured by effective, timely and responsive use of space and 
space effects.  The future of the United States Navy’s space programs are yet unwritten,  
 
 
                                                 
201 Taylor Dinerman. “United States Space Force: Sooner than Later.” The Space Review. 27 
February 2006. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/565/1. 27 June 2007.   
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but with a strong investment in its space cadre and redirected efforts supporting 
fundamental science and technology, that future promises to be as bright as the historical 
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APPENDIX:   SIGNIFICANT DEFINITIONS 
This appendix provides further detail regarding the definitions offered in Chapter 
II.  Some of the definitions have been edited to allow for the most prevalent portions to 
be viewed.  Unedited versions of the definitions can be found in the documents 
themselves located in the List of References section of this thesis. 
A. ORGANIZATIONS 
1.  January 11, 2001 U.S. Commission to Assess National Security Space 
Management and Organizations (2001 Space Commission) 
The Commission was established pursuant to a provision inserted in the FY2000 
National Defense Authorization Act. The Commission met from May-December 
2000 and issued its report on January 11, 2001. Members were: 
  
• Donald Rumsfeld (until resigning on being nominated SecDef in 
December) 
• Former Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-WY) 
• Duane Andrews, former Asst. SecDef for C4I 
• Robert Davis, former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Space 
• William Graham, former Director of the White House Office of Science 
and Tech Policy 
• General Howell Estes, USAF (Ret.), former commander, U.S. Space 
Command 
• General Ronald Fogleman, USAF (Ret.), former Air Force Chief of Staff 
• General Charles Horner, USAF (Ret.) former commander, U.S. Space 
Command 
• Admiral David Jeremiah, USN (Ret.) former Vice Chairman, JCS 
• General Tom Moorman, USAF (Ret.), former Air Force Vice Chief of 
Staff 
• General Glenn Otis, USA (Ret.), former CINC, U.S. Army Europe and 7th 
Army 
• LtGeneral Jay Garner, USA (Ret.), former Army Assistant Vice Chief of 
Staff 
 110
• Douglas Necessary, former House Armed Services Committee staff 
member202 
The recommendations from the commission were as follows: 
  
1. The President should consider establishing space as a national security 
priority. 
2. The President should consider the appointment of a Presidential Space 
Advisory Board to provide independent advice on developing and employing 
new space capabilities. 
3. The President should direct that a Senior Interagency Group for Space be 
established and staffed within the National Security Council structure. 
4. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence should meet 
regularly to address national security space policy, objectives and issues. 
5. An Under Secretary of Defense for Space, Intelligence and Information 
should be established.  
6. Assign responsibility for the command of Air Force Space Command to a 
four-star officer other than CINCSPACE/CINCNORAD [Command-in-Chief 
U.S. Space Command/Commander-in-Chief North American Aerospace 
Defense Command. End the practice of assigning only Air Force flight-rated 
officers to the position of CINCSPACE and CINCNORAD.  
7. Assign Air Force Space Command responsibility for providing the resources 
to execute space research, development, acquisition and operations....Assign 
the Air Force responsibility to organize, train and equip for prompt and 
sustained offensive and defensive air and space operations...and designate the 
Air Force as Executive Agent for Space within the Department of Defense.  
8. Assign the Under Secretary of the Air Force as the Director of the National 
Reconnaissance Office and designate the Under Secretary as the Air Force 
Acquisition Executive for Space.  
9. Direct the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Services' 
laboratories to undertake development and demonstration of innovative space 
technologies and systems for dedicated military missions.  
10. Establish a Major Force Program for Space (i.e., a separate budget category). 
2. Naval Network Warfare Command  
NETWARCOM is the functional component for space to USSTRATCOM 
and the Navy Space Type Commander.  In close coordination with 
FLTFORCOM, Second Fleet, and carrier and expeditionary strike group 
commanders, NETWARCOM works to improve fleet combat 
effectiveness with smarter, more aggressive use of space effects and better 
                                                 
202 Center for Defense Information, Excerpts from the Report of the Commission to Assess United 
States National Security Space Management and Organization. 12 January 2001. 
http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/document.cfm?DocumentID=1335&IssueID=70&StartRow=1&ListRow
s=10&appendURL=&Orderby=DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=68&issueID=70. June 2007. 
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understanding of how space effects support maritime operations.  
FLTFORCOM designated NETWARCOM as the Naval Space Campaign 
lead as directed in CNO Guidance 2005.  NETWARCOM is also the 
functional authority for the Navy space cadre, ensuring operational space 
expertise is increased through the Fleet readiness Training Program and 
deployments.  Naval Satellite Operations Center (NAVSOC) is a 
subordinate command that operates satellite constellations to provide 
military UHF narrow-band communications (Fleet Satellite), military UHF 
narrow-band, EHF and Global Broadcast System communications (UFO 
Follow-on) and support Ionospheric research .  NAVSOC also operates 
the Geodetic/Geophysical Satellite (GEOSAT) Follow-on radar altimeter 
satellite that provides ocean surface height information to naval 
meteorological centers, and polar-orbiting host satellites that provide 
additional EHF communications to military users.203 
3.   Network, Information Operations, and Space Center Space Cell 
The NIOSC Space Cell provides the following effects to both the Commander 
NETWARCOM and the fleet: 
• Space Cell NNWC Internal Support 
• Provides Commander, NNWC SSA/Synchronizes with NIOSC 
IO/NETOPS cells for synergistic effects 
• NIOSC Space Cell Relationship to JSpOC: 
o Coordination, synchronization, advocacy for maritime support 
requirements as community of interest members 
o Broker space effects requirements for maritime users 
o Define/refine maritime support requirements and convey impacts 
to maritime users 
• NIOSC Space Cell source for technical data to provide to fleet units 
• NIOSC Space Cell’s source of SSA (includes threat info and status of blue 
space forces) 
• NIOSC Space Cell Support to MHQ/MOC (Operational level): 
o Reachback 
o Staff planning augmentation (data retrieval, info analysis, COA 
development) 
o Theater level synchronization of maritime space requirements 
• NIOSC Space Cell Support to CSG/ESG (Tactical level): 
o Reachback 
o Staff planning augmentation (data retrieval, info analysis, COA 
development) 
o Provide tailored support products (SSA, etc.) 
                                                 
203 Department of the Navy. Naval Network Warfare Command Website. 
http://www.netwarcom.navy.mil/. May 2007. 
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o Maritime domain focus 
o Low bandwidth compatible 
o Daily Navy Space Brief: Emphasized SSA, focus on any adverse 
impact to maritime forces 
• Space Launch Coordination: Coordination to deconflict ATLAS V launch 
from Cape Canaveral. Drove scheme of maneuver in JAXOA. 
• CENTCOM Joint Space C2 Coordination Efforts:  
o Initiated coordination between the Joint DS4, JSpOC, NAVCENT 
Space Ops POC (N39), and CSG-8 to shape and influence the 
JSTO ISO maritime forces. 
• Strike Support: Worked with JSpOC and CSG-8 Space Ops to provide 
both TACAIR and TLAM required GPS PDOP strike planning packages 
and coordination for GETS. 
• Adversary Space: Research the space capabilities and related tactics of 
potential adversaries.  Described how they could degrade our maritime 
forces by targeting centers of gravity supported by space capabilities. 
• Connectivity/Manning: CSG-8 helped to define Space Cell 
comm/manning requirements based upon our support requirements. 
• Coalition Space CONOPS: Researched possibility of conducting Space 
Ops at REL CNFC within CENTCOM based on CSG8 requirement. 
• Fleet Space Playbook: aka Naval Space Campaign CONOPS, ready for 
CSG-8 OPTEST deployed.204 
 
                                                 
204 Julie Niedermaier, Commander, U.S. Navy. Navy Space Cadre Update (SSFA Space 
Indoctrination). PowerPoint Brief. Slide 19. March 2007. 
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4. Naval Satellite Operations Center (NAVSOC) 
 
Figure 9.   Naval Satellite Operations Center Operations Data Flow Diagram205 
 
5. Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center (MHQ-
MOC) 
The design of the MHQ with MOC fulfills both service management and 
operational roles with full continuity across the range of military 
operations.  MHQ with MOC allows the maritime commander to perform 
normal theater-wide operations across the region when no specific Joint 
Operations Area (JOA) has been established.  The MHQ with MOC 
construct enables operational-level commands to fully support command 
relationships that could be chosen by a JFC:206 
• NCC CDR as Service Component Commander with operational control 
(OPCON) 
                                                 
205 Paul M. Insch, Captain, U.S. Navy. NAVSOC Command Brief. Naval Satellite Operations Center. 
PowerPoint Brief. June 2006. Slide 42. 
206 Department of the Navy. Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center Concept of 
Operations (CONOPS), Final DRAFT Version. 15 May 2006. p. ii. 
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• Numbered Fleet commanders and principal headquarters commanders as 
Service Component Commander with OPCON 
• NCC CDR assigned as JFMCC  
• Numbered Fleet commanders and principal headquarters commanders 
assigned as a JFMCC  
• NCC CDR assigned as JTF Commander  
• Numbered Fleet commanders and principal headquarters commanders 
assigned as JTF Commander  
6. Carrier Strike Group (CSG)  
Strike groups are formed and disestablished on an as-needed basis, and vary 
depending on timeline and mission.  They are, however, all comprised of similar types of 
ships.  A typical carrier strike group might have: 
 
Nimitz-class carrier  
 
 













• a carrier – The carrier provides a wide range of options to 
the U.S. government from simply showing the flag to attacks 
on airborne, afloat and ashore targets. Because carriers 
operate in international waters, its aircraft do not need to 
secure landing rights on foreign soil. These ships also 
engage in sustained operations in support of other forces.  
• a guided missile cruiser – multi-mission surface 
combatant. Equipped with Tomahawks for long-range strike 
capability.  
• two guided missile destroyers – multi-mission surface 
combatants, used primarily for anti-air warfare (AAW)  
• an attack submarine – in a direct support role seeking out 
and destroying hostile surface ships and submarines  
• a combined ammunition, oiler, and supply ship – 
provides logistic support enabling the Navy's forward 
presence; on station, ready to respond  
The Carrier Strike Group (CSG) could be employed in a variety of 
roles, all of which would involve the gaining and maintenance of sea 
control:  
• Protection of economic and/or military shipping.  
• Protection of a Marine amphibious force while enroute to, 
and upon arrival in, an amphibious objective area.  
• Establishing a naval presence in support of national 
interests.  
Figure 10.   Standard CSG Profile207 
                                                 
207 Department of the Navy. The Carrier Strike Group. 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/ships/carriers/powerhouse/cvbg.asp. June 2007. 
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7. Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) 
The primary functions of the JSpOC are: 
• Develop a global space operations strategy to meet CDRUSSTRATCOM 
objectives and guidance. 
• Assist development of theater space operations strategy to meet 
geographic unified commander objectives and guidance through robust 
interaction with theater AOCs. 
• Produce and disseminate the Joint Space Tasking Order (JSTO). 
• Task and execute day-to-day space operations for assigned and attached 
space forces. 
• Receive, assemble, analyze, filter and disseminate space-related all-source 
intelligence and weather information to support air and space operations 
planning, execution and assessment. 
• Conduct operational-level assessments to determine mission and overall 
space operations effectiveness as required by CDRUSSTRATCOM and 
other geographic unified combatant commanders to support global and 
theater combat assessments.208 
8. Government Accountability Office (GAO)  
GAO's primary products are reports, often called "blue books," and 
testimony before Congress. GAO also issues correspondence (letters), 
which are narrower in scope, of more limited interest, and do not contain 
recommendations. With virtually the entire federal government subject to 
its review, the agency issues a steady stream of products, usually over 900 
separate products a year.  The agency operates under strict professional 
standards of review. All numbers and statements of fact presented in GAO 
work are thoroughly checked and referenced. 
Most reports are done at the request of members of Congress--often 
committee chairpersons and ranking minority members. The agency also 
responds, whenever possible, to requests from individual members. For 
example, a senator might ask GAO to examine fraud in the Food Stamp 
Program. Or a House committee might request a study of a weapon system 
that is over budget and behind schedule. Other program reviews are 
required by law or are self-initiated under the agency's own authority.209 
 
                                                 
208 Department of the Air Force. “Air Force Operational Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 2-3.4, 
Joint Space Operations Center (Draft).” 20 January 2006. 
209 Government Accountability Office Website. http://www.gao.gov/about/aboutrpt.html. June 2007. 
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9. Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR)  
SPAWARSYSCOM is the Navy’s premier Command, Control, Communications, 
and Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) command for 
acquisition and life-cycle management of communications and warfare systems. 
SPAWAR is a dynamic organization, providing world-class information solution to the 
Warfighters.210 
10. Program Executive Office (PEO) Space Systems 
 
Figure 11.   Program Executive Office Space Systems Organizational Chart211 
 
                                                 
210 Department of the Navy. Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command Website. 
http://www.spawar.navy.mil. May 2007. 
211Department of the Navy. PEO Space Systems Missions Statement. Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command. http://enterprise.spawar.navy.mil/body.cfm?type=c&category=26&subcat=54. May 
2007.  
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11. Navy Communications Satellite Program Office (PMW-146) 
 
Figure 12.   PMW-146 Communications Satellite Programs Office Organizational 
Chart212 
 
12. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) 
As part of the 16-member Intelligence Community, the NRO plays a 
primary role in achieving information superiority for the U. S. 
Government and Armed Forces. 
A DoD agency, the NRO is staffed by DoD and CIA personnel. It is 
funded through the National Reconnaissance Program, part of the National 
Foreign Intelligence Program.  Vision and Mission: The NRO is guided by 
                                                 
212 Department of the Navy. PMW-146 Organizational Chart. Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command. http://enterprise.spawar.navy.mil/pd14/PMW146/index.htm. June 2007. 
 118
its vision of being Freedom's Sentinel in Space: One Team, 
Revolutionizing Global Reconnaissance. Our Mission: The NRO develops 
and operates unique and innovative overhead reconnaissance systems and 
conducts intelligence related activities essential for U.S. National 
Security.213 
13. Naval Research Laboratories (NRL) 
In 1992, the Secretary of the Navy consolidated existing Navy Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation Engineering facilities and Fleet 
Support facilities to form a corporate community. This community 
consists of a single corporate research laboratory (NRL) aligned with the 
Office of Naval Research (ONR) and four warfare-oriented centers 
aligned by mission with the Systems Commands. The four centers are the 
Naval Air Warfare Center, the Naval Command Control and Ocean 
Surveillance Center, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, and the Naval 
Undersea Warfare Center.  
As part of the consolidation, the Naval Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Research Laboratory, with locations in Stennis Space Center, Mississippi, 
and Monterey, California, merged with NRL to become what is today, the 
Navy's corporate laboratory. 
Mission:  NRL operates as the Navy's full-spectrum corporate laboratory, 
conducting a broadly based multidisciplinary program of scientific 
research and advanced technological development directed toward 
maritime applications of new and improved materials, techniques, 
equipment, systems and ocean, atmospheric, and space sciences and 
related technologies. In fulfillment of this mission, NRL:  
• Initiates and conducts broad scientific research of a basic and long-range 
nature in scientific areas of interest to the Navy.  
• Conducts exploratory and advanced technological development deriving 
from or appropriate to the scientific program areas.  
• Within areas of technological expertise, develops prototype systems 
applicable to specific projects.  
• Assumes responsibility as the Navy’s principal R&D activity in areas of 
unique professional competence upon designation from appropriate Navy 
or DOD authority.  
• Performs scientific research and development for other Navy activities 
and, where specifically qualified, for other agencies of the Department of 
Defense and, in defense-related efforts, for other Government agencies. 
                                                 
213 United States. National Reconnaissance Office Website. http://www.nro.gov/index.html. May 
2007. 
 119
• Serves as the lead Navy activity for space technology and space systems 
development and support.  
• Serves as the lead Navy activity for mapping, charting, and geodesy 
(MC&G) research and development for the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA).214 
 
14. Navy Center for Space Technology (NCST) 
The Space Systems Development Department (SSDD) is the space and 
ground support systems research and development organization of the 
Naval Center for Space Technology (NCST). Located at the U.S. Naval 
Research Laboratory in Washington DC, the primary objective of the 
SSDD is to develop space systems to respond to Navy, Department of 
Defense, and national mission requirements with improved performance, 
capacity, reliability, efficiency, and/or life cycle cost. Together with the 
Spacecraft Engineering Department (SED), the SSDD derives system 
requirements from a mission, develops architectures in response to these 
requirements, and designs and develops systems, subsystems, equipment, 
and implementation technologies to achieve an optimized, integrated 
operational space and ground system.215  
Spacecraft Engineering Department (SED): Under the aegis of the Naval 
Center for Space Technology (NCST), SED serves as the focal point for 
the Navy's in-house spacecraft bus capability. Research and development 
activities range from concept and feasibility studies through initial on-
orbit space systems operation. Design, assembly, and test activities are 
performed in conjunction with NCST's Space Systems Development 
Department (SSDD). The SED provides analysis, design, and hardware 
expertise in structures and mechanisms, attitude determination and control 
systems, propulsion and reaction control systems, thermal control systems, 
satellite integration and test, launch vehicle integration, and satellite-to-
boost-stage integration. The SED functions as the Program Manager for 
Navy Space Programs. In this role, systems engineering and technical 
directions are provided while maintaining an active in-house satellite 
development capability. The SED performs as a prototype laboratory in 
this role and ensures that designs are transferable to industry for follow-on 
satellite builds.216 
                                                 
214 Department of the Navy. NRL Missions Statement. Naval Research Laboratory. 
http://www.nrl.navy.mil/content.php?P=MISSION. June 2007. 
215 Department of the Navy. Space Systems Development Department. Naval Center for Space 
Technology. Naval Research Laboratory. http://code8100.nrl.navy.mil/. June 2007. 
216 Department of the Navy. Spacecraft Engineering Department. Naval Center for Space 
Technology. Naval Research Laboratory. http://code8200.nrl.navy.mil/. June 2007. 
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B. CONCEPTS 
1. Sea Power 21 
"SEA POWER 21" will guide our Navy as we defend our nation and 
defeat our enemies in the uncertain century before us. It will align our 
efforts, accelerate our progress, and realize the potential of our people.  
SEA POWER 21 defines a Navy with three fundamental concepts: SEA 
SHIELD, SEA STRIKE, and the SEA BASE,enabled by FORCEnet. 
Respectively, they enhance America's ability to project offensive power, 
defensive assurance, and operational independence around the globe. A 
supporting triad of initiatives will develop those core operational concepts: 
Sea Warrior, SEA TRIAL, and Sea Enterprise.  
SEA SHIELD develops naval capabilities related to homeland defense, 
sea control, assured access, and projecting defense overland. By doing so, 
it reassures allies, strengthens deterrence, and protects the joint force.  
SEA STRIKE is a broadened concept for naval power projection that 
leverages enhanced C4ISR, precision, stealth, and endurance to increase 
operational tempo, reach, and effectiveness.  
The SEA BASE projects the sovereignty of the United States globally 
while providing Joint Force Commanders with vital command and control, 
fire support, and logistics from the sea, thereby minimizing vulnerable 
assets ashore.  
Sea Warrior is the process of developing 21st century Sailors. It identifies 
the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed for mission accomplishment; 
applies a career-long training and education continuum; and employs a 
responsive, interactive career management system to ensure the right skills 
are in the right place at the right time.  
SEA TRIAL is a continual process of concept and technology 
development through focused wargames, experiments, and exercises. It 
strengthens the Navy's culture of innovation and accelerates the delivery 
of enhanced capabilities to the Fleet.  
Sea Enterprise captures efficiencies by employing lessons. From the 
business revolution to assess organizational alignment; target areas for 
improvement, and prioritize investments.  
FORCEnet is an overarching effort to integrate warriors, sensors, 
networks, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a fully 
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netted, combat force.  FORCEnet will be the Navy's plan to make 
network-centric warfare an operational reality.217  
 
Figure 13.   Sea Power 21 Diagram218 
 
2. Coordinating Authority 
Coordinating authority may be exercised by commanders or individuals at 
any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Coordinating 
authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for 
coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or 
more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or 
more forces of the same Service (e.g., joint rear area coordinator exercises 
coordinating authority for rear area operations among the component 
commanders). Coordinating authority may be granted and modified 
through a memorandum of agreement to provide unity of command and 
unity of effort for operations involving National Guard, Reserve 
                                                 
217 Department of the Navy. Sea Power 21. Naval Warfare Development Command.  
http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/Concepts/Sea_Power_21/Sea_power_21.aspx. June 2007. 
218 Vern Clark, Admiral, U.S. Navy. Sea Power 21. Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities. Naval 
Institute Proceedings. October 2002. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/proceedings.html. June 2007.   
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Component (RC), and Active Component forces engaged in interagency 
activities. The commander or individual has the authority to require 
consultation between the agencies involved but does not have the authority 
to compel agreement. It is more applicable to planning and similar 
activities than to operations. Coordinating authority is not in any way tied 
to force assignment. Assignment of coordinating authority is based on the 
missions and capabilities of the commands or organizations involved.219 
3. Space Authority 
The space authority will coordinate space operations, integrate space 
capabilities, and have primary responsibility for in-theater joint space 
operations planning. The space authority will normally be supported by a 
JSST and will coordinate with the component SSTs and/or embedded 
space operators. It gathers space requirements throughout the joint force. 
While the space authority may facilitate non-traditional uses of space 
assets, joint force staffs should utilize the established processes when 
planning traditional Space Force Enhancement missions — intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance; integrated tactical warning and attack 
assessment; environmental monitoring; communications; and navigation 
and timing.  Following coordination, the space authority provides to the 
JFC a prioritized list of recommended space requirements based on the 
joint force objectives.220 
4. Space Coordinating Authority (SCA) 
The U.S. Air Force is currently the lead service with regards to space operations 
and planning.  It is for this reason that the CFACC/COMAFFOR is granted the 
responsibility to serve as the space coordinating authority for a specific theater of 
operations.  The JFC still maintains SCA at the JTF level.  
5. Joint Warfighting Space  
JWS brings space effects directly to the Joint Force Commander.  Joint 
Warfighting Space will provide the following:  
• Dedicated space forces:  Expeditionary space and Near Space forces under 
control of the Joint Forces Commander 
                                                 
219 United States. Joint Staff. Joint Publication 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). 
Department of Defense, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. GL-6. 
220 United States. Joint Staff. Joint Publication 3-14: Joint Doctrine for Space Operations. 
Department of Defense. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf. Section III-3. 
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• Responsiveness:  Usable capabilities in hours-to-days instead of days-to-
weeks-to-months 
• Integrated effects:  Integrated with Global National Security Space and 
other theater systems221 
 
6. Space Effects and Space Effects Packages 
Space Effects Package example from the Fleet Space Handbook:222 
SPACE ASSESSMENT: 
• Status: SATCOM, GPS, ISR, METOC, Missile Warning 
• Space Weather: Geomagnetic activity impact to HF Comm, charge 
particle impact to SATOPS 
• GPS EMI: None reported in Theater 
• SATCOM EMI: Service Advisory exists, resolution in progress by 
NIOSC Space, NCTAMS, and CSG N6 
• Space Vulnerabilities: Space debris threat to Space assets, ASAT, 
GPS/SATCOM jammers, and SATVUL 
SPACE OPERATIONS PLAN: 
• Space Control 
o Surveillance 
 Monitor debris threat to Space assets and possible Space 
launches in vicinity of Strike Group operations. 
o Protection 
 Monitoring for potential GPS EMI to assure Position, 
Navigation, and Timing (PNT) for weapon systems. 
 Monitoring for SATCOM EMI to assure Over the Horizon 
(OTH) Command and Control (C2). 
o Prevention 
 Employ scheme of maneuver to prevent adversary from 
monitoring Strike Group operations from overhead. 
o Negation 
 If required, coordinate with DIRSPACEFOR to task. 
                                                 
221 Department of the Air Force. Operating Concept for Joint Warfighting Space (Draft). 13 January 
2005. p. 15. 
222 Department of the Navy.  Naval Network Warfare Command. Fleet Space Handbook. 2007. p. 16. 
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• Force Enhancement 
o Overhead Non-Imaging Infrared (ONIR) to detect infrared activity 
in vicinity of the Strike Group. 
o MASINT, task to support the ISR Plan 
o IMINT, task to support the ISR Plan 
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